Interesting to see the various proposals for an adaptive protocol level maximum block size.
It seems clear that adaption should occur based on transaction fees, since they are supposed to take over as the main incentive for securing the transaction log once initial distribution winds down further. This means that this is the closest so far to achieving an equilibrium based on incentives which optimise for the properties I, as a bitcoin user, want:
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.1507328. That is: first and foremost I want the (transaction log of the) network to be really well secured. Once that is achieved, I want more transactions to be possible, so long as doing so doesn't destroy incentives for those securing the network.
That said, I think the proposed rate is too high. We need to budget what *transactors* in the system should need to pay in order to ensure robust security of the transaction log, and not step too far over that level when designing the equilibrium point. 50 BTC per block works out at 12.5% of the monetary base per annum once all coins are created. This seems excessive, though admittedly it is what *holders* of bitcoins are currently paying via the inflation schedule.
Although it is difficult to estimate, the level of transaction fees required, long term, to maintain the security of the transaction log, should be the starting point when designing the equilibrium via which an adaptive maximum block size will be set (assuming one doesn't buy Mike's optimism about those incentives being solved by other means).
Suppose the system needs 3% of the monetary base to be spent per annum on securing the transaction log. Then, in the long term, that works out at pretty much 12 BTC per block. Could just call it 12 BTC per block from the start to keep it simple. So once the scheme is in place and max block size is still 1 MiB, the mean transaction fee over the last N blocks will need to 0.0029 BTC to provoke an increase in max block size. That seems pretty doable via market forces. Then, block size increases, and mean transaction fee decreases, but total transaction fees remain around the same, until an equilibrium is reached where either block space is no longer scarce, or enough miners, for other reasons, decide to limit transaction rate softly.
So my question is: apart from waving fingers in the air, are there any good ways to estimate what percentage of the monetary base should be spent by users of the system as a whole, per annum, in order to adequately ensure security of the transaction log? It's really a risk management question. As is most of the rest of the design of Bitcoin.