Topic: Gold collapsing. Bitcoin UP. - page 316. (Read 2032266 times)

For the record, I've never disputed the origin of the 1mb max block size, ...

For the record, I've never disputed the origin of the 1mb max block size, ...

It can be phased in, like:

if (blocknumber > 115000)
    maxblocksize = largerlimit

It can start being in versions way ahead, so by the time it reaches that block number and goes into effect, the older versions that don't have it are already obsolete.

When we're near the cutoff block number, I can put an alert to old versions to make sure they know they have to upgrade.

Forgot to add the good part about micropayments.  While I don't think Bitcoin is practical for smaller micropayments right now, it will eventually be as storage and bandwidth costs continue to fall.  If Bitcoin catches on on a big scale, it may already be the case by that time.  Another way they can become more practical is if I implement client-only mode and the number of network nodes consolidates into a smaller number of professional server farms.  Whatever size micropayments you need will eventually be practical.  I think in 5 or 10 years, the bandwidth and storage will seem trivial.

And there is this:

The sooner you Monopolist Maximalists get over the fact that GavinCoin doesn't have the required 80% consensus, the better.

last time I've checked Satoshi himself explicitly state that max block size limit was a temporary band aid to avoid a certain type DoS attack to the bitcoin network, just for the record.

The nature of Bitcoin is such that once version 0.1 was released, the core design was set in stone for the rest of its lifetime.

(snip)
Satoshi's Austrian fork can continue to represent a new store of value and settlement system, guaranteeing for the first time in history every human the opportunity to be their own bank.
(snip)

As I have outlined in this thread and else where on these forums...

http://armstrongeconomics.com/archives/31006

Micropayments are only feasible given a prunable mini-blockchain like XCN's, or perhaps vaporware such as the Lightening Network.

The "hardness" is in your example elimiated by the assumption you made that most nodes already upgraded.  This is just the definition of hardfork - all nodes have to upgrade, otherwise they may be left behind when the chain with large blocks becomes the longest one.  But I also see it like the others, as long as there is not universal consensus about the fork, miners may not create large blocks by themselves.  It becomes interesting when they see a large block by someone else, because they they have to risk either building on it and being orphaned if the majority does not agree with them, or building on the preceding small block and being orphaned if the majority accepts the large block.

I think it is interesting to speculate what happens if most nodes implement the suggested 20 MB patch. It means that they will accept both large and small blocks, so it is not really a hard fork at that point. Let's say the miners are not sure about the other miners. Eventually, someone will produce a large block, hoping that others will build on it. If some does, and some does not, this will be seen as an orphaned branch by the nodes, not a fork. The longest branch will win as normal. If the large block does not win, it will be a costly experience for the miners who made the large block, and also for those who build on it. It could be that the first attempt does not succeed, and it will be clear after only 2 blocks. Then another attempt could be done a few weeks later, after maybe a discussion among miners and others. I don't see the hardness of the fork.

So something like a blockchain "The Price is Right" where miners try to bid on the biggest acceptable block without going over?

I think it is interesting to speculate what happens if most nodes implement the suggested 20 MB patch. It means that they will accept both large and small blocks, so it is not really a hard fork at that point. Let's say the miners are not sure about the other miners. Eventually, someone will produce a large block, hoping that others will build on it. If some does, and some does not, this will be seen as an orphaned branch by the nodes, not a fork. The longest branch will win as normal. If the large block does not win, it will be a costly experience for the miners who made the large block, and also for those who build on it. It could be that the first attempt does not succeed, and it will be clear after only 2 blocks. Then another attempt could be done a few weeks later, after maybe a discussion among miners and others. I don't see the hardness of the fork.

Rather then risk the mess above, it would probably be better to add a "version" field to the transactions (and every other protocol message), change this version field EVEN if that protocol message didn't actually change, and have clients ignore messages of the wrong version.  Write your new clients to rev the version field once a particular block # is mined.  This would get you a clean separation.

need some opinions on this, from Reddit:

"Second, if push comes to shove and we end up with a fork battle then whoever holds the most will have the most power in choosing which wins out anyway. They can simply sell on one fork and buy on the other to shift the relative values. Whichever fork ends up most valuable will attract the most miners. Stronger value and security will attract more users to that fork."

is this viable?  this could be interesting...

a store-of-value that can't offer anything for the micropayments of the fledgling Knowledge Age, is going no where in terms of network effects.

Bitcoin is going to monopolize network effects in the NWO paradigm that most of the masses will fall into. If you are going to create an alternative, then you must identify the unique network effects of the alternative market.

Monero’s Allure

Furthermore, potential attackers are at a disadvantage for another reason. Monero tends to oppose organizations rather than people. Even someone who stands to lose from Monero by not reacting to it, such as a banker or government agent, stands to gain a great deal by buying now. Only the very wealthiest people might reasonably expect to be worse off attempting to buy up as much as possible now than if it were gone. (This could happen if their attempt to buy caused the price to rise too fast relative to their ability to acquire additional Moneros, to the point that they ultimately had less influence over the future Monero economy than they have over the economy of today.) Thus, the agency problem with Monero affects Monero competitors as well as Monero holders.

Nearly any government agent who begins to see Monero as a potential threat must also simultaneously see it as an opportunity. He, too, can invest in Monero. And why shouldn’t he? Monero may be a threat to his livelihood, but it may well be making him an offer he can’t refuse. How can an organization that stands to lose by the adoption of Monero provide its members with a better opportunity for staying loyal than Monero provides for defection?

Even those who might resist the temptation to defect would have to think about the defection of his fellows. How quickly is adoption happening? Is there time to mount an attack before Monero becomes too powerful? How easily could the resources for such an attack be amassed, given both the ignorance and treachery of the other agents. If such an attack would be unlikely to succeed, then buying now would be the only intelligent action. Regardless of whether he liked Monero, it would be futile to continue pursuing a doomed cause.

Potential Monero attackers are in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the same way that the people cannot easily rebel against the king owing to a lack of coordination on their part, governments cannot rebel against Monero for the same reason. The government puts the people in a Prisoner’s Dilemma against one another, and Monero does the same to government agents.

Monero is like Invasion of the Body Snatchers. Monero attracts inside men to act as covert saboteurs. There have long been predictions from both Moneroers and naysayers of impending government attacks, but I think there is a possibility that Monero could win without suffering much resistance. Moreover, although I said above only that any legal Monero attack could be perverted, the considerations discussed in this section tend to make such diffusion very likely.

Monero defends itself by being obscure, but once it has attracted someone’s attention, its best interest is for that person to understand the logic presented here. For then he will also understand that his best course is to deny Monero’s threat to his superiors and quietly to become its willing slave.

Aptly put.

Perhaps the (roughly) two camps could agree to a 'velvet divorce' enforced with some social agreement and crypto-magic.

Gavin's Keynesian fork, with its inflated transaction supply, can continue its futile quest to mimic Visa, Mastercard, dollar bills, and pennies until the UXTO buffer pukes blood.

Satoshi's Austrian fork can continue to represent a new store of value and settlement system, guaranteeing for the first time in history every human the opportunity to be their own bank.

we would end up with an Austrian fork and a Keynesian fork dueling it out

It is highly unlikely to happen as radically as you describe.  If this were to happen, then most likely we would end up with an Austrian fork and a Keynesian fork dueling it out, which I could see possibly happening.  Users would have to make a choice between one or the other, or a combination of the two.  This is the likely outcome in your scenario because bitcoin is global and can be forked easily.  The dollar or Euro cannot be forked with a new set of rules applied, so this scenario is impossible with legacy currencies.