Topic: How much would you trust trezor? - page 8. (Read 10395 times)
Trezor hardware wallet is very good from safety point of view. You can not find any other hardware wallet like this. From the other point, if something happen with electronical part - you loose your BTC
If I use(buy) it, then I should trust it. Because they're selling a hardware, not just an online service. And they're not a small company
Trezor is the first,and also the best, we all know that rrezor have more than good design,they have a good performance.
Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/time-to-bust-a-myth-paper-wallets-are-less-secure-than-normal-encrypted-wallets-1013586Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive.
You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.
Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...
The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.
Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password
Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).
there will be draw backs for either approach.
However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.
The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media.
Let's assume that it is encrypted and printed on paper/metal.
You can create a raw transaction offline and randomly select a computer to broadcast it from.
What attack vectors exist now? The random computer you used to broadcast your raw transaction to the network?
Also assume the printer the key(s) were generated on had no wifi capabilities and never connected to the internet or any other computer than the air-gapped one. Then the printer is burned with a flame thrower.
Also if you ignore the above, it would still be very expensive to be frequently destroying printers when reusing a USB stick/hard drive is going to offer the same amount of protection as a paper wallet (it will be the same if you ignore the above, however in reality it will offer greater protection).
The idea would be to generate everything you will need before you destroy the printer.
Also using a fresh install of BSD or another linux/GNU distribution on brand new hardware to create your raw transaction before broad casting...I'd say is pretty safe.
Also it would be expected that you need additional addresses as time progresses, so if you were to generate 10 (or however many) addresses with a printer prior to destroying it, then you eventually will need an additional printer to print the private keys to additional addresses
Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/time-to-bust-a-myth-paper-wallets-are-less-secure-than-normal-encrypted-wallets-1013586Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive.
You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.
Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...
The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.
Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password
Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).
there will be draw backs for either approach.
However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.
The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media.
Let's assume that it is encrypted and printed on paper/metal.
You can create a raw transaction offline and randomly select a computer to broadcast it from.
What attack vectors exist now? The random computer you used to broadcast your raw transaction to the network?
Also assume the printer the key(s) were generated on had no wifi capabilities and never connected to the internet or any other computer than the air-gapped one. Then the printer is burned with a flame thrower.
Also if you ignore the above, it would still be very expensive to be frequently destroying printers when reusing a USB stick/hard drive is going to offer the same amount of protection as a paper wallet (it will be the same if you ignore the above, however in reality it will offer greater protection).
The idea would be to generate everything you will need before you destroy the printer.
Also using a fresh install of BSD or another linux/GNU distribution on brand new hardware to create your raw transaction before broad casting...I'd say is pretty safe.
Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/time-to-bust-a-myth-paper-wallets-are-less-secure-than-normal-encrypted-wallets-1013586Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive.
You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.
Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...
The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.
Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password
Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).
there will be draw backs for either approach.
However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.
The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media.
Let's assume that it is encrypted and printed on paper/metal.
You can create a raw transaction offline and randomly select a computer to broadcast it from.
What attack vectors exist now? The random computer you used to broadcast your raw transaction to the network?
Also assume the printer the key(s) were generated on had no wifi capabilities and never connected to the internet or any other computer than the air-gapped one. Then the printer is burned with a flame thrower.
Also if you ignore the above, it would still be very expensive to be frequently destroying printers when reusing a USB stick/hard drive is going to offer the same amount of protection as a paper wallet (it will be the same if you ignore the above, however in reality it will offer greater protection).
You could also add the part of splitting the encrypted text into multiple places and that just adds another layer of security but also...work
Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/time-to-bust-a-myth-paper-wallets-are-less-secure-than-normal-encrypted-wallets-1013586Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive.
You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.
Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...
The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.
Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password
Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).
there will be draw backs for either approach.
However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.
The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media.
Let's assume that it is encrypted and printed on paper/metal.
You can create a raw transaction offline and randomly select a computer to broadcast it from.
What attack vectors exist now? The random computer you used to broadcast your raw transaction to the network?
Also assume the printer the key(s) were generated on had no wifi capabilities and never connected to the internet or any other computer than the air-gapped one. Then the printer is burned with a flame thrower.
I would personally suggest using electrum for both your cold and hot wallets (at least for your hot wallet on your computer). It takes up very little resources, is deterministic, and has all the same features that armory has.
One important feature Armory has that Electrum does not: transcations and/or extended public key data are kept private when using Armory, whereas using a Trezor with Electrum involves sharing your transaction history with public Electrum nodes. Those nodes are unlikely to be trying to use that information for antything, but it's better if that info is not made available to strangers in the first place.
It'd be really good for the privacy of Trezor users if:
- Electrum devs implemented an easy to use "full node" mode
- Armory devs integrated Trezor
- Bitcoin Core integrated Trezor
You can also run your own electrum server on a VPS and have your instance of electrum only connect to your electrum server.
Other options would be to connect to an onion electrum server via tor, or only have electrum open when you are connected to a VPN, although both of these solutions would result in the electrum server still knowing all of your addresses
Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/time-to-bust-a-myth-paper-wallets-are-less-secure-than-normal-encrypted-wallets-1013586Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive.
You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.
Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...
The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.
Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password
Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).
there will be draw backs for either approach.
However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.
The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media.
I have two wallets, main one that i almost never use, and a "hot" one. If i really need funds i transfer x amount to hot wallet.
Hot wallet has theoretical chance to be compromised, but real one doesn't, because it's on another HDD that's disconnected all the time and has it's own OS.
When i want to transfer coins, i disconnect all other drives , place "real one", with own OS,send coins and disconnect it again.
There's no chance in getting main HDD compromised, as it only has OS and bitcoin client on it, nothing else.
Hot wallet has theoretical chance to be compromised, but real one doesn't, because it's on another HDD that's disconnected all the time and has it's own OS.
When i want to transfer coins, i disconnect all other drives , place "real one", with own OS,send coins and disconnect it again.
There's no chance in getting main HDD compromised, as it only has OS and bitcoin client on it, nothing else.
Stuxnet proved that wrong.
Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/time-to-bust-a-myth-paper-wallets-are-less-secure-than-normal-encrypted-wallets-1013586Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive.
You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.
Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...
The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.
Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password
Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).
there will be draw backs for either approach.
Of course creating the keys on an air gapped computer that never connects to a network or the internet.
To be completely honest, not as much as others may. The chances of them running off are extremely slim, but it's not just that. My Trezor recently crashed, and if it were not for my Recovery Seed's and an old Android phone, it's possible I could've been out a couple of coins.
The hardware does have too many problem, and mytrezor.com is shit tbh. I don't know too much about the company so I won't say too much, I trust them a fair bit.
The hardware does have too many problem, and mytrezor.com is shit tbh. I don't know too much about the company so I won't say too much, I trust them a fair bit.
Just discovered the Trezor connects to the Bits of Proof server owned by Blythe Masters. I understand that the server doesn't hold the private keys but this still makes me trust Trezor less.
I've been avoiding saying this out loud for some time, for Trezor's sake. Bear in mind that Satoshi Labs run the MyTrezor.com Bits of Proof server, not Blythe Master's cryptocurrency investment vehicle
(also, Bits of Proof was still owned by the original developer when Satoshi Labs bought the BoP licence from him, so they couldn't have predicted that Tamas would sell to these graverobbers)
But you are right to point it out; anything involving Blythe Masters should be steered well clear of. Electrum + Trezor FTW ATM.
Just to make sure guys, the thing that you are talking about is when we are using Trezor with mytrezor.com wallet, right?
If I am using Trezor with the Electrum than there is no problems with Blythe Masters, right?
Thanks guys for clearing this out and repeating second time, just to make sure!
There's no problems with Blythe Masters at MyTrezor.com AFAIK, but yes, Electrum definitely has zero association, however loose, with her or with any other JP Morgan cronies.
Just discovered the Trezor connects to the Bits of Proof server owned by Blythe Masters. I understand that the server doesn't hold the private keys but this still makes me trust Trezor less.
Well, Trezor was on the market much earlier than Blythe stepped into the Bitcoin game. BOP was acquired by her company and what from I know, SatoshiLabs are working on new backend solution.You do not need to rely on SatoshiLabs servers, because you can use Electrum, Multibit, Encompass wallet or Mycelium.
I'm a very paranoid person. I (for real) keep offline-generated BIP38 "paper" wallets (actually etched in metal, but that's besides the point) buried in the ground in the forest outside of my town. I leave my cellphone at home when I go to the burial sites so my cellphone company has no record of me being in the area. I use a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 validated hardware-encrypted thumbdrive, with an encrypted linux partition (on which I have a TrueCrypt container) to store my wallet. I only plug said thumbdrive into a dedicated device (laptop) which doesn't even have a HDD. I'm so paranoid that I actually flashed the BIOS on said laptop with openBIOS. I run Tails OS to access my secure thumbdrive, and I carry the thumbdrive with me around my neck all day (yes I even sleep with it). I'm basically a paranoid nutcase when it comes to my data -- especially my cryptocurrency. I ordered a Trezor and I´m storing most of my funds on this device. I hope that gives you an idea of how secure this is. These guys really know what they are doing and have addressed every concern I could imagine.
Just discovered the Trezor connects to the Bits of Proof server owned by Blythe Masters. I understand that the server doesn't hold the private keys but this still makes me trust Trezor less.
I've been avoiding saying this out loud for some time, for Trezor's sake. Bear in mind that Satoshi Labs run the MyTrezor.com Bits of Proof server, not Blythe Master's cryptocurrency investment vehicle
(also, Bits of Proof was still owned by the original developer when Satoshi Labs bought the BoP licence from him, so they couldn't have predicted that Tamas would sell to these graverobbers)
But you are right to point it out; anything involving Blythe Masters should be steered well clear of. Electrum + Trezor FTW ATM.
Just to make sure guys, the thing that you are talking about is when we are using Trezor with mytrezor.com wallet, right?
If I am using Trezor with the Electrum than there is no problems with Blythe Masters, right?
Thanks guys for clearing this out and repeating second time, just to make sure!
i like to run a trap wallet on my desktop and use simply my computer, stealing that few cent of bitcoin, will immediately put me on the fence and proceed to wipe out the disk, never happened for now, so my computer is safe
for now i only trust my usb and my ssd, i don't use anything expensive like trezor, and i'm not going to use it in the future
for now i only trust my usb and my ssd, i don't use anything expensive like trezor, and i'm not going to use it in the future
What if the attacker gets to both of your trap wallet and the actual wallet itself before doing any transactions?
the actual wallet is a cold storage the trap wallet is a hot wallet with a very low amount, unless he know that , the wallet is a trap and i have more bitcoin hidden off line, he will steal immediately those coins
That's not very secure at all. I mean if you pick up wallet stealer it would be ok, but if you pick up some trojan, the owner of trojan will probably inspect all your
storage devices after finding out you are bitcoin user.. Also, it would be logical not to steal your coins right away if he sees that you send and receive coins regulary,
it would be moch more logical for him to wait until you have some sizable amount there..
then he will wait a very long time because i'm not touching my cold storage until the bitcoin price will increase drammatically, and anyway, because the value will be greater, i have planned a secure erase for the that time
therefore i should be relatively safe
Just discovered the Trezor connects to the Bits of Proof server owned by Blythe Masters. I understand that the server doesn't hold the private keys but this still makes me trust Trezor less.
I've been avoiding saying this out loud for some time, for Trezor's sake. Bear in mind that Satoshi Labs run the MyTrezor.com Bits of Proof server, not Blythe Master's cryptocurrency investment vehicle
(also, Bits of Proof was still owned by the original developer when Satoshi Labs bought the BoP licence from him, so they couldn't have predicted that Tamas would sell to these graverobbers)
But you are right to point it out; anything involving Blythe Masters should be steered well clear of. Electrum + Trezor FTW ATM.
i like to run a trap wallet on my desktop and use simply my computer, stealing that few cent of bitcoin, will immediately put me on the fence and proceed to wipe out the disk, never happened for now, so my computer is safe
for now i only trust my usb and my ssd, i don't use anything expensive like trezor, and i'm not going to use it in the future
for now i only trust my usb and my ssd, i don't use anything expensive like trezor, and i'm not going to use it in the future
What if the attacker gets to both of your trap wallet and the actual wallet itself before doing any transactions?
the actual wallet is a cold storage the trap wallet is a hot wallet with a very low amount, unless he know that , the wallet is a trap and i have more bitcoin hidden off line, he will steal immediately those coins
That's not very secure at all. I mean if you pick up wallet stealer it would be ok, but if you pick up some trojan, the owner of trojan will probably inspect all your
storage devices after finding out you are bitcoin user.. Also, it would be logical not to steal your coins right away if he sees that you send and receive coins regulary,
it would be moch more logical for him to wait until you have some sizable amount there..
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