Except that in theory a cartel which is gaining profits by delaying non-member transactions, can shift profits to a fee or tax on members outside of your transaction fees. This is why I said above that you can't build a closed-system (walled off from exchange to/from fiat) and there is no such equilibrium.
Also such a cartel can drive the profitability of transaction processing below 0, so as to cause a snowball effect where they gain 100% of the SH. Monopolies function exactly this way throughout history. In fact, they even use debt to create the snowball wave, because they can stay solvent for longer than you can.
I do not believe that you can come up with a successful scenario here. Everything you have relies on EvilCorp being able to significantly delay transaction processing. All reality goes against this.
Funny thing about consensus is that a 50% attack works differently. Any percentage attack requires an exponentially increasing stake in the network. If there are 100k honest shareholders, a 50% attack requires a 100% match of the money in the shareholder part of the network. 100k new shares, now 50% control. A 75% attack would require a 300% match. A 90% attack would require a ~1000% match. A bitcoin 50% attack requires 50% of the current total hash power, because they can deny the blocks of others; a 75% requires a 75% match. >50% is only significant because it is enough to always overtake the honest chain eventually, no matter what.
Disagree, because once an attacker bids up the price of a SH beyond profitability, no one else will buy.
Do you propose to set a price for a SH that never changes? I think this would cause another set of problems.
That is why I wrote the above. I am thinking about how we set a limit and how it can't be dominated.
It's fairly simple. If you are worried about cartels such as this, start with a higher transaction fee. The transaction fee will ultimately dictate how much of the total money supply is locked in the network, and how much money this cartel must acquire and be willing to lock away to game the network. If 10% were locked in the honest network, the cartel could never go above 90% because the entire money supply would be in shares.
Incorrect logic because the % inside the system says nothing about resources outside the system that can come in via fiat exchange. Also a higher transaction fee means another altcoin with lower transaction fees can outcompete you.
It appears me that you keep thinking in terms of a closed system (unless I am missing something in your analysis). That is why my point about Coase's Theorem is so fundamental.
Yes I anticipated this rebuttal. The CB ledger does not exist until all SHs have seen all TBs and done all their signing. It is chicken and egg problem.
I guess you could incrementally build up the ledger, having CBs built more frequently, so the maximum delay isn't excessive. But the fact remains, you are still going to need to limit the # of SH so that the maximum delay is not excessive, which has been my point all along.
You have missed key points. There is the consensus block, the block to which all shareholders have last agreed is the state of the network, and the ongoing consensus, which is updated every transaction block.
If every SH needs to see these 10 second incremental updates, then the overload communication attack vector resurfaces again.
Assuming a peer has the vast majority of TBs leading up to the TB it is interested in, and a split is not likely to occur immediately after, his transactions are secure as of that block. They could theoretically be respent within the same block. No 100% consensus is required for this.
This is another example of you writing incoherently. I can't understand that.
Usually people that write incoherently, think incoherently, but I am offering you a lot of patience, because some of your ideas are good. I wish you could slow down when you write and think about if the reader can grasp what you've written given we don't have all that is in your head which is unwritten.
As far as limiting the # of SH, if the CB period is 10 CDs, the CB period is 10 CDs and 100% consensus will be reached over that time frame. It does not matter if there are 10 SHs, it does not matter if there are 5 million SHs. More SHs != more delay. It just means there is another 150 byte piece of consensus you need to be sure everyone agrees.
Just because you assert it is so, but I can't understand what reasoning you are using to base your claim.
I chose 10 seconds and 10 days because 87k is such a large number that it has a vast amount of room to grow into. But growing above it is not problematic because of the efficiency described a few posts above. 5 million x 150 bytes / 10 CDs is less than 1kB/s.
Sent from each signing SH to one other SH. But I was assuming this has to be communicated to all SH, so they will know which transactions have been excluded, so that when they sign, they can include the missing transactions.
Or are your proposing that each signing SH only send the ledger to the next signing SH? But this needs to be sent to all the SHs that can sign during that TB window, given we have no limit on SH and so we may have multiple SHs signing in that TB window.
Bottom line is some calculations on numbers of SH and the maximum delays that could be achieved are needed.
The distinction is I am trying to reason about how to set the limit on SH such that it can't be readily monopolized as in how Rockefeller monopolized railways and oil.
How about by requiring it to cost a lot of money in a currency that has a decentrally managed, incorruptible distribution system?
I assume you mean something special about your minting proposal. I have stated I do not yet understand your minting design. Are you going to explain it now?
I am proving that to be a true statement with my rebuttal above.
Sorry, but you are not.
Sorry but I am.
The only way your design will work is if it is stable in the natural universe, not as some conceptual walled garden.
If your minting proposal is able to prevent large exchange of fiat for Decrits, then that is a valid transaction cost in Coase's theorem. But I don't yet understand your minting proposal, so I can not yet agree if it works.
You have made the valid point that 51% attack in Bitcoin means the attacker can delay all transactions forever, whereas a 51% attack in your proposal means potentially they can delay transactions by at most 51% of the maximum period for all SH to sign.
Yes, if we ignore any notion of probability.
Agreed.
Also because your proposal has a weakness that Bitcoin doesn't have, which is that malicious control of less than 50% of the peers in Bitcoin can only delay transactions that percentage of the blocks with delays randomly distributed, but in your design without randomization, the delay could be (in a worst case) up to that percentage of the maximum time for all SH to sign.
Yes, if we ignore any notion of probability.
Agreed.
Those delays that can be created with bitcoin also steal money that people wasted on electricity. It's much easier to get those people to quit when they start falling under the wasted-energy-profitability-curve that does not exist in decrits.
But only in the 51+% scenario do they have no chance of getting profit.
Otherwise it is just an economic calculation, same as for Decrits.
So I don't know why you say I have totally redesigned your system or am not supporting your novel concepts.
Then, if we want to communicate better, stop skipping to conclusions.
Have any of my conclusions been proven wrong yet?
All I concluded was that the system can not be closed and must be natural within the realities of the real world. And that the SH would need to be limited. Both conclusions appear to be correct.
I also concluded that if there is no random input entropy, then the order of SH can not be assumed to be random. I stated that whoever is last will be able to game this order. You stated that wobble solved this, but it sounded like handwaving to me, because you never explained what the heck wobble is. Now I understand you were referring to the random order of joins/leaves, which is not "wobble" in any definition that comes to my mind at least.