The problem is that there is no way to tell an SPV client that the chain they are following because it has the most proof of work is actually invalid and should be rejected.
If that capability existed, then nobody would have to care whether or not miners choose to burn their own electricity mining invalid blocks or not.
This seems to happen frequently in Bitcoin where bad behaviour by party A can negatively effect party B, and so everybody focuses exclusively on preventing party A's bad behaviour instead of making the system more robust by removing party A's ability to negatively impact party B to solve all current and future problems.
I don't think I agree with the highlighted part.
The structure of the blockchain's proof-of-work on minimal sized headers is itself the mechanism SPV clients use to determine if a chain is valid. Yes they do not verify the chain's contents themselves. Instead they rely on the fact that producing a false longest chain is prohibitly expensive and thus very unlikely.
To effectively pull off a longest but invalid chain attack requires an attacker to spend more mining effort than the rest of the ecosystem, in order to produce a false chain that will never be acknowledged by the p2p network and can only be used to temporarily trick SPV users.
In short, proof of work on headers is itself a form of validation.