Topic: Gold collapsing. Bitcoin UP. - page 1051. (Read 2032266 times)
I do small business valuations as part of my job. I'd discount them to 2 BTC if I could get people to pay me that way. Or 600 XMR.
oh heavens. everyone eventually capitulates:
http://coinfire.cf/2014/08/05/exclusive-alex-jones-announce-tonight-will-begin-accepting-bitcoin/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiGxd5de68c&feature=youtu.be&t=12m40s
http://coinfire.cf/2014/08/05/exclusive-alex-jones-announce-tonight-will-begin-accepting-bitcoin/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MiGxd5de68c&feature=youtu.be&t=12m40s
it's so nice to know that none of this ever has to be paid back. what a great country!:
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/706025967449751-federal-debt-7t-under-obama#.U-A8IyRXELo.twitter
we want moar.
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/706025967449751-federal-debt-7t-under-obama#.U-A8IyRXELo.twitter
we want moar.
pm selloff in progress...
it looks to me that mining would be best described as being in a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium - cypherdoc
Highlights are mine:
"A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579
Highlights are mine:
"A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579
Nice. I hadn't looked at it that way but it makes perfect sense.
Nash equilibrium works well in theory, the real world is a little more messy.
Pre-mass adoption there are so many outside interests seeking bitcoin failure that there are other incentives at play.
Once there is more distribution and buy in, the full effects of the Nash Equilibrium will be much stronger than they are today.
the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game; therefore, i think the Nash Equilibrium takes those hostile actors into account. the minimum # of participants required to apply the theory is 2 and doesn't depend on large #'s. what's also important for all actors to know and understand, and to know that the others know, is that the longest blockchain and the POW required to construct it is mathematically immutable. b/c we know that the hashrate of the Bitcoin Network is thousands of times larger than most of the supercomputers on Earth makes the strategical decision making of each individual actor clear; don't cheat.
it looks to me that mining would be best described as being in a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium - cypherdoc
Highlights are mine:
"A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579
Highlights are mine:
"A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579
Nice. I hadn't looked at it that way but it makes perfect sense.
Nash equilibrium works well in theory, the real world is a little more messy.
Pre-mass adoption there are so many outside interests seeking bitcoin failure that there are other incentives at play.
Once there is more distribution and buy in, the full effects of the Nash Equilibrium will be much stronger than they are today.
hero member
Activity: 836
Merit: 1007
"How do you eat an elephant? One bit at a time..."
it looks to me that mining would be best described as being in a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium - cypherdoc
Highlights are mine:
"A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579
Highlights are mine:
"A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579
Nice. I hadn't looked at it that way but it makes perfect sense.
hero member
Activity: 836
Merit: 1007
"How do you eat an elephant? One bit at a time..."
Costa said the bank's activities "were in clear violation of Bank of Portugal rules" and used "fraudulent schemes." Police suspect former Chief Executive Ricardo Espirito Santo Salgado, who stepped down last month, of fraud, forgery and money-laundering at the bank, whose business dates from the 19th century and has been one of Portugal's most venerable financial institutions, as well as for years its biggest private bank.
Portugal Bank Collapse and Rescue Raises Questions
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/portugal-puts-66-bn-save-ailing-bank-24827430
dickheads.
Portugal Bank Collapse and Rescue Raises Questions
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/portugal-puts-66-bn-save-ailing-bank-24827430
dickheads.
Portugal, Argentina. Someday those folks will discover bitcoin.
Costa said the bank's activities "were in clear violation of Bank of Portugal rules" and used "fraudulent schemes." Police suspect former Chief Executive Ricardo Espirito Santo Salgado, who stepped down last month, of fraud, forgery and money-laundering at the bank, whose business dates from the 19th century and has been one of Portugal's most venerable financial institutions, as well as for years its biggest private bank.
Portugal Bank Collapse and Rescue Raises Questions
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/portugal-puts-66-bn-save-ailing-bank-24827430
dickheads.
Portugal Bank Collapse and Rescue Raises Questions
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/portugal-puts-66-bn-save-ailing-bank-24827430
dickheads.
oh, btw:
Gold & Silver collapsing. Bitcoin up.
Gold & Silver collapsing. Bitcoin up.
Silver, oh noes! who leads again?
silver will make a new all time recent low and then it might make sense to store some long term value in it.
it looks to me that mining would be best described as being in a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium - cypherdoc
Highlights are mine:
"A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579
Highlights are mine:
"A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579
Silver, oh noes! who leads again?
Bitcoin forming a daily swing low reversal UP on volume expected to be higher by days end:
gold back below support after dead cat bounce:
Bitcoin Specie project has been doing it, for real, with silver for quite a while now.
Gold will be added soonish.
http://coldhardca.sh
The higher the volume, the lower the premium and closer to the spot alloy price.
Its available direct in quantity, or through many of the bitcoin bullion sellers. Most also offer international shipping.
Vaulting is available at the mint by custom agreement.
Agora Commodities in US
https://agoracommodities.com/product/silver-bitcoin-specie/
HardBTC.org in UK
http://hardbtc.org/ocart/index.php?route=product/category&path=64
Bitgild.com in NL
Hellifino. I've used m2 in calcs because of that check next to savings deposits. I believe people treat it as such when they HODL, but I'm not an economist.
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