If that's the case, preaching about a "dangerous" service to bitcoin doesn't seem like the right way to go about fixing this. Even if you can convince pirate to not provide the service, it'd be fairly simple for someone shady to do the same thing, in a different community, for more nefarious purposes. If bitcoin's security fundamentally depends on convincing people to do the right thing, then that seems like a bug in bitcoin that should be addressed. You might be able to convince upstanding community members to introduce simple safeguards to workaround known protocol issues, but as interest grows, so will people doing things like this.
I welcome "fixes", but they really aren't possible. Bitcoin is a decentralized system— but it's not decentralized anymore if you put control of it up for grabs in real-time by the highest bidder. This is true for _any_ decentralized system.
Some of the security of bitcoin comes from the fact that it's economically more sensible to cooperate than to defect— that doing nasty things to the system will _lose_ money for the people who have the ability to do it (e.g. blockchain bloating attacks, and transaction prohibition attacks). But a key element in that is educating people about whatever is in their best interests. As a miner, it's not in your interest to cause increased centralization or enable attacks.
There are many techniques which can be applied to resist centralization. Bitcoin is more than a piece of software. More than a protocol. It's an ecosystem, an economy. And education is part of our defenses.
Here is a more scary and concrete example.
Lets imagine that meta-pool services with open mining policies became very popular and together represented >50% of the hash power. I, the evil attacker, setup a copy of bitcoin to perform the timewarp attack: I will lie about the timestamps in my blocks in such a way to drive down the difficulty to 1 while massively cranking up the block rate. I then go to the mining loan services and purchase all the hash power they have available offering 0.0001 BTC/share. This astronomical rate will get me all the hash power I need, and I'll easily be able to pay for it because I'll be making 0.02 BTC/share once I get the difficulty down to 1.
Normally we're resistant to the timewarp attack because anyone who controlled >50% of the hash power would find it not in their best interest to blow up bitcoin. But in this case, my investment would only be the funds I needed to front to start the attack. The miners themselves wouldn't get a chance to disagree with this policy because I will have bought their mining on the open market, and carried out my attack before they even noticed— perhaps I could even manage to cash out some of the spoils of the attack before bitcoin collapsed completely, making it all quite profitable for me... and leaving miners with a bunch of worthless gpus.
(which is also why the fact that I could go out and buy lots of hash power isn't a problem)
All this is also an argument why any consolidation is bad— but in the case of pools they see substantial continued income by sitting back and not being evil compared to being evil and potentially getting a lot of money quickly but then being out of the game.. The incentives are not the same for market purchases. There is no harm in trying a little evil, even if you're not sure you'll be successful... because you'll only lose the small premium you had to pay to try.
Of course, if the service is more conservative about where the hash power can go— then thats a big improvement. And I'd withdraw most of my objections there. (though not all— the service is itself more consolidation that we don't really need)
? We haven't even invited anyone yet. 
