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Topic: How Many Full Nodes Bitcoin Online ? - page 3. (Read 22454 times)

staff
Activity: 4284
Merit: 8808
December 29, 2018, 01:29:14 PM
#84
- Also it seems to me that in any case minisketch has nothing to do about that because the drop of the tx's due to not meeting the min relay criteria is a previous step in the protocol. Minisketch just adds an optional and more efficient (bandwidth wise) way of dealing with a preexistent situation.

You've got it.

The "re-relay" problem that he imagines isn't actually a thing, but even if it were, minisketch would just be an unrelated improvement:  Nodes communicate their minfeerate to peers and don't get offered stuff they'll just drop due to fees. Existing things they do drop (due to being double spends, arriving while they're in the process of changing their fee filter, etc) they remember the txids so they won't fetch them again if a peer offers them, which itself doesn't happen much because txn are only offered when the peer initially accepts them.

Quote
allow more transactions without having to increase the block size just yet.

https://blockchair.com/bitcoin/block/544791
Size (bytes)    1,700,065

Last I checked 1700065 was greater than 1000000. Smiley Segwit increased the blocksize, but didn't increase the size that lite clients have to deal with or break compatibility.

Quote
facilitate the integration of L2
Not really, I mean that might have been why many people on the forum found it exciting,  but separating out witnesses was proposed back in 2012 when no one was really thinking much about L2.   Unintended malleability is just a source of 1001 awful corner cases that are really hard for wallets to handle except by refusing to spend your own unconfirmed outputs, or other similarly terrible and burdensome workarounds. We previously tried fixing these problems via BIP62 but it was just a finger in a failing dam, because the original design was flawed we kept finding more and more avenues and were forced to abandon that approach.  Lightning was proposed before segwit was a thing and at least theoretically lightning can be done without it-- but in practice without the ability to control malleability it is just too awful and dangerous to write any automatic transaction processing software, so after segwit was proposed which completely solved that issue lightning developers decided to wait on its availability.

Quote
Also, transaction malleability was a problem due to poor coding and lack of redundancy/cross checks on whatever exchange got affected (if any). A simple reconciliation of the balance of input addresses BEFORE doing any retry would have easily detected and stopped the exploit.
Not quite-- MTGox's claims were indeed just trying to cover up his insolvency cover-up, but even without that easily fixed accountability screwup malleability is a problem because of spending change output.  There were several big attacks that really messed up and took down basically every big fund sender (e.g. bitstamp)-- we kept them under control by getting miners to blacklist various attack patterns, but that kind of workaround can be evaded by sufficiently motivated attackers.  It actually was important to fix the general case for reasons unrelated to mtgox.  Mtgox just seized on and exaggerated an existing problem that had given then a little trouble (and unlikely ~everyone else actually caused them some funds loss, rather than just a jammed wallet) ... but it still was actually an existing problem.  It was strategic for mtgox to lie in this way, had they imagined some totally new fake problem to blame their insolvency on they would have instantly been called out.

I really don't understand why FUDsters have had any success with the "malleability isn't fixed".  The fact that it's possible to intentionally make a malleable transaction even exists as a useful and intentional feature: e.g. the ability to create anyonecanpay transactions where other people provide part of the funds after you sign. The malleability issue was always that it wasn't possible to spend an unconfirmed output (e.g. as your change, wallets have always refused to spend unconfirmed outputs by other people due to the risk of double spending) without those dependant spends (and their ancestors) being maliciously invalidated by someone else.   -- it's not like intentional malleability is avoidable, after all you could also always double spend yourself.

I guess some people are just pathologically uncomfortable with anyone else having any choice at all in their life.  The fact that you could choose to intentionally make a transaction that they allow other people to modify, and then have to deal with the consequences yourself just seems to drive some people wild.  Similarly, the fact there is some buried command-line configuration option that virtually no one sets to increase the minimum feerate your node will accept-- with essentially no consequence for anyone but yourself-- causes the same people to melt down ... the idea that other people can make their own free choices seems to leave some unable to sleep and stuck obsessively posting about it. The fact that their choice harms no one and is fundamentally impossible to prevent is apparently just not relevant to these people.

Unfortunately, other people see the floods of posts and think that there must be some issue.  But no: sadly, some people on the internet are just broken.

It's really frustrating that they'll say anything to sustain their obsessions ... like above "they introduce RBF to actually help malleators malleate" uh no, third part malleability always either lower feerates or keeps it the same, so if RBF mattered at all it would actually make malleability less sucessful by allowing the original to replace (in practice it doesn't because the mallated txn is only larger by one byte). Not only is the claim untrue, if anything it's the opposite of the truth.  But the speaker will never suffer any negative consequence that he cares about for spreading this lie, and it might convince some ignorant party... so he'll do it every time.
legendary
Activity: 4410
Merit: 4766
December 29, 2018, 01:01:23 PM
#83
Of course you can malleate your own legacy transactions, so what?

You have failed to provide an example about how that known behaviour would become a PROBLEM/attack vector in real life.

you failed to understand the malleability problem
though this is offtopic... and i know im being poked by an obvious fan groupy based on certain terms you use, ill bite
you said:
It seems to me THAT problem has a solution now as exchanges can use the "specific format" that makes malleability impossible.
i replied
if i sent you 1franky(0.1) -> bc1qexchange(0.1)
you said
Quote
Of course you can malleate your own legacy transactions, so what?
so even when you as an exchange use a specific format... i can still malleate a tx to you
maybe go do some research.. you know... google

hint, its not about confirmed transactions. never was about confirmed transaction.. never has been about confirmed transactions.
if you want to argue and say there never was a problem then take that up with the devs who obviously thought there was a problem for them to do what they did and promote what they did.

also lightning network is not a layer two feature of bitcoin.
its a completely separate network that allow multiple different coins to get locked up and then people get to play around on this other network.

its not scaling bitcoin network. its diverting people away from using the bitcoin network.
might be worth you doing research beyond the utopian dream promotional material

...
lets get some things straight here.
for people to be on this forum means they have already heard about bitcoin and crypto.. after all they didnt magicly just gt dropped into the forum.

they dont need the wishy washy only positive advertising of utopian dreams and empty promises.. they want to know what is really going on.. both good and bad.

i understand there is a group of people that only want to overpomise and fluffy cloud unicorn stuff with positive chatter.. but thats just not really doing much because to read that stuff here in the forum is advertising to people that already been advertised to.

people want to know whats beyond the fluffy clouds
legendary
Activity: 1862
Merit: 1530
Self made HODLER ✓
December 29, 2018, 12:49:55 PM
#82
AFAIK the main problem of malleability was that exchanges could get fooled by a malleated tx such that their software couldn't recognise the malleated (broadcasted by the attacker) tx had indeed suceeded and the original one didn't, so they would end replaying it making a double (or multiple by rinse and repeat) spend themselves. <- REAL spends, don't confuse with the "double spend" attack.

It seems to me THAT problem has a solution now as exchanges can use the "specific format" that makes malleability impossible.

Ok, main problem solved.

Now go to the next one... You are saying that if I am the receiver I don't control the sending tx, which is true. So the "attacker" can choose to send me a tx which is susceptible of malleability, ok. And now what? The "attacker" is going to send me multiple malleated tx's? What can I say... thanks?

I think I am not getting it... can you use another example but instead of guns use a real life example on how that would be detrimental to me as a receiver of a Bitcoin tx?

yea your not getting it...you think the main problem is solved..
EG
if i sent you a tx of
1franky(0.1) -> bc1qexchange(0.1)
that tx is not a segwit tx. i can still malleate my signature to change the txid even when you want the funds to arrive at a segwit bc1q address

so an exchange will still get transactions that can be malleated..

all an exchange has control over is. if an exchange CHOOSES to only use segwit. then the exchange itself cannot malleate..
it doesnt mean an exchange cant be victim to malleation

segwits false promise was to solve malleability for the bitcoin network.. it hasnt
segwits real purpose was to add a gateway tx format to a different network which the different network would offer different things

Of course you can malleate your own legacy transactions, so what?

I only care if I have received the BTC in the intended deposit address and how many confirmations it has. You can malleate and rebroadcast your tx as many times as you want (which is pointless because as soon as the first one wins the race all the rest will get rejected), I don't care what the txid is as I am not checking for it.

You have failed to provide an example about how that known behaviour would become a PROBLEM/attack vector in real life.

Yes, Segwit main purpose was always to facilitate the integration of L2 and to allow more transactions without having to increase the block size just yet. The fact that it does offer a viable solution to the transaction malleability problem was more of a side effect / secondary goal.

P.S.: Also, transaction malleability was a problem due to poor coding and lack of redundancy/cross checks on whatever exchange got affected (if any). A simple reconciliation of the balance of input addresses BEFORE doing any retry would have easily detected and stopped the exploit.
legendary
Activity: 4410
Merit: 4766
December 29, 2018, 10:32:15 AM
#81
anyway this topic has got so derailed.

anyway. if nodes want to be fullnodes and validate all transactions, keep all transactions and when a block arrives confirm block and keep block.
then having configurable features that then dont validate, dont keep and dont send full data is not a full node. especially if the configurations are for silly things that can be solved in a multitude of other ways

i know blah blah blah rebuttal of define full node define less than full node define litenode define spv

but in short if you going to
prune the block archive,
reduce mempool holding
cause issues with block propagation latency
drop transactions
not relay certain tx
drop and regrab

your not helping the network

if core want to be the "full node" provider. they should concentrate on being a full node and concentrate on fixing network wide flaws. let other teams play around with providing less than full nodes user configurable flimsy stuff..

or more appropriate. core fans shouldnt do REKT campaigns on other teams that also wanna be full node providers
legendary
Activity: 4410
Merit: 4766
December 29, 2018, 09:38:45 AM
#80
AFAIK the main problem of malleability was that exchanges could get fooled by a malleated tx such that their software couldn't recognise the malleated (broadcasted by the attacker) tx had indeed suceeded and the original one didn't, so they would end replaying it making a double (or multiple by rinse and repeat) spend themselves. <- REAL spends, don't confuse with the "double spend" attack.

It seems to me THAT problem has a solution now as exchanges can use the "specific format" that makes malleability impossible.

Ok, main problem solved.

Now go to the next one... You are saying that if I am the receiver I don't control the sending tx, which is true. So the "attacker" can choose to send me a tx which is susceptible of malleability, ok. And now what? The "attacker" is going to send me multiple malleated tx's? What can I say... thanks?

I think I am not getting it... can you use another example but instead of guns use a real life example on how that would be detrimental to me as a receiver of a Bitcoin tx?

yea your not getting it...you think the main problem is solved..
EG
if i sent you a tx of
1franky(0.1) -> bc1qexchange(0.1)
that tx is not a segwit tx. i can still malleate my signature to change the txid even when you want the funds to arrive at a segwit bc1q address

so an exchange will still get transactions that can be malleated..

all an exchange has control over is. if an exchange CHOOSES to only use segwit. then the exchange itself cannot malleate..
it doesnt mean an exchange cant be victim to malleation

segwits false promise was to solve malleability for the bitcoin network.. it hasnt
segwits real purpose was to add a gateway tx format to a different network which the different network would offer different things
legendary
Activity: 4410
Merit: 4766
December 29, 2018, 09:27:26 AM
#79
Also it seems to me that in any case minisketch has nothing to do about that because the drop of the tx's due to not meeting the min relay criteria is a previous step in the protocol. Minisketch just adds an optional and more efficient (bandwidth wise) way of dealing with a preexistent situation.
....

Sorry if I have stepped into this conversation without the necessary knowledge but, at this point, it has caught some of my attention and would like to know if I got it or not.

im against features that get offered as solving big picture issues but end up not solving the big picture issues of what the initial feature intent is
but devs avoiding the obvious more simple way to solve an issue network wide for everyone

EG segwit. offered as solution to malleation.. result people still are victimised by malleation after segwit activation
because the victim is not part of the choice to choose to malleate or not of funds it gets/doesnt get.
EG funny part. after pretending malleation is solved. they introduce RBF to actually help malleators malleate

as for the tx transmission bandwidth and the compact block big picture surrounding a bandwidth concern
the big picture is transactions get sent around the network of non mining nodes so that nodes have a store of transactions ready for when a block is created the node has the transactions in mempool to quickly validate the block and not need to regrab transactions after the blocks arrives. to allow quick propagation of blocks.

the whole point of relaying transactions is to give nodes transactions
dropping them defeats the whole point of sending them in the first place.
thus making relaying transactions pointless if now devs think its ok to not keep transactions

if gmaxwell thinks dropping transactions is perfectly fine then why even bother sending transactions to non mining nodes.
save more bandwidth by only sending transactions to nodes that flag that they are pools, by having a mining flag for instance
(yes you will argue that will cause more propagation issues.. i will reply yes welcome to the issue as i was being reverse psychological to prove a point)

also when
nodeX gets a tx from a peerA and drops it. that does not mean the next peerB suddenly doesnt need to send the same tx to
nodeX. peer B will still see nodeX doesnt have the tx and WILL resend it... and nodeX will drop it again
peer C will still see nodeX doesnt have the tx and will send it... nodeX will drop it

its not fixing the big picture of getting nodes to keep transactions so that compact blocks can propagate quickly. as the whole point of relaying transactions to non mining nodes is to give them transactions they dont have.

and the minisketch doesnt solve the problem of having to get the same data from peer b, c.

yet by removing the drop for silly reasons. means when node X gets tx from A.. it wont need to get it from B, C .. and wont need to get it after a block is solved... because.. big picture. it would already have it

oh, and if peer B,C doesnt have the tx to give. peer B,C wont get it from nodeX because node X didnt keep it so peer B and C will then be going through the same process of using bandwidth to try getting it from other peers

if everyone just kept to a same rule of only drop invalid transactions. everyone would all keep the same valid transactions without having to re send transactions or interrogate peers or re grab after compact block arrives.

and yes i can pre-empt the next empty argument
some fool will argue that peer A sent it at initial relay so now its peer Bs problem.. guess what
when a block is solved. guess who nodeX is going to ask again... yep. nodeA
and guess what nodeA will do. nodeA will resend it

some fool will argue that my concern only amounts to maybe 1 tx now and then..
nope if a node is saying drop transactions under 1000sat fee. there will be more than 1 tx now and again involved

devs always know of flaws, but instead of SOLVING the big picture they just OFFER flimsy, reduce the chances of flaw but not remove it

think about it
devs say this minisketch under their default setting tests shows a reduction of bandwidth to then allow a node that usually connects to 8 nodes could connect to 16-24 nodes (2-3x reduction) but thats not 7x reduction to allow 56 nodes.

and because settings are configurable around drops. if they ran tests using variable settings instead of just spinning up 8 nodes using defaults. the reduction would be LESS than 2-3x

and ontop of that. nodes still end up grabbing data after a compact block. meaning although they grabbed a tx severals times from peers at initial relay. they still grab again at block receipt. causing block propagation delays

where as removing configurable settings for silly reasons would actually give a better bandwidth reduction and make compact blocks not need to trigger as much bandwidth for the same dang tx's

and an outside the box thought. if they actually removed the drop for silly reasons and put in a fee priority formulae that al nodes utilitise so that there still remains control over spammy dust. a fee formulae can actually make spammers pay more for sending spammy dust without it affecting everyone fees at block confirm.

but nah.. devs just wanna OFFER flimsy stuff.. and not SOLVE the big picture
full member
Activity: 378
Merit: 100
December 29, 2018, 09:23:59 AM
#78
There plenty in the internet it you will browse it.
The one thing good about it is that it serves a secuirty to validate some transactions and blocks other nodes which is suspicious.
legendary
Activity: 1862
Merit: 1530
Self made HODLER ✓
December 29, 2018, 08:04:52 AM
#77

eg "segwit solves malleability"...
nope it doesnt solve malleabillity.. it "exclusively" offers a non malleable tx format IF people only use this "exclusive" tx format, by which that "exclusive" tx format needs to avoid certain opcodes, or else people could malleate tx's that use the certain format


So it does indeed offer a valid solution to the malleability problem, doesn't it?

it has not SOLVED malleation

the foolish thing is that its a anti-malleability option not solution.. its something that the payer has to choose to use.

if your a impending recipient of funds on the bitcoin network. waiting to be paid.. you obviously are not the one making the transaction. right..
so your not the one in a position to choose
your not the one that is able to say that its solved for you. because you dont know what the payer will do when paying you.

so you cant say to yourself things are solved and there is no need to worry about malleability..
a malicious person wanting to be malicious will use malleability against you and you cant stop them

imagine it this way, there is a gun crisis in a country.. instead of making a no gun law for the whole country. what happens is that authorities offer a voluntary no commitment cardboard box for people to put a gun in should they not want to use a gun

do you think gun lovers are going to choose to put down their gun by using the box?
are gun haters going to suddenly have a sigh of relief that there are no more guns?

AFAIK the main problem of malleability was that exchanges could get fooled by a malleated tx such that their software couldn't recognise the malleated (broadcasted by the attacker) tx had indeed suceeded and the original one didn't, so they would end replaying it making a double (or multiple by rinse and repeat) spend themselves. <- REAL spends, don't confuse with the "double spend" attack.

It seems to me THAT problem has a solution now as exchanges can use the "specific format" that makes malleability impossible.

Ok, main problem solved.

Now go to the next one... You are saying that if I am the receiver I don't control the sending tx, which is true. So the "attacker" can choose to send me a tx which is susceptible of malleability, ok. And now what? The "attacker" is going to send me multiple malleated tx's? What can I say... thanks?

I think I am not getting it... can you use another example but instead of guns use a real life example on how that would be detrimental to me as a receiver of a Bitcoin tx?
legendary
Activity: 4410
Merit: 4766
December 29, 2018, 07:43:57 AM
#76

eg "segwit solves malleability"...
nope it doesnt solve malleabillity.. it "exclusively" offers a non malleable tx format IF people only use this "exclusive" tx format, by which that "exclusive" tx format needs to avoid certain opcodes, or else people could malleate tx's that use the certain format


So it does indeed offer a valid solution to the malleability problem, doesn't it?

it has not SOLVED malleation

the foolish thing is that its a anti-malleability option not solution.. its something that the payer has to choose to use.

if your a impending recipient of funds on the bitcoin network. waiting to be paid.. you obviously are not the one making the transaction. right..
so your not the one in a position to choose
your not the one that is able to say that its solved for you. because you dont know what the payer will do when paying you.

so you cant say to yourself things are solved and there is no need to worry about malleability..
a malicious person wanting to be malicious will use malleability against you and you cant stop them

imagine it this way, there is a gun crisis in a country.. instead of making a no gun law for the whole country. what happens is that authorities offer a voluntary no commitment cardboard box for people to put a gun in should they not want to use a gun

do you think gun lovers are going to choose to put down their gun by using the box?
are gun haters going to suddenly have a sigh of relief that there are no more guns?
legendary
Activity: 1862
Merit: 1530
Self made HODLER ✓
December 29, 2018, 04:49:26 AM
#75

eg "segwit solves malleability"...
nope it doesnt solve malleabillity.. it "exclusively" offers a non malleable tx format IF people only use this "exclusive" tx format, by which that "exclusive" tx format needs to avoid certain opcodes, or else people could malleate tx's that use the certain format


So it does indeed offer a valid solution to the malleability problem, doesn't it?
legendary
Activity: 1862
Merit: 1530
Self made HODLER ✓
December 29, 2018, 04:27:02 AM
#74
Let's see if I have gotten this right... In simple words:

- Gmaxwell minisketch proposal is a way to reduce bandwidth usage by nodes during the relay of tx's. It does so by detecting which tx's are needed to be transmitted so that only those that are missing get transmitted to the other node. It is not part of the bitcoin consensus and fully optional so that it only gets used only between supporting pairs of nodes.

- Franky1 argues against the drop of some tx's by the nodes for not meeting the criteria of min relay fee which is a node operator configurable value. He thinks that nodes should not drop those tx's (only in case of signature mismatch or already spent/insufficient inputs). He also argues that if tx's were not dropped in first instance there would be no need for that "re-relay" of those missing tx's "over and over".

- It is not clear (to me) if that is what actually happens (the re-relay of those tx's repeated times) but from gmaxwell post it seems that it is not the case.

- Also it seems to me that in any case minisketch has nothing to do about that because the drop of the tx's due to not meeting the min relay criteria is a previous step in the protocol. Minisketch just adds an optional and more efficient (bandwidth wise) way of dealing with a preexistent situation.

So, if the above is correct... everything reduces to franky1 being against min relay which has nothing to do with gmaxwell proposal?

Sorry if I have stepped into this conversation without the necessary knowledge but, at this point, it has caught some of my attention and would like to know if I got it or not.
legendary
Activity: 4410
Merit: 4766
December 28, 2018, 10:56:45 PM
#73
Transaction relay and the mempool are mostly separate:
Here is a simplified flowchart:

tx -> [mempool accept?] -no--> [add to rejected tx list; drop]

^ highlighting the flaw even at step 1

as i clarified in PM to not ramble on in this topic
my point was by having the ability to drop

when the peers interrogate each other(step 2) after dropping the tx.
the peer in "flowchart" will again request the same TX ,,,,, and then drop it (rinse and repeat)

then....
when a block comes along. that includes reference to the tx that the peer in flowchart keeps dropping. then the peer yet again asks other peers that same dang tx again because...
drum roll.....
its not in its mempool

which over all means the same tx keeps getting broadcast and dismissed more than once

all because a node is allowed to drop tx's due to silly things like customised relay limits

the solution:
is remove the "drop" for silly reasons like min relay
then the tx's are accepted.. and then everyone gets the tx at first go around. without repeats.
and without needing to retry again even after getting a compact block.. because
drum roll.....
the tx IS in the mempool.
thus allowing a block to be verified quick because the node RETAINS the tx
AND has not caused as much bandwidth usage because it hasnt dropped tx's to need to re pickup tx's

big picture:
the whole point of relaying unconfirmed transactions to everyone
the whole point of non mining nodes having a mempool
is to KEEP transactions so that when a compact block comes along nodes can verify it quickly without causing latency/propagation delays from asking for tx's.


by allowing "drop" and by saying its ok for peers to have different transaction sets.. is just saying its ok to make the network work harder by having nodes request data repeatedly.

the only time a tx should really be dropping a tx is if the signatures fail or the UTXO is spent.... not because of random user preference

so get rid of the user preference and then everyone gets to have a full mempool of tx's by default.. to then not cause latency issues at the compact block validation event and not cause bandwidth issues with re-grabs

P.S to HairyMaclairy
i am not even a Bcash guy.. so fail on you
but you much like most kiss asses do love to think if core dev gets poked. your sheep defense response is to folow a script
about bcash

you need to open your mind that if someone loves bitcoin. but finds a flaw or does not agree with how a dev is messing with bitcoin.. it might be because they person poking at a dev actually cares more about bitcoin than the dev does.

oh and if you want to believe that gmax is a poor guy, not making money.
ultimately demoralizes the developers to the point where we give up on this completely uncompensated voluntary work improving the protocol.


yep $101mill / 9 founders = more than a chicken nugget... so dont feel pity for him like he is a starving coder on his last penny only coding bitcoin out of love

sorry gmax. i know i playd some drum rolls. buy im not gonna play you a violin... seriously YOU playing the poor guy card!?
legendary
Activity: 1414
Merit: 2174
Degenerate bull hatter & Bitcoin monotheist
December 28, 2018, 06:32:24 PM
#72
Thank you for your hard work gmax.  

Many of us do not have sufficient technical knowledge to systematically refute the points made by Franky - but we can recognize Bcash talking points when we see them.  

Trolls seek to divert precious resources (our time) by sending us on wild goose chases.  It is far easier and faster to talk shit than to refute it.  You are too kind when you refer to Franky’s deliberate misstatements as misunderstandings.

Having comprehensively demonstrated that Franky is not credible, we can all safely ignore his further comments without a need to continually show why he is wrong.

Mission accomplished.  
staff
Activity: 4284
Merit: 8808
December 28, 2018, 05:14:00 PM
#71
Transaction relay and the mempool are mostly separate:

Here is a simplified flowchart:

 tx -> [would mempool accept?] -no--> [add to rejected tx list; drop]
                                                     -yes-> [copy transaction]  -[copy1]-> [relay pool] --> [offer to peers]
                                                     -[copy2]-> [store in mempool] -[confirm, pushed past limit, expire] -> [drop]


The mempool is only involved in tx relay by getting used as a filter: don't bother relaying anything onwards that you wouldn't mempool with the assumption that other nodes and miners mempools are largely similar to yours.

Mempools being different between peers doesn't result in redundant transaction broadcasts. No process actively tries to make mempools similar to each other because none is needed.  There is no need in the protocol for mempools to be consistent, so it doesn't try to make them consistent.  They are naturally pretty consistent on long running nodes, however, but if they weren't it would all continue to work fine. In particular, a transaction being dropped does not cause it to be requested over and over again from peers because transactions are only offered once (when they are newly accepted) and because the node remembers the txids it rejected and thus knows not to fetch them again if a second peer happens to offer them. Transactions are also rarely dropped because they failed to meet the minimum feerate because nodes explicitly tell their peers the minimum feerate they'll accept so only transactions meeting that threshold are offered.

Our work on minisketch aims to make the bolded part in that flowchart more efficient by making it possible for all your peers to offer you all the txn they learned and for you to offer all of them all that you learned while using bandwidth equal to what would be used if everyone magically knew what their peers hadn't heard of yet and only offered them what they hadn't heard of yet.

The above claims of "only testing on 8 nodes" are just whole cloth fabrication and don't make any sense... our work is validated, as is usual, with measurements on the real network (because duh), and with a topology simulator that simulates tens of thousands of nodes.

The poster above seems to have misunderstood the proposal as some effort to synchronize mempools and then believed it would waste capacity constantly resending a transaction when one node had a transaction and one of its peers had dropped the transaction.   Handling cases like peers with differently sized mepools would be a consideration if we were attempting to synchronize mempools, but we're not nor would we have a reason to do so.  Instead, we're synchronizing the list of transactions nodes would have announced to each other.... So if alice and bob are connected, and both would have told each other about TxA then no data needs to be sent for TxA.  In the existing protocol either Alice or Bob (or both) would transmit the existence of TxA to each other, which is a waste because they both already knew about it.

I think I've made more than a fair effort in correcting these misunderstandings. I hope someone else will pick up the torch before the posters persistence spreads the misunderstanding further and perhaps ultimately demoralizes the developers to the point where we give up on this completely uncompensated voluntary work improving the protocol.
legendary
Activity: 4410
Merit: 4766
December 28, 2018, 11:02:26 AM
#70
flip:
Our work is not related to making "mempools synced", though they are naturally similar.
flop:
subject to having them in the first place, and subject to the restriction that anything configured to use less memory obviously can't keep as much.
^ here you are saying "subject to" meaning you know nodes can configure settings and end up holding different data.
you try to hint everyone has consistant data and near same... but then say people can put restrictions and configure...

meaning this makes mempools not have same data and thus NEED data, thus need to check other peers nodes to see who has what to then get the data needed.

i know your meaningless tests just spin up 8 nodes and look for a pre minisketch stat and a post minisketch stat... but how about actually configure the 8 nodes to have different "restrictions" and "configurations" and then see the difference compared to your meaningless test of spinning 8 nodes of same config
after all its you that says there is no fixed consensus of config and no way you WANT there to be a config consensus that fixes everyone to using the same settings... so actually do some realistic tests where the configs of the 8 nodes are random and not the same if you really believe theres no way they can be the same

hint if node A has 1,2,3,4,5,7
hint if node B has 1,2,4,5,7,8
hint if node C has 2,3,5,6,7,8
your mini sketch wont have A just check(interrogate) B and then not have to bother with checking C.. because B does have 3. but doesnt have 6. so minisketch then needs to check C and realise it needs 6 from C
so mini sketch wont result in only needing to check just one node and that is the end of it. minisketch will still check other nodes too

flip:
Our work is exclusively related to eliminating the massive overheads from relaying transactions the first time through as they go around the network.
flop
Quote
to then suddenly need to grab hundreds of transactions from X and hundreds of tx from Y AGAIN
That doesn't happen in the Bitcoin protocol, no one has proposed for it to happen, and it isn't needed.
dont run tests under perfect circumstances of out of 8 nodes 7 nodes hold same data so one node only needs to check one node to complete and thats it. realise that all 8 nodes will have different tx's and so all 8 will still need to be checked.. remember you said it there isnt and cant be a consensus of all nodes accepting the same transactions blah

also think big picture about ALSO compact blocks and bloom filtering. imagine not just initial relay "exclusivity" of just a small data set of INV.. for initial relay, but also solving the wider issue of getting transactions that a mempool wont have if it were to get a compact block
.. what i am saying is with minisketch if indeed is less data than old methods.. try it against getting the best accumulation of mempool transactions so that compact blocks can actually be accomplished

or.. are you leaving that for 4 years time due to "conservative"
no wonder after 3 years things have not really progressed due to scaling. if you think a proposed feature should only be used for an exclusive purpose. and only has benefit on optimal conditions, which you only test it under.

try some out of box thinking

i will make one apology
i am sorry i dont kiss your ass or treat you as a king.
but you have plenty of ass kissers so maybe you do need someone thats not just gonna agree and accept what you offer as the ultimate solution.. even if the solution is for "exclusive use" in one small utility and only under certain use-case

eg "segwit solves malleability"...
nope it doesnt solve malleabillity.. it "exclusively" offers a non malleable tx format IF people only use this "exclusive" tx format, by which that "exclusive" tx format needs to avoid certain opcodes, or else people could malleate tx's that use the certain format

so i apologise for not just being an ass kisser, but an echo chamber of kissing, slurping and cheers does not help critical thinking
legendary
Activity: 2688
Merit: 13334
BTC + Crossfit, living life.
December 28, 2018, 04:42:22 AM
#69
My technical knowledge is not at the necessary level, for such a deep debate, but this type of answers are what encourage to study and learn more how Full Nodes work.

@the very moment i’m best of with increasing stash and HODL haha
Have to read Some when i’m back home, cause forgot my laptop.... and just saw that last post by gmax, that shows me i only know like 2-5% or something Roll Eyes
A thread like this is Brain coocking for me @the moment
Hope to learn much in here gonna do my best
Already thx for all your guy’s Effort in here
legendary
Activity: 938
Merit: 2540
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December 28, 2018, 03:04:28 AM
#68
My technical knowledge is not at the necessary level, for such a deep debate, but this type of answers are what encourage to study and learn more how Full Nodes work.
legendary
Activity: 3836
Merit: 4969
Doomed to see the future and unable to prevent it
December 27, 2018, 10:30:11 PM
#67

W00ps, broke my rule again +sM, wish I had 50 to give you.
legendary
Activity: 3318
Merit: 4606
diamond-handed zealot
December 27, 2018, 08:03:03 PM
#66
holy shit
legendary
Activity: 2688
Merit: 13334
BTC + Crossfit, living life.
December 27, 2018, 07:15:40 PM
#65
Hey gonna show of my HAT in here Cheesy

WoW already few pages in here gonna read them tomorrow (try) so i hopefully gonna know how it all works as well.

Good job in here man
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