Topic: Gold collapsing. Bitcoin UP. - page 54. (Read 2032266 times)

I fear there's a misunderstanding here. The key point is the relation between the number of transactions and the size of the block (or the associated Shannon Entropy). With mechanisms like IBLT, the quantity of information transmitted on the wire (Shannon Entropy) is constant, whatever the number of transactions in the block.
EDIT: Do you plan to participate in this event ?

Well, my intention was not to offend anyone with this term. Actually, I felt safe to write it because it was used by Gavin to describe its first proposal (as an interim solution).
I agree with you that there's nothing bad with a temporary solution... as long as the target solution is known beforehand.
And that's one of my problems with the current proposals. For now, there's no target solution which has been proposed and agreed by "everyone".


Imho, it's good that the relay network doesn't verify transactions. These verifications must be done by miners and this is an important part of their job in the decentralized network. Verifications done by the relay network would be a very bad incentive for miners, leading us to a very centralized system.

I imagine the Pepsi doesn't routinely allow Coke employees to offer suggestions during their business meetings.

Like it or not, all forms of money inherently compete with each other.

Someone invested in currency A always has an interest in preventing the complete success of currency B, because a complete win for currency B means a loss for A.

Are you suggesting they are not?

But before they need to scale, they just might need some help convincing potential users they are even necessary at all.

...and Monero has had scaleable block sizes since inception. 

The assumption of invidious motive degrades the debate.  It is not an effective method to getting closer to a resolution.
When politicians use this method and claim that their opposition hates their country, rather than persuade based on the merits of their position, it irks me just as much. 

Right, that would make sense until you realise in both cases (lightning and sidechains) these technologies need bigger blocks to scale.

I think what he is saying is that he doesn't think the [2] people want bitcoin to fail, they want to leverage the artificial fee market to push the adoption of their preferred alternative technology.

There is also absolutely no point to move from 1.0 MB to 1.1 MB.

I used "logic" to sound arrogant, it is a bad habit. Anyway, there is absolutely no higher risk with 1.1 MB than 1.0 MB. I don't want to repeat all the other arguments either way.

I don't follow your logic.
Larger blocks would help Blockstream be effective.
I doubt there are many people (if any) in either Blockstream or Monero that are seeking for Bitcoin to not succeed.

It is disingenuous to assume a wicked motive in this debate just because you disagree on the risk assessment.
Those that disagree with you could do the same and say that you want big blocks ahead of other developments because you want Bitcoin to fail and it would also not make any sense or be useful to getting the right answer.

I think this unclear and could be misconstrued. This is the fee per transaction you are talking about, correct? As no one really knows about the total amount of fees without assumptions about the demand curve.

I'm leaning more and more towards 2, judging by the percentage of Blockstream supremacists and monero pimps between block minimalists.

Blessed is the Eternal Stalemate, for it preserves and strengthens Satoshi's Holy Sanity Check from the aggression of Bitcoin's adversaries.

   TIL there is intelligent life on Reddit:




tl;dr  La Serenissima is long accustomed to laughable failed sieges by stymied enemies, Gavincoin merely being the most recent.

Or the opposite of #1.  As a developer, having power is very bad.  
The goal of the project is to avoid centralization of power, and at least some are working on achieving that goal for themselves by divesting of it while it remains possible to do so.  (BIP100)

This improvement proposal is the only significant one so far that removes the dev team from picking arbitrary numbers and dates and puts the size to the market of miners.

There are some other proposals on miners paying to a forward pool to increase the block size, but they are not so formalized yet.

Yes:

The iCEman: "more debate prolongs the stalemate"

https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.12067133

Good insight solex.  Bitcoin's ongoing (yet still potential) Great Schism does appear to cleave along Taoist/Buddhist cypherpunk vs Confucian corporatist lines.

Betting (and especially fighting) against the Chuang-Tzu acolytes of Crypto-Shaolin is highly contraindicated...

Our Supreme Abbot is worth twelve hundred thousand inferior imperial functionaries (whether they hail from DC, London, or Beijing).  And as Hearn enrages the young blood, XT will be (subtly) massacred....

Peter_R:

Great paper! The last paragraph got me thinking though, and I think I have come up with another way of visualizing the system that could generalize the result to the case where block reward is zero.

Mempool Demand Curve:

I think it simplifies things if block reward and transaction fees are treated as the same thing, where the block reward is simply treated as a transaction with a large fee (ie, coinbase transaction would be a very tall skinny triangle). The block reward can then be included in the mempool demand curve, causing it to pretty much start at R instead of 0.

Block Space Supply Curve:

Again, when considering the revenue per block, I will combine the reward and fees (R and M) and call it M_rev. The profit equation then becomes:

Profit = M_rev (h/H) e^(-τ/T) - ηhT
(Sorry for the rudimentary looking equation, I'm not sure how to enter it properly here)

In your paper, you base the supply curve on the "neutral profit". The problem with this is that the analysis breaks down when the block reward is zero. Instead of assuming a profitable empty block, I will simply solve for the total revenue (reward plus fees) needed to yield a profit. So, to get the block space supply curve, simply set the profit to 0 and solve for M_rev, yielding:

M_rev = ηHT e^(τ/T)

Similar to your formulations, this curve will curve upward as block size increases, but will intersect the y axis at ηHT. So for a miner to profit by mining an empty block, the block reward must be greater than ηHT.

Plotting the Supply and demand curve together looks like this:
(I have normalized both curves to a single miner’s point of view by multiplying by h/H)

https://i.imgur.com/mxgW7UE.jpg

And the miner’s profit is the distance of the revenue curve above the cost curve.

The nice thing about plotting it this way is that we can also consider what would happen if transaction fees become a significant source of revenue and the block reward is not sufficient to profitably mine empty blocks:

https://i.imgur.com/Cd1Anik.jpg

We can see that in this case, it would only make sense for the miners to include enough transactions to be in the region of the graph where revenue exceeds cost. This would also work in the extreme case where R=0.

Great! Thanks for the link.
Subscribed.

 

I refuse to believe you are actually an adult person.

Bitcoin will like this:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-11/china-weakens-yuan-reference-rate-by-record-1-9-amid-slowdown