Topic: Hardware Wallet Hacked? (Read 826 times)
So someone can't brute force it using software? Im very surprised by this since ppl said there is like how many words again that is used?
I would not call hacking if someone is not careful enough in handling their backup
I'd tend to agree. There is no wallet in the world which can be 100% safe from user error. You can have your bitcoins stored in a wallet generated by flipping a coin on an airgapped machine inside a faraday cage inside a safe inside a nuclear bunker. None of that matters if you are going to type your seed phrase in to some random website promising to airdrop you some useless token. Suggesting this is a flaw specifically of hardware wallets, rather than all wallets, is inaccurate at best.Hardware wallets are not 100% immune to hacks
It's worth pointing out that no wallet is 100% immune to being hacked. Every wallet has its own unique vulnerabilities, and the best way to be safe is to learn about and appreciate the different vulnerabilities and take steps to mitigate them. 
Hardware wallets are not 100% immune to hacks especially when it involves instances where someone else manages to get their hands on your seed phrase because you failed to store it somewhere safe.
I would not call hacking if someone is not careful enough in handling their backup, it would be pure negligence used by someone to simply gain access to another person's private keys. It is the same with fake hardware wallets sites that are trying to trick inexperienced users into entering their seed online, or if a user is sharing his seed with someone else (we see such example on this forum), and another person is just clean all accounts.To hack hardware wallet hacker actually need physical access, which in most cases is an impossible mission. What would be far more dangerous is a remote attack, but it would have to somehow exploit the vulnerabilities of the user interface and the hardware wallet itself, possibly combined with some vulnerability of the operating system.
I'm not going to say it's impossible, but pulling a seed out of a hardware wallet with a remote attack sounds like science fiction at the moment.
Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?
In this link, you will find the 35C3 presentation that discusses and demonstrates how popular hardware wallets can be hacked - https://wallet.fail/However, do note that physical access to the hardware wallet is necessary for such an attack to even take place. Some hardware wallets ensure that a physical attack will erase all the data contained within it. Hardware wallet makers ensure that they provide secure solutions to every form of attack, such as authentication to assure you that the device you receive has not been compromised on the supply chain or hidden wallets to circumvent a $5 wrench attack. Air-gapped hardware wallets that use QR codes for transactions are also available. Hardware wallets like ColdCard, Ledger, Cobo Vault use a secure element that ensures that your private key never leaves your hardware wallet, even if your phone or software is compromised.
Hardware wallets are not 100% immune to hacks especially when it involves instances where someone else manages to get their hands on your seed phrase because you failed to store it somewhere safe.
I'd hate to live in a world where a hardware wallet could be hacked remotely, as in if it's sitting in my safe not connected to any device.
There is (currently) no conceivable way that could happen without someone being able to open your safe and physically get their hands on your device. But having said that...:My pea-brain understanding of hardware wallets is that the device itself is needed to sign transactions and that's it. All the coins are stored within the seed phrase--but of course if someone gets their hands on that, they'd have the ability to do anything they wanted with them.
I wouldn't say the coins are stored within the seed phrase. Coins are stored on the blockchain.* The hardware wallet simply stores your private keys, which give you permission to make transactions with the associated coins. The seed phrase is a more human-readable encoding of your seed number, which is a 256 bit number (256 zeros and ones). All your private keys can be derived from your seed number, which is why it acts as back up access to all of your coins.*Actually, the blockchain stores transaction data. "Coins" are an abstract concept and not actual "things" which need to be stored, but this doesn't change how we think about how hardware wallets work.
To put things into the simplest terms, hardware wallets have never been hacked remotely (assuming no attacker ever got their hands on it in transit) due to the way they were designed. Things could easily change in the future
You think? I'd hate to live in a world where a hardware wallet could be hacked remotely, as in if it's sitting in my safe not connected to any device. Hopefully that will never become possible, but the pessimist in me kinda sorta believes that it could happen.My pea-brain understanding of hardware wallets is that the device itself is needed to sign transactions and that's it. All the coins are stored within the seed phrase--but of course if someone gets their hands on that, they'd have the ability to do anything they wanted with them. Someone correct me if I'm wrong, because I'm not a tech guy by any means.
The most important thing I've learned with my Ledger is to keep that seed phrase safe. I could flush that beautiful Ledger down the toilet, but I'd still have access to my coins as long as I had the phrase. But the problem is that the thing on which the seed phrase is written down is subject to everything else that can be stolen or destroyed--theft, fire, whatever. That's the only way I can think of that a hardware wallet can be "hacked" short of a keylogger or some sort of malware in the mix.
Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?
It's not easy to hack a hardware wallet, unless of course you give your keys to someone. If someone gains physical access to your hardware wallet, I also wouldn't be so sure... at least set up a reasonably long/complex passphrase if you're using Trezor for bigger amounts of money and are taking it into account that someone could gain physical access to it.
Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?
It's not easy to hack a hardware wallet, unless of course you give your keys to someone. Because either way if it's a weak passphrase you're going to loose your BTC.
Not necessarily. For hardware wallets, the attacker still needs to extract the seed. On Trezor devices we now know that can be done for less than $100 with fairly basic components. As far as we know, other devices still require high tech equipment and the expertise to use it. Very few people have the access and skills required, and hiring such a lab would cost several thousand dollars at a minimum. It's simply not a concern for your average crypto user, but is a concern for people holding large sums of money who are being specifically targeted by criminals. Sorry to be a downer, but it just gets to me that this is out there and yet they are still selling them and people think they are safe just using an 8 digit pin.
Nothing is 100% safe, and if you have access to additional options (such as passphrases) which increase your security, then I would always opt to use them.Well, it would be quite unique to have a multi-sig with one trezor, one ledger and letsay a bitcoin core wallet, then a two word phrase is enough as long as the attacker does not know which one is which.
There are even cooler methods but should not be disclosed as of yet...
Because either way if it's a weak passphrase you're going to loose your BTC.
Not necessarily. For hardware wallets, the attacker still needs to extract the seed. On Trezor devices we now know that can be done for less than $100 with fairly basic components. As far as we know, other devices still require high tech equipment and the expertise to use it. Very few people have the access and skills required, and hiring such a lab would cost several thousand dollars at a minimum. It's simply not a concern for your average crypto user, but is a concern for people holding large sums of money who are being specifically targeted by criminals. Sorry to be a downer, but it just gets to me that this is out there and yet they are still selling them and people think they are safe just using an 8 digit pin.
Nothing is 100% safe, and if you have access to additional options (such as passphrases) which increase your security, then I would always opt to use them. 
This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?
I'm not saying it would be convenient, certainly not for day to day use (but then most people aren't transacting in huge amounts day to day so they might as well keep two trezors, one without a passphrase, another with a secure passphrase they'd use only occasionally), I just said that in case someone thought no funds are safe on a Trezor, and that's with several assumptions: the attacker gains physical access to the device, the attacker has a lot of resources (i.e. willing to design and produce ASICs just to get to the coins) and the user wants security comparable to a 24 word passphrase from a set of 2048 words. And yeah, it'd actually have to be 37 randomly chosen characters.
In reality 5 randomly chosen words from a 300k word dictionary (e.g. Webster's) would still be more than enough and more user friendly. It'd also be a slightly stronger passphrase than one from randomly choosing 7 words from a set of 7776 words (long diceware word list).
I love my ColdCard more each day.
Just be careful in assuming that your ColdCard is completely safe. Just because an attack like this has only been demonstrated on a Trezor, doesn't mean a similar one (or indeed, a completely different attack) is not possible on a ColdCard, a Ledger, or any other hardware wallet.I guess I just don't get why at this point it's even worth getting a Trezor.
I don't own a Trezor, but provided you realize that someone has physical access to it, and you have your seed backed up properly, then you should still have ample time (provided any reasonable length of passphrase) to sweep your funds to a new wallet.The entire part of hardware wallets was that even if you lost it it was still secure.
Secure enough. With enough time and access to a lab with electron microscope (or money to rent such a thing), your seed is probably extractable from any hardware device. The hardware wallet buys you enough time to retrieve your mnemonic phrase and sweep your funds to new wallet.So more or less it comes down to you can just as easily have a BIP38 encrypted paper wallet with your coins on it. Because either way if it's a weak passphrase you're going to loose your BTC.
Sorry to be a downer, but it just gets to me that this is out there and yet they are still selling them and people think they are safe just using an 8 digit pin.
This should be a big red alert about this.
-Dave
I love my ColdCard more each day.
Just be careful in assuming that your ColdCard is completely safe. Just because an attack like this has only been demonstrated on a Trezor, doesn't mean a similar one (or indeed, a completely different attack) is not possible on a ColdCard, a Ledger, or any other hardware wallet.I guess I just don't get why at this point it's even worth getting a Trezor.
I don't own a Trezor, but provided you realize that someone has physical access to it, and you have your seed backed up properly, then you should still have ample time (provided any reasonable length of passphrase) to sweep your funds to a new wallet.The entire part of hardware wallets was that even if you lost it it was still secure.
Secure enough. With enough time and access to a lab with electron microscope (or money to rent such a thing), your seed is probably extractable from any hardware device. The hardware wallet buys you enough time to retrieve your mnemonic phrase and sweep your funds to new wallet.This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?
I'm not saying it would be convenient, certainly not for day to day use (but then most people aren't transacting in huge amounts day to day so they might as well keep two trezors, one without a passphrase, another with a secure passphrase they'd use only occasionally), I just said that in case someone thought no funds are safe on a Trezor, and that's with several assumptions: the attacker gains physical access to the device, the attacker has a lot of resources (i.e. willing to design and produce ASICs just to get to the coins) and the user wants security comparable to a 24 word passphrase from a set of 2048 words. And yeah, it'd actually have to be 37 randomly chosen characters.
In reality 5 randomly chosen words from a 300k word dictionary (e.g. Webster's) would still be more than enough and more user friendly. It'd also be a slightly stronger passphrase than one from randomly choosing 7 words from a set of 7776 words (long diceware word list).
This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?
It's an unrealistic expectation, but it is technically correct.You can read the report from Ledger where they reported on this attack here: https://ledger-donjon.github.io/Unfixable-Key-Extraction-Attack-on-Trezor/
Near the bottom there is a paragraph entitled "Mitigation" where they explain their reasoning. If the seed can be extracted, then the entire security of the wallet rests on the passphrase. They suggest a passphrase of 37 random characters (not a phrase or series of words) is necessary to reach the same level of security as a 24 word mnemonic phrase would on its own.
I love my ColdCard more each day.
I guess I just don't get why at this point it's even worth getting a Trezor. I can use just about any wallet with a 37 character passphrase and it will be just as secure.
The entire part of hardware wallets was that even if you lost it it was still secure.
I guess I am missing something.
-Dave
This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?
It's an unrealistic expectation, but it is technically correct.You can read the report from Ledger where they reported on this attack here: https://ledger-donjon.github.io/Unfixable-Key-Extraction-Attack-on-Trezor/
Near the bottom there is a paragraph entitled "Mitigation" where they explain their reasoning. If the seed can be extracted, then the entire security of the wallet rests on the passphrase. They suggest a passphrase of 37 random characters (not a phrase or series of words) is necessary to reach the same level of security as a 24 word mnemonic phrase would on its own.
As long as the funds are secured by a long enough passphrase (>30 characters should be good enough), they are still safe on a Trezor.
I like you malevolent I really do. Your posts are usually insightful and intelligent.
This one...um....30+ character passphrase? It's hard enough getting people to use more then a 5 or 6 digit pin. You want then to use a full 30+ character saying or group of words?
-Dave
You can hack a Trezor using side channel attack, there are various tools for this, one is Chipwhisperer manufactured in Canada. Their CEO even demonstrated the hack in a video in Las Vegas in August this year.
As long as the funds are secured by a long enough passphrase (>30 characters should be good enough), they are still safe on a Trezor.
Yes, you can hack a trezor and extract all 24 words
Do you care to elaborate on that maybe? Where did you read or hear about Trezor wallets getting hacked and seed words being extracted?I did read an article a while ago published by Kaspersky it is possible to gain access to the seed using a hacking technique called voltage glitching. More about that here:
Source: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/hardware-wallets-hacked/25315/
Quote
Using a hacking technique called voltage glitching (applying lowered voltage to a microcontroller, which causes funny effects in the chip) they switched Trezor One’s chip state from “no access” to “partial access,” which allowed them to read the chip’s RAM, but not the flash storage. After that they found out that when the firmware upgrade process is started, the chip places the cryptographic seed into RAM to retain it while the flash is being overwritten. In this manner, they managed to get all memory contents. Finding the cryptographic seed in this dump turned out to be no problem; it was stored in RAM unencrypted, in the form of a mnemonic phrase (meaning actual words instead of random number) that was easy to spot.
https://media.kasperskydaily.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/92/2019/01/10073034/hardware-wallets-hacked-trezor-pwned.jpg
You can hack a Trezor using side channel attack, there are various tools for this, one is Chipwhisperer manufactured in Canada. Their CEO even demonstrated the hack in a video in Las Vegas in August this year.
Yes, you can hack a trezor and extract all 24 words
Do you care to elaborate on that maybe? Where did you read or hear about Trezor wallets getting hacked and seed words being extracted?I did read an article a while ago published by Kaspersky it is possible to gain access to the seed using a hacking technique called voltage glitching. More about that here:
Source: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/hardware-wallets-hacked/25315/
Quote
Using a hacking technique called voltage glitching (applying lowered voltage to a microcontroller, which causes funny effects in the chip) they switched Trezor One’s chip state from “no access” to “partial access,” which allowed them to read the chip’s RAM, but not the flash storage. After that they found out that when the firmware upgrade process is started, the chip places the cryptographic seed into RAM to retain it while the flash is being overwritten. In this manner, they managed to get all memory contents. Finding the cryptographic seed in this dump turned out to be no problem; it was stored in RAM unencrypted, in the form of a mnemonic phrase (meaning actual words instead of random number) that was easy to spot.
Can hardware wallets like Ledger Nano be hacked and their coins stolen?
Yes, you can hack a trezor and extract all 24 words
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