Topic: Decrits: The 99%+ attack-proof coin - page 5. (Read 45353 times)

I'm glad that Etlas came to my fundamental argument with regard to the negativity of ideas equation in relation to a low cost.

With regard to your comment above , all the more reason to support a test client , remember this :

---------Federal  Central Bank

------commercial corps

----Government

---Gov agencies


Don't worry I know where it's wrong ; ) 

But where does say the NSA sit ?

So I can conclude that even if you are correct , the NSA saw the future , and created a distraction , I don't believe that's what happened , but I could argue it .  And it would more than justify a beta client,  emuni have done that .

So stop arguing the same point now and help these guys make this beta. If it fails you can say , I told you .

Let me start by saying that your "can't do" attitude is reproachful. If I listened to everyone who told me that "you can't do this" over the last 2 years, we wouldn't be here debating the finer points of a system that, on its surface, solves or reduces a hundred different problems with bitcoin. And perhaps fiat too. Bitcoin presumes the financial incentive is not there to attack the network, or that it is difficult to surmount for some entity for which money is little object. There is no lesser presumption in decrits. Your see-sawing between "it's 51% attackable" to "it's completely inept" to "it's not anonymous enough" is a complete waste of everyone's time, including yours. Let me be stupid if you think I'm stupid, but go on your merry fucking way.

If, on the other hand, you are actually capable of changing your opinion, stop acting like a toad and start presenting arguments cohesively and in a focused manner, and perhaps progress could actually be made. Sor.rge and I have had a very productive conversation over PMs without you being the distraction that you have been since you arrived.

Now you may have noticed that I set up a little trap for you "upthread" by asking you what EvilCorp does in step 6 to control the network, and your answer was "well he controls the SHs he controls". We already know this. Yes, he can delay transactions, yes, he can delay other SH TBs if he controls enough in a row, but he does not control the network at 51% or at 90% of the shares.

Now, if this was proof-of-work or proof-of-hard disk, EvilCorp needs only control resources he may already control from say, attacking another network. But the only way to control decrits is to own decrits, something that can not be obtained anywhere else other than from within the network. So even if in the remotest of remote possibilities, someone does take control of the network and destroys it, whatever resources EvilCorp used to take control are now forever gone. He had to spend his fiat, or if a government printed fiat into hyperinflation to perform the attack, that government has essentially been overthrown. No government can stay in power without a sane monetary system. c.f. ROMAN EMPIRE. And now the people can just clone decrits, hell perhaps even agreeing to use the state of the network as it was before EvilCorp destroyed it, and destroy evilcorp's shares, and continue to prosper. No, this is not a simple transition, but it is a permanent fix to a temporary problem. EvilCorp has been eliminated regardless of whether or not the network continues in another form.

So, since EvilCorp/government is unlikely to perform this network destruction attack--as they go down with the ship--they will attempt to control. Except, to attempt the control you describe, they must continue to buy up shares in dramatically larger quantities than honest people. Being the "last TB" is mostly irrelevant. If he doesn't like what he sees, he can make 1 more opportunity for 3,000 DCR. He can make 2 more for 6,000 DCR. He can pick from what a GPU that can hash at 1MHash/s x 10 seconds or 10MHash for 30 billion decrits if a share costs 3,000 DCR. 30 billion decrits versus a millipenny of electricity. Are you going to continue to presume that these have the same difficulty to obtain?

And once he does find something he likes, he can't change the entropy after that unless he can throw another X million or billion decrits into the pool. And the options of what he might like boils down to "what few SHs can I give some strikes to?" He essentially has to buy everyone out of the currency before he can control it. All using a very simple, deterministic function. And he can't just withdraw and try again. Shares are not kept for 1 year as described in the OP except not really ever because then it suits your attack vector. Shares must be kept for 1 year or else you will lose your money. Your money is your control, not your hash power or your hard disk size. If you lose your money, you lose your control. Get it yet? If you don't keep adding or subtracting money from the system, you also lose your control. Get it yet?

This can even be extended to be even more difficult to obtain control of the last TB, if that truly is identified as a weakness. Program the function so that only the oldest 20% of the SHs are capable of creating the last TB. Now using removing money from the shares results in a multi-year penalty for each SH repurchased, or you'll have to control >80% just to have the opportunity to add billions more in shares to control the order. Meaning that adding shares and keeping them longer is the only way. And you must. keep. adding to continue controlling the order at a rate of 3,000 DCR per hash attempt.

I would very much like to be wrong. It would be wonderful to not waste the resources of Proof-of-Work. It would be wonderful to not have hard failure (fork) at control of 51% of peers. I wish I was wrong, that is why I came over here to learn and analyze after making the conclusion below. But so far, I think the conclusion remains, until someone can show why it does not.


The last SH in that CB thus controls the hash.

I do not think you will be able to find a way that the last SH in an period you choose, does not have control over the input entropy. That is the key distinction from Proof-of-Work, where the peers compete to the first.

This is the point I made very early in my participation in this thread. The key difference is last versus first in terms of where the input entropy comes from. In Proof-of-Work, the input entropy is determining who is first, thus it can't be gamed. In these non-Proof-of-Work systems, the last peer determines the input entropy, and thus I am positing it can always be gamed. I am nearly sure this is correct.

It appears to be fundamental.

I like to reduce complex things to key fundamentals, so that I can understand clearly the differences that matter most when making a critical decision about my efforts.


Incorrect. If my SH controls the transactions in the last TBs for that hash, I can caused the hash to have any value I want (at some cost).


But if I control the hash, then I have control over which IDs I want to target.


Not that this is necessary. But still incorrect. If I control the last SH, then I can create SH deposit transactions (create new SHs) before I sign my TB which controls what the hash will be.


It has deterministic values from every seed. All I have to do is compute from any seed of my choice, target my SH IDs to those values over any length of time that it takes for me to do so. Then just create that hash seed every time one of my SH is last. Thus disruption.

Additionally, once I do this, I might be able to continuously do it, because I can perhaps always place of my SH last from there forward.


Then I only need to target those known patterns. I have as much time as I need to get my SH's IDs into that pattern.

Sorry but I think the issue of input entropy is FUNDAMENTAL in decentralized cryptography.

I saw this before I came to this thread. I had abandoned my Proof-of-hard disk, because I saw this fundamental problem.

P.S. Satoshi apparently wasn't working alone. I believe he had the resources of the NSA. I think they figured out that only Proof-of-Work was secure (up to 51%). The reasons I believe this are:

* very unlikely for one man to accomplish what he did
* he used military terminology and examples
* he said "we"
* his writing style was uniquely American english, not UK and the way a Japanese would write english
* he remained secret and covered all his tracks perfectly