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Topic: [GLBSE] (discontinued) Anti-Pirate: Bonds for negative BTCST investments - page 3. (Read 9622 times)

donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
What do people think about renaming from Anti-Pirate to Antimatter? Less descriptive, but way cooler. Smiley

I was asking about pirate posing as someone else and buying these contracts, thus adding to his incentive to default.

I don't really think it'll happen, but given that the people buying these at least have some degree of uncertainty about him, it's conceivable that some people might be worried about it.
The people buying these bonds will want Pirate to have additional incentive to default.

They will? I assumed they would primarily be used as part of a hedging strategy. I guess it then incentivizes pirate lenders to buy up all the bonds to prevent pirate's sockpuppet account from doing it first, lest he have perverse incentives Smiley
legendary
Activity: 2618
Merit: 1007
The "classical" antagonist to a pirate is still a ninja! (http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/pirates-vs-ninjas)

Alternatively you could be the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_India_Trading_Company (see "Pirates of the Caribbean")... Wink
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
What do people think about renaming from Anti-Pirate to Antimatter? Less descriptive, but way cooler. Smiley

I was asking about pirate posing as someone else and buying these contracts, thus adding to his incentive to default.

I don't really think it'll happen, but given that the people buying these at least have some degree of uncertainty about him, it's conceivable that some people might be worried about it.
The people buying these bonds will want Pirate to have additional incentive to default.
donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
I was asking about pirate posing as someone else and buying these contracts, thus adding to his incentive to default.

I don't really think it'll happen, but given that the people buying these at least have some degree of uncertainty about him, it's conceivable that some people might be worried about it.
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
wow, OP you are in my top 5 list of bitcoin people I respect. You just keep coming up with epic stuff. I'm in awe.
Come on, with all this respect, at the very least you could use my name...

One issue I encountered when I was trying to work through the details of writing CDSes was trust. How do you plan on preventing a pirateat40 sockpuppet (not saying he would create one, but just hypothetically) from buying insurance against himself, thus increasing his own incentive to default.
Is the failure mode Pirate offering such bonds, or buying them?

Assuming he plans to default, by buying bonds he is essentially encouraging me to effectively invest funds into his program. There's some profit to be made here but this doesn't seem catastrophical to me. I doubt anything can be done to prevent this.

If he's issuing bonds, I don't think he has any advantage over anyone else issuing bonds without intending to fulfill his obligations. Obviously whoever is issuing the bonds should be trustworthy.

One issue I encountered when I was trying to work through the details of writing CDSes was trust. How do you plan on preventing a pirateat40 sockpuppet (not saying he would create one, but just hypothetically) from buying insurance against himself, thus increasing his own incentive to default.
This is extremely difficult, if not impossible.
I'm rather sure OP is not Pirate. But if he is, wow, just wow.
My words exactly. (imagines self as Pirate) Wow.

Ask anyone who has met me in NYC or Prague (or in Israel for that matter) if I look anything like a pirate. Smiley
legendary
Activity: 1449
Merit: 1001
[

I'm rather sure OP is not Pirate. But if he is, wow, just wow.

Thats even funnier then when someone said burt=shakaru Smiley
donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
One issue I encountered when I was trying to work through the details of writing CDSes was trust. How do you plan on preventing a pirateat40 sockpuppet (not saying he would create one, but just hypothetically) from buying insurance against himself, thus increasing his own incentive to default.
This is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

We'll find a BTCST-PR poking around on the forum, soon Smiley
donator
Activity: 308
Merit: 250
One issue I encountered when I was trying to work through the details of writing CDSes was trust. How do you plan on preventing a pirateat40 sockpuppet (not saying he would create one, but just hypothetically) from buying insurance against himself, thus increasing his own incentive to default.
This is extremely difficult, if not impossible.
donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
One issue I encountered when I was trying to work through the details of writing CDSes was trust. How do you plan on preventing a pirateat40 sockpuppet (not saying he would create one, but just hypothetically) from buying insurance against himself, thus increasing his own incentive to default.
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
The above is still a concept; I have not made a final decision whether I would like to offer these bonds. I am writing this to hear any thoughts about the idea and learn if anyone would be interested in buying such bonds.

A face value equal to half the maturity value was chosen mainly because this leads to an effective interest rate equal to the decay rate, which is intuitive. A greater maturity value can be used, which will allow making an investment with a lower collateral (essentially a higher margin ratio), but this will mean that the decay rate needs to be higher for a given effective interest rate, which is less robust.

The asset as described can be cleanly equated to a negative deposit against collateral. There is an alternative offering I am considering: Dropping the right to sell the bonds at face value (and replacing it with a compensation clause for a scenario that the BTCST program changes materially without defaulting). This allows more flexibility with the pricing, but makes it harder to compare directly with BTCST deposits, except for the fact that this is a bet on an imminent default. Opinions on the preferred variant are also welcome.

So this offering, if does happen, is an indirect statement that you believe pirateat40 will not default, right?
As far as I understand it, you are betting that it will take less than 10 weeks for pirate to default. (0.93^10 = 0,483982307)
If it takes longer, you would've been better off keeping your BTC - if it takes shorter, you make a profit.
Basically yes, but that's not accurate. You need to consider this with respect to a complete model of the default time probability distribution.

If I believe that Pirate has a probability of p to default, and that the time of the event in this case is exponentially distributed with mean m, then the expected amount I will have to pay per 1 BTC face value worth of bonds is

\[ 2p \int_0^{\infty} (1/m)\exp(-t/m)(1-r)^t dt = 2p / (1 - m\ln(1-r)) \]

Sorry, the "you" in my question was Meni Smiley I just wanted to clarify that I understood the motivations for this offering, as they seem to be different from Mircea's (not that I fully understand his, either).
Mircea's offering is basically just like PPT, but with some tweaked terms, some more precise description of terms, and where they are issued without being backed by actually depositing funds in BTCST (which is relevant only for the issuer, not for investors).

The main difference with Anti-Pirate is that they are exact opposites. PPT are positive, Anti-Pirate is negative. Buying Anti-Pirate can be compared to selling PPT, and vice versa. MPOE-PR has made a big deal in this thread out of the fact that these can be sold, borrowing as necessary.

The issuer of an asset always takes the opposite position of a buyer of an asset; if his desired position is neutral, he will have to seek an alternative means to take the same position as buying the bond. For mining bonds this is generally buying hardware; for PPT this is depositing funds in BTCST; etc.

The 2nd difference is that Anti-Pirate is perpetual while PPT has a set time. As the one who first mentioned the term "perpetuity" in the PureMining thread you can surely appreciate that, but anyway think what would it be like if instead of offering PureMining I would offer PureMining.March, PureMining.April, PureMining.May...

Finally, Anti-Pirate is an original (individually at least, globally until shown otherwise) methodology to provide perpetual negative bonds. Not that the idea is groundbreaking, just a correct application of some concepts to the issue at hand.

EDIT: I'm not sure you can deduce my personal motivation for (considering) offering the bond, since its place in my entire investment portfolio needs to be considered.

If Meni invests the proceeds from sale of anti-pirate bonds into pirate, he will come out ahead so long as default doesn't happen in the next 5 or 6 weeks.
I will not comment on whether I did or will invest funds into Pirate. I will say however that availability of funds is not really much of a problem as far as such investment is concerned, only default risk (and possibly, lack of storage demand).
legendary
Activity: 2646
Merit: 1137
All paid signature campaigns should be banned.
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.855299

And you can tell the sockpuppet above that provided he manages to get an OTC rating of any weight or otherwise makes a deposit he can easily borrow MPOE shares to sell short on MPEx.

I have finally figured out what PR stands for.  It is "Pretty Rude".  Am I correct?
legendary
Activity: 2618
Merit: 1007
If he manages to sell another few thousand PUREMINING shares @0.4 or even higher instead (by buying mining hardware or mining bonds with the anti-pirate income), he might make much more than investing in Pirate... Wink
hero member
Activity: 518
Merit: 500
If Meni invests the proceeds from sale of anti-pirate bonds into pirate, he will come out ahead so long as default doesn't happen in the next 5 or 6 weeks.
donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
The above is still a concept; I have not made a final decision whether I would like to offer these bonds. I am writing this to hear any thoughts about the idea and learn if anyone would be interested in buying such bonds.

A face value equal to half the maturity value was chosen mainly because this leads to an effective interest rate equal to the decay rate, which is intuitive. A greater maturity value can be used, which will allow making an investment with a lower collateral (essentially a higher margin ratio), but this will mean that the decay rate needs to be higher for a given effective interest rate, which is less robust.

The asset as described can be cleanly equated to a negative deposit against collateral. There is an alternative offering I am considering: Dropping the right to sell the bonds at face value (and replacing it with a compensation clause for a scenario that the BTCST program changes materially without defaulting). This allows more flexibility with the pricing, but makes it harder to compare directly with BTCST deposits, except for the fact that this is a bet on an imminent default. Opinions on the preferred variant are also welcome.

So this offering, if does happen, is an indirect statement that you believe pirateat40 will not default, right?
As far as I understand it, you are betting that it will take less than 10 weeks for pirate to default. (0.93^10 = 0,483982307)
If it takes longer, you would've been better off keeping your BTC - if it takes shorter, you make a profit.

Sorry, the "you" in my question was Meni Smiley I just wanted to clarify that I understood the motivations for this offering, as they seem to be different from Mircea's (not that I fully understand his, either).
legendary
Activity: 2618
Merit: 1007
The above is still a concept; I have not made a final decision whether I would like to offer these bonds. I am writing this to hear any thoughts about the idea and learn if anyone would be interested in buying such bonds.

A face value equal to half the maturity value was chosen mainly because this leads to an effective interest rate equal to the decay rate, which is intuitive. A greater maturity value can be used, which will allow making an investment with a lower collateral (essentially a higher margin ratio), but this will mean that the decay rate needs to be higher for a given effective interest rate, which is less robust.

The asset as described can be cleanly equated to a negative deposit against collateral. There is an alternative offering I am considering: Dropping the right to sell the bonds at face value (and replacing it with a compensation clause for a scenario that the BTCST program changes materially without defaulting). This allows more flexibility with the pricing, but makes it harder to compare directly with BTCST deposits, except for the fact that this is a bet on an imminent default. Opinions on the preferred variant are also welcome.

So this offering, if does happen, is an indirect statement that you believe pirateat40 will not default, right?
As far as I understand it, you are betting that it will take less than 10 weeks for pirate to default. (0.93^10 = 0,483982307)
If it takes longer, you would've been better off keeping your BTC - if it takes shorter, you make a profit.
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
The above is still a concept; I have not made a final decision whether I would like to offer these bonds. I am writing this to hear any thoughts about the idea and learn if anyone would be interested in buying such bonds.

A face value equal to half the maturity value was chosen mainly because this leads to an effective interest rate equal to the decay rate, which is intuitive. A greater maturity value can be used, which will allow making an investment with a lower collateral (essentially a higher margin ratio), but this will mean that the decay rate needs to be higher for a given effective interest rate, which is less robust.

The asset as described can be cleanly equated to a negative deposit against collateral. There is an alternative offering I am considering: Dropping the right to sell the bonds at face value (and replacing it with a compensation clause for a scenario that the BTCST program changes materially without defaulting). This allows more flexibility with the pricing, but makes it harder to compare directly with BTCST deposits, except for the fact that this is a bet on an imminent default. Opinions on the preferred variant are also welcome.

So this offering, if does happen, is an indirect statement that you believe pirateat40 will not default, right?
Yes, offering this bond lengthens my Pirate position. But that doesn't mean I can't seek ways to hedge this risk.

Quote
Meni is correct that your offering is nothing like what he has stated in his OP.
We agree on that, in the sense that what he has stated in his OP is not an offer. However, it purports to (maybe, one day) be what the MPEx offer actually is, hence the contention.
Ok, now I know you're just trolling.
hero member
Activity: 756
Merit: 522
Quote
Meni is correct that your offering is nothing like what he has stated in his OP.

We agree on that, in the sense that what he has stated in his OP is not an offer. However, it purports to (maybe, one day) be what the MPEx offer actually is, hence the contention.
donator
Activity: 266
Merit: 252
I'm actually a pineapple
The above is still a concept; I have not made a final decision whether I would like to offer these bonds. I am writing this to hear any thoughts about the idea and learn if anyone would be interested in buying such bonds.

A face value equal to half the maturity value was chosen mainly because this leads to an effective interest rate equal to the decay rate, which is intuitive. A greater maturity value can be used, which will allow making an investment with a lower collateral (essentially a higher margin ratio), but this will mean that the decay rate needs to be higher for a given effective interest rate, which is less robust.

The asset as described can be cleanly equated to a negative deposit against collateral. There is an alternative offering I am considering: Dropping the right to sell the bonds at face value (and replacing it with a compensation clause for a scenario that the BTCST program changes materially without defaulting). This allows more flexibility with the pricing, but makes it harder to compare directly with BTCST deposits, except for the fact that this is a bet on an imminent default. Opinions on the preferred variant are also welcome.

So this offering, if does happen, is an indirect statement that you believe pirateat40 will not default, right?
vip
Activity: 1358
Merit: 1000
AKA: gigavps
Subscribing.

And you can tell the sockpuppet above that provided he manages to get an OTC rating of any weight or otherwise makes a deposit he can easily borrow MPOE shares to sell short on MPEx.

MPOE-PR,

You are trying to run and business yet your attitude on these forums is a bit, well, shit. I would like to suggest that your reputation on these forums will be a key factor in whether your MPEx venture is successful or not.

As it stands now, your attitude is pretty much dooming you are your business from any real success.

Meni is correct that your offering is nothing like what he has stated in his OP.

Best,
gigavps
donator
Activity: 2058
Merit: 1054
What will your anti-pirate bond do in the event of a change in interest rates offered?
In the bond described in the OP, this will have no effect. If investors believe this is indicative of a different default risk (likely reduced), they can react by exercising the right to sell bonds, or to refrain from buying more bonds. And I will also take this into consideration when pricing any newly issued shares.
So, if, say, pirate decreases rates to 5% per week, the face value of these anti-bonds will still decay at 7% per week?
Yes. See also my edit to my previous answer.

The point is that the decay rate does not need to correspond to pirate's interest rate. In principle, the effective interest rate is (ry)/(1-y), where r is the decay rate and y is the ratio between the face value and the maturity value. In the no-sell variant, the "face value" does not need to be predefined and is de facto determined by the traded price. In this case the price can change to match whatever pirate's interest rate is.
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