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Topic: [GLBSE] (discontinued) Anti-Pirate: Bonds for negative BTCST investments - page 2. (Read 9622 times)

donator
Activity: 4760
Merit: 4323
Leading Crypto Sports Betting & Casino Platform
So the million dollar question seems to be...

Will Bitcoin Savings & Trust default?

About the bet:
It's not defined how a "default" looks like - even MPOE shares are worded more strictly! Undecided

I think there will be plenty of noise if anything remotely close to a default happens, so I doubt we'll have to resort to technicalities in describing it.

+1

EDIT:  It is literally the textbook definition of what a "default" looks like...

[1] Default may occur if the debtor is either unwilling or unable to pay their debt.

Quote from: betsofbitco.in - http://betsofbitco.in/item?id=349
This statement is true if Bitcoin Savings and Trust is unwilling or unable to pay out requested deposits on or before July 4th, 2012
donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
Nefario said he would add prediction market functionality to GLBSE, and advised against using the current functionality for this (though I have had quite a few ideas how to do the latter). If neither Nefario nor anyone else do this in a timely manner, I will seriously consider becoming involved in a project to create a Bitcoin prediction market platform (both using Bitcoin for payments and being rich in Bitcoin-related predictions).
Maybe you can collaborate with him on that even, I'm not sure if a prediction market is the real main issue on GLBSE right now - if they do some serious work with some HCI people on the interface, they might get more money flowing than adding another complexity to the mix atm. If they release an extensive API soon or allow you to work with them somehow maybe, it could work side by side though. Smiley

About the bet:
It's not defined how a "default" looks like - even MPOE shares are worded more strictly! Undecided

I think there will be plenty of noise if anything remotely close to a default happens, so I doubt we'll have to resort to technicalities in describing it. betsofbitco.in clearly seems to think they have enough information to go on in judging. I wonder if whoever submitted the original statement (OgNasty?) can amend it, though.
legendary
Activity: 2618
Merit: 1007
Nefario said he would add prediction market functionality to GLBSE, and advised against using the current functionality for this (though I have had quite a few ideas how to do the latter). If neither Nefario nor anyone else do this in a timely manner, I will seriously consider becoming involved in a project to create a Bitcoin prediction market platform (both using Bitcoin for payments and being rich in Bitcoin-related predictions).
Maybe you can collaborate with him on that even, I'm not sure if a prediction market is the real main issue on GLBSE right now - if they do some serious work with some HCI people on the interface, they might get more money flowing than adding another complexity to the mix atm. If they release an extensive API soon or allow you to work with them somehow maybe, it could work side by side though. Smiley

About the bet:
It's not defined how a "default" looks like - even MPOE shares are worded more strictly! Undecided
donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
So the million dollar question seems to be...

Will Bitcoin Savings & Trust default?

Looks like 10 bitcoins say no Smiley Who wants yes?
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
(note: betsofbitco.in is not a prediction market)
I wish it were Sad please make us a prediction market!
Nefario said he would add prediction market functionality to GLBSE, and advised against using the current functionality for this (though I have had quite a few ideas how to do the latter). If neither Nefario nor anyone else do this in a timely manner, I will seriously consider becoming involved in a project to create a Bitcoin prediction market platform (both using Bitcoin for payments and being rich in Bitcoin-related predictions).
donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
(note: betsofbitco.in is not a prediction market)

I wish it were Sad please make us a prediction market!
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
So the million dollar question seems to be...
Does Pirate really have that much in deposits? Wink

I had a thought about doing this asset in the form of a prediction market (note: betsofbitco.in is not a prediction market), but what I have here is much more inline with the underlying.
donator
Activity: 4760
Merit: 4323
Leading Crypto Sports Betting & Casino Platform
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
This is happening. Get your Anti-Pirate bonds (initially 500 at 1.1 BTC) on Tuesday, 24 April 2012 at 03:45 UTC.

IPO page: https://glbse.com/ipo/26
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054

But that's not even the main point, there's something much more basic that you're missing. Suppose I want to take a long position of X BTC on Pirate. I can do this by either depositing in his program or by offering X BTC worth of bonds. Assume the worst case that Pirate buys them all. Then this increases his incentive to default by X BTC, and if I deposited in his program I would also have increased his incentive by X BTC. So choosing to offer these bonds has no effect on the incentive to default, and that's assuming the worst case - if people other than Pirate buy bonds, his incentive to default decreases (when compared to the case that I obtained my position by depositing).

What you're really saying is that depositing in Pirate's program is a very bad idea as it encourages default. Which may be true, but has nothing to do with this. This bond allows people to deposit negative amounts which discourages default, unless pirate deposits a negative amount in his own program which makes this neutral.

I don't understand your reasoning and would appreciate a better explanation  (I'm not saying you are wrong, just that I'd like to understand your arguments better).  

In my mind, what you are doing is creating a new market for Pirate. Previously he had to rely upon people investing (a decision that he doesn't control), but now he can take action himself (either by an internet proxy/fake identity or an accomplice) and make money off of you.  I guess so long as this is a small amount of money it won't exercise a big influence on his decisions, but I also really don't know what kind of sums either party is dealing with.

Now when you and other people (the pass-through bond for instance) create new markets for Pirate you are creating new inflows that allow the Ponzi scheme to grow larger - this will probably allow it to last longer, get larger, and hurt more people when it collapses.
If I didn't offer the bonds, it is likely that I would have instead invested funds in BTCST. He is "making money off me" due to the fact that I chose to take a long position, but he is not making any more money due to the fact that I obtain this position by offering bonds rather than investing. In fact he will be making less money because he has to pay a fee on top of the face value. All of this is of course under the assumption that he does in fact have malicious intents.

Positive bonds such as PPT.X, on the other hand, do allow more cash to flow into Pirate, but I still believe the effect is small.
legendary
Activity: 1868
Merit: 1023

But that's not even the main point, there's something much more basic that you're missing. Suppose I want to take a long position of X BTC on Pirate. I can do this by either depositing in his program or by offering X BTC worth of bonds. Assume the worst case that Pirate buys them all. Then this increases his incentive to default by X BTC, and if I deposited in his program I would also have increased his incentive by X BTC. So choosing to offer these bonds has no effect on the incentive to default, and that's assuming the worst case - if people other than Pirate buy bonds, his incentive to default decreases (when compared to the case that I obtained my position by depositing).

What you're really saying is that depositing in Pirate's program is a very bad idea as it encourages default. Which may be true, but has nothing to do with this. This bond allows people to deposit negative amounts which discourages default, unless pirate deposits a negative amount in his own program which makes this neutral.

I don't understand your reasoning and would appreciate a better explanation  (I'm not saying you are wrong, just that I'd like to understand your arguments better). 

In my mind, what you are doing is creating a new market for Pirate. Previously he had to rely upon people investing (a decision that he doesn't control), but now he can take action himself (either by an internet proxy/fake identity or an accomplice) and make money off of you.  I guess so long as this is a small amount of money it won't exercise a big influence on his decisions, but I also really don't know what kind of sums either party is dealing with.

Now when you and other people (the pass-through bond for instance) create new markets for Pirate you are creating new inflows that allow the Ponzi scheme to grow larger - this will probably allow it to last longer, get larger, and hurt more people when it collapses.

donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
This is another very interesting offer! But one thing doesn't seem quite right...
The issuer has the right to buy back the bonds at 160% of their face value. This cannot be exercised if there is substantiated suspicion that a default has already taken place.
If you make the buy-back price 200% of face value, there will be no need for people to trust that you will not buy back the bonds just in advance of a default.

Your provision regarding "substantiated suspicion" sounds reasonable, but it won't feel very satisfactory to the few outliers who are convinced the default is about to happen then lose their bonds for 160%. At 200%, no-one can complain.
This makes sense, I'll think about this.
donator
Activity: 826
Merit: 1060
This is another very interesting offer! But one thing doesn't seem quite right...
The issuer has the right to buy back the bonds at 160% of their face value. This cannot be exercised if there is substantiated suspicion that a default has already taken place.
If you make the buy-back price 200% of face value, there will be no need for people to trust that you will not buy back the bonds just in advance of a default.

Your provision regarding "substantiated suspicion" sounds reasonable, but it won't feel very satisfactory to the few outliers who are convinced the default is about to happen then lose their bonds for 160%. At 200%, no-one can complain.
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
Meni, instead of responding to trolls on this thread, why don't you just create your offering on GLBSE, announce it here and start selling shares?
Creating assets on GLBSE requires planning. I wrote the OP when I was ready to write the OP, not when I was ready to create the asset. If all goes well it should be a matter of days.

Rest assured that MPOE-PR's objections are not holding me back.
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
Quote
Ok, now I know you're just trolling.
Let me point out to you, Meni Rosenfeld, that throughout this thread I have been speaking as to facts. You have been speaking as to persons.
I think you'll find that most of your posts in this thread contain personal attacks, including the first and the latest.

A number of people have suggested that your behavior is unacceptable. There are two possibilities, either we're all wrong and you should stop wasting your time on us, or you're wrong and you should stop wasting our time.

You are no longer welcome in this thread.
hero member
Activity: 756
Merit: 522
Quote
Ok, now I know you're just trolling.

Let me point out to you, Meni Rosenfeld, that throughout this thread I have been speaking as to facts. You have been speaking as to persons.

Quote
But now it sounds like Pirate could default, run away with all of the deposited funds and make extra money from the options (held by a collaborator or fake account).

Now I think this is a very bad idea as it encourages default.

Exactly. A very well run scam, benefiting from the naivite of a circlejerk made out of people who misrepresent (especially to themselves) both their skills and their reach. This is in fact a texbook case of how a well run Ponzi goes.

Quote
Affinity fraud includes investment frauds that prey upon members of identifiable groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, language minorities, the elderly, or professional groups. The fraudsters who promote affinity scams frequently are – or pretend to be – members of the group. They often enlist respected community or religious leaders from within the group to spread the word about the scheme, by convincing those people that a fraudulent investment is legitimate and worthwhile. Many times, those leaders become unwitting victims of the fraudster's ruse.

From the everhelpful wikipedia

Quote
The currently intended scale of the offering will be such that the additional incentive, compared to Pirate's existing holdings, is negligible.

Yes, a negligible initiative to pretend like it's doing what it's not, all the while accomplishing the exact opposite. You should be in politics.
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
I liked the idea at first.

But now it sounds like Pirate could default, run away with all of the deposited funds and make extra money from the options (held by a collaborator or fake account).

Now I think this is a very bad idea as it encourages default.
The currently intended scale of the offering will be such that the additional incentive, compared to Pirate's existing holdings, is negligible. If Pirate isn't planning to default now, it is highly unlikely that buying this bond will convince him to do so.

But that's not even the main point, there's something much more basic that you're missing. Suppose I want to take a long position of X BTC on Pirate. I can do this by either depositing in his program or by offering X BTC worth of bonds. Assume the worst case that Pirate buys them all. Then this increases his incentive to default by X BTC, and if I deposited in his program I would also have increased his incentive by X BTC. So choosing to offer these bonds has no effect on the incentive to default, and that's assuming the worst case - if people other than Pirate buy bonds, his incentive to default decreases (when compared to the case that I obtained my position by depositing).

What you're really saying is that depositing in Pirate's program is a very bad idea as it encourages default. Which may be true, but has nothing to do with this. This bond allows people to deposit negative amounts which discourages default, unless pirate deposits a negative amount in his own program which makes this neutral.
legendary
Activity: 1868
Merit: 1023
I liked the idea at first.

But now it sounds like Pirate could default, run away with all of the deposited funds and make extra money from the options (held by a collaborator or fake account).

Now I think this is a very bad idea as it encourages default.
donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
That's not a likely use case. Every Anti-Pirate bond negates an equivalent pirate investment. People who invest in both will make no returns and will just have to provide collateral and a fee for the privilege of getting nothing.

It's a stretch, but maybe it can be used to move up a Pirate tier, or enable other special Pirate offerings. For example someone who wants to risk only 1500 BTC with Pirate, can deposit 2000 BTC and buy 500 BTC face value worth of anti-pirate bonds. The increased interest rate just might be able to compensate for the costs.

The intended use case is for people who really want to be short on Pirate.

Fair enough Smiley Sounds like something Mr. Popescu would really like to have, then Wink
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
What do people think about renaming from Anti-Pirate to Antimatter? Less descriptive, but way cooler. Smiley
I was asking about pirate posing as someone else and buying these contracts, thus adding to his incentive to default.
I don't really think it'll happen, but given that the people buying these at least have some degree of uncertainty about him, it's conceivable that some people might be worried about it.
The people buying these bonds will want Pirate to have additional incentive to default.
They will? I assumed they would primarily be used as part of a hedging strategy. I guess it then incentivizes pirate lenders to buy up all the bonds to prevent pirate's sockpuppet account from doing it first, lest he have perverse incentives Smiley
That's not a likely use case. Every Anti-Pirate bond negates an equivalent pirate investment. People who invest in both will make no returns and will just have to provide collateral and a fee for the privilege of getting nothing.

It's a stretch, but maybe it can be used to move up a Pirate tier, or enable other special Pirate offerings. For example someone who wants to risk only 1500 BTC with Pirate, can deposit 2000 BTC and buy 500 BTC face value worth of anti-pirate bonds. The increased interest rate just might be able to compensate for the costs.

The intended use case is for people who really want to be short on Pirate.

The "classical" antagonist to a pirate is still a ninja! (http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/pirates-vs-ninjas)

Alternatively you could be the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_India_Trading_Company (see "Pirates of the Caribbean")... Wink
Not a fan, but will consider this.
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