I have no problem with people being skeptical of ICOs and we're not selling securities
My interpretation of USA securities law, it is very likely you are.
No, same terms as Augur and Ethereum sale.
Topic: IOTA - page 744. (Read 1473233 times)
I have no problem with people being skeptical of ICOs and we're not selling securities
My interpretation of USA securities law, it is very likely you are.
Now you know why ... They were ... And ...
Insults are not welcome in this thread, without an evidence I treat your words as insulting.
Where there is smoke there is fire. No insults intended, just being realistic. Feel free to delete my posts if you want.
Edit: I admire your strict (and level-headed) adherence to sensing versus intuition. I am EN?P (nearly balanced between F and T). I am like 81% N. So I rely a lot on intuition and don't wait to have every fact sensed with full verification. I admire those who are ISTP (but not so much ISTJ). I have to learn to appreciate the virtues of that and yet maintain respect/balance where my intuitions helps me.
Let me help you with that, Myers-Briggs is absolute bullshit equivalent to astrology: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers%E2%80%93Briggs_Type_Indicator#Criticism
Every metric is a relative perspective. This one like all others in science have only relativistic truth. Given the very few degrees-of-freedom, one shouldn't expect it to hold sway over complex factors in personality. I think it was Einstein who said chose the question to fit the answer you desire.
Contrary to my initial upthread enthusiasm, I am leaning towards this DAG concept can not work because it appears to attempt to defeat the CAP (Brewer's) Theorem. Before I was thinking the multiple branches are orthogonal, but it becomes clearer from the game theory issues quoted above, that there are complex dependencies. Analogous issues as the following appear to apply to DAG:
Hard to tell what you mean without knowing what you have sacrificed - C, A or P.
Quote from: TPTB_need_war
Contrary to my initial upthread enthusiasm, I am leaning towards this DAG concept can not work because it appears to attempt to defeat the CAP (Brewer's) Theorem
Could you please elaborate? In particular, we don't claim thisQuote
Consistency (all nodes see the same data at the same time)
should be true in iota. Possible? I don't see how it's possible to draw a picture to have longest-path-as-the-score rule to be broken by an adversary.
"Longest-path-as-the-score" differs from what is proposed in the whitepaper. We were talking about another algo.Longest-chain. There can only be one. Reverting to a block chain, except that chain grows per TX and not per block. But afaics double-spend coherence and complex game theories thereof would require you to violate the CAP theorem.
Simple. Just allow special coinbase txs that additionally need to reference the previous coinbase tx and need so much PoW that they can only happen on average every 10 mins:)
This magically moves Nash equilibrium towards superwide DAG.
Bottleneck to what? It is only recording checkpoints. It is not slowing down the forward advance of the DAG. It is orthogonal, except for the coinbases which can be spent into the DAG (after sufficient # of blocks to be probabilistically sure of coinbases not being reverted by an orphaned chain).
What is this blockchain supposed to checkpoint? DAG topology? Then this blockchain must possess fragmentation flexibility of DAG which is impossible in high-load, unless DAG waits for the blockchain to catchup. You can wait for 1 month before getting ability to spend coinbase coin, but once a corresponding checkpoint is recorded into the blockchain a greedy miner will generate another (better) tip containing a double-spending transaction invalidating tip which has been recorded.
in the event a honest guy tries to reference a legit tip and the attacker's tip, he'll detect the contradiction and won't do it. Therefore, the attacker's subtangle will be abandoned.
This requires not just an honest guy, but a diligent one as well.
The risk is that honest guys will be lazy and rely on others to go far back in history to check all tx for double spending.
The lazy guys risk that their tx's will be abandoned, because the majority of the nodes won't reference them.
That is precisely how I would have answered. It is quite clear that everyone has a strong incentive to be on a correct branch, else any time down stream someone can broadcast a notice that a branch is incongruent then that branch gets abandoned.
But doesn't this mean that there is a great incentive to not include tips in your branch, because these don't yet have enough veracity to be sure they won't end up being a double-spend. In your system there is often no way to prove which of the double-spends were first, so they both are invalid.
Seems to me no one has an incentive to lengthen instead of broaden the tree. But I haven't absorbed the white paper. Did you address that?
But that default doesn't seem to be the correct game theory? This is Prisoner's Dilemma game. Afaics, lower incentive to go first on including a new tip. Just noticed yesterday this research on cases where the pessimistic Nash equilibrium is claimed not to hold (but on quick glance I ponder if they have overly simplistic assumptions in their models).
Obviously if everyone defects to making their own branches (maximally broaden the tree), then no one's tips get lengthened and thus the entire system doesn't function. But is the optimum strategy the default that you assume?
The attacker doesn't publish it untill he has enough transactions referencing the second doublespending transaction.
The second doublespending won't be referenced because the longest tip already contains the legit transaction.
Contrary to my initial upthread enthusiasm, I am leaning towards this DAG concept can not work because it appears to attempt to defeat the CAP (Brewer's) Theorem. Before I was thinking the multiple (multifurcating) branches are orthogonal, but it becomes clearer from the game theory issues quoted above, that there are complex dependencies. Analogous issues as the following appear to apply to DAG:
The key failure in your design is the lack of incentive to have a consensus. What is the incentive for voting nodes to agree with the correct fork and for minority nodes to agree with the majority fork? Seems to me they can all disagree and no one can prove otherwise, because they can pretend to have never heard the votes of others (no way to prove receipt of a vote on the internet). This shows that without the objectivity of a PoW, then there is no objectivity and you end up in chaos.
Primarily this is mitigated by the fact that if a node doesn't create a fork, there is nothing to vote on, no consensus is needed. If I have a signed block chain A0->B0->C0 and it's published, no one can vote between C0 and let's say C1 because there is no signed C1. If you don't sign forks, no one can vote on your transactions.
I don't comprehend your notation and its applicability, but I was just thinking conceptually that you have a these N block chains operating orthogonally, thus one one can receive the transfer of value from the other. Then you can have double-spends and what not. So then you can have different block chains disagreeing about a plurality of different orthogonal block chain states. There is no global unified state, that is the entire point since missing the global PoW block period to force timely consensus to this single objective reality. If we don't want a global state, then we must use a probabilistic forking structure such as Iota's DAG to obtain Byzantine fault tolerance. You've conflated the independence with the determinism required for global coherence. Global coherence with individual realities (relativism) can only be probabilistic. I believe this follows from Brewer's theorem which says it is impossible to have all three of consistency, availability, and partion tolerance.
In PoW, miners have an incentive to reach consensus because otherwise their rewards won't be honored by the longest chain. In your system the majority of the vote is the winning fork, except there is no penalty for delaying for an indefinite period acknowledging receipt of such a vote. Thus complex game theories arise. Even more critically, the majority vote may be split among multiple forks, such that there is no consensus, because you have multiple chains thus a plurality of permutations of forks.
I do want readers to note which of the three posters in this thread was able to state directly the design error. That should be instructive to investors.
I do want readers to note which of the three posters in this thread was able to state directly the design error. That should be instructive to investors.
Well-behaved nodes are configured to flip their vote if they observe their fork variant as having fewer votes than another. The only way to vote is to have a balance tied up in the network. To vote to confuse the network is to destroy its value which destroys your investment. The incentive is to retain value in the system rather than accumulate rewards through inflating everyone else.
Not necessarily. They could collude to steal value from another fork by double-spending to the other fork and then disagreeing about the objective time of spending. Perhaps other complex game theory as well. Also it may not be intentional. Per my point above, the objective reality may be indeterminate and the system may have a plurality of minority realities (votes). That is what I expect to be the normal mode due to chaos theory.
How so?
If there are only Alice and Bob then Alice will get more coins if Bob gets none.
Your design has a problem if as you say "It's easy to invalidate a branch".
Not my design, a design with coin generation has it.
By invalidating a fragment you earn more coins.
How so?
Quote
You can't just replace miner by attacker. The payoff matrix is different for the cases of with and without coin generation, in the former caIt's easy to invalidate a branchse participants are not interested in approval of each other's transactions.
Your design has a problem if as you say "It's easy to invalidate a branch".
Do you mean that invalidating tangle fragments increases the chance of
a coinbase tx getting confirmations? Why would that be the case?
And wouldn't that apply to any tx that someone wants to see confirmed badly?
a coinbase tx getting confirmations? Why would that be the case?
And wouldn't that apply to any tx that someone wants to see confirmed badly?
By invalidating a fragment you earn more coins.
This argument is not convincing, since you can just replace "miner" by "attacker",
and face the same problem?!
and face the same problem?!
You can't just replace miner by attacker. The payoff matrix is different for the cases of with and without coin generation, in the former case participants are not interested in approval of each other's transactions.
CoinTelegraph did an interview with me ( David ) yesterday. It will be of interest and answer some questions that people who is following IOTA might have. http://cointelegraph.com/news/115508/iota-a-blockchain-less-gasp-token-for-the-internet-of-things
Isn't this way over thinking it? Just let everyone invest as much as they want to, and devide the total currency supply proportionately to each persons contribution.
If you are prepared to fully trust the developers to not be buying their own tokens, sure, it's as good a solution as any.
This approach does not rock my boat I should add. One might even say I have trust issues.
Re: Premine vs PoW vs ICO vs User ID vs 'a life of crime':
Why not simply make a fixed number of tokens available, at a fixed price per token?
(If not sold out, any unsold tokens would then be provably burned)
This way, developers can still buy their own tokens, but in doing so, they are competing with the other users/buyers. Any tokens bought up by the developers, are tokens that become unavailable for someone else to buy. This is much better than the usual premine, in the sense that the developers are trading a portion of potential outside funding, in exchange for whatever tokens they buy for themselves (aka, putting their money where their mouths are, because they then become a truly interested party, after funding).
Tying up to an existing coin (or coins) seems interesting as well. That would likely attract the widest user foundation, though possibly at the expense of most (all?) of the funding potential...
Why not simply make a fixed number of tokens available, at a fixed price per token?
(If not sold out, any unsold tokens would then be provably burned)
This way, developers can still buy their own tokens, but in doing so, they are competing with the other users/buyers. Any tokens bought up by the developers, are tokens that become unavailable for someone else to buy. This is much better than the usual premine, in the sense that the developers are trading a portion of potential outside funding, in exchange for whatever tokens they buy for themselves (aka, putting their money where their mouths are, because they then become a truly interested party, after funding).
Tying up to an existing coin (or coins) seems interesting as well. That would likely attract the widest user foundation, though possibly at the expense of most (all?) of the funding potential...
Sorry there is no difference from a premine. They can buy up most of the coins thus limiting the supply and thus they can set an artificially higher price per share for the ICO (some fewer investors are willing to pay a higher price than other investors, i.e. not all investors are equally astute). Review the math of my post again. Remember all ICO from other investors money ends up in their pocket, no matter how many coins they buy.
[...]
I disagree.
A higher price per share (artificial or not), naturally balances the forces of (developer) greed vs (investor) demand. The higher the price, the more investor interest is dissipated on account of the lesser upside potential, and in the extreme case, one ends up left with a minority of investors/users, as well as has severely handicapped the adoption potential. Then again, as you said, maybe not all investors are equally astute...
With a low enough price per share, the ICO naturally sells out. In such instance, would the developer trade a bit of external funding for some pie of their own token? Maybe. Would they do this for a significant portion of the total tokens for sale? Doubtful.
Personally, I see unproven technology for emerging markets as being an extremely high risk investment, and I will value it accordingly. Talents and accomplishments might become extremely valuable (if functional success is delivered), but comparatively speaking, the product itself, is of little value, especially when it can be replicated/cloned/forked to exhaustion.
Isn't this way over thinking it? Just let everyone invest as much as they want to, and devide the total currency supply proportionately to each persons contribution.
This needs elaborating. Why would the coinbase txs be treated any different from other tx?
If by invalidating a tangle fragment a miner can increase his profit
Do you mean that invalidating tangle fragments increases the chance of
a coinbase tx getting confirmations? Why would that be the case?
And wouldn't that apply to any tx that someone wants to see confirmed badly?
Quote
then he will do that. It's easy to invalidate a branch if you split your tokens and include small transactions into all branches, you can use any to doublespend.
This argument is not convincing, since you can just replace "miner" by "attacker",
and face the same problem?!
Some investors here trying to set a max cap for ICO (5000 BTC) or the maximum amount which other investors can send (500 USD). They think that this will affect their RoI.
They are wrong. Crypti set the maximum cap for itself as 750 BTC and is in deep shit now. Ethereum has gathered 30 000 BTC and it's investors made around x6 RoI.
So the key to good RoI is not low max cap for ICO.
They are wrong. Crypti set the maximum cap for itself as 750 BTC and is in deep shit now. Ethereum has gathered 30 000 BTC and it's investors made around x6 RoI.
So the key to good RoI is not low max cap for ICO.
So far, I think Ethereum and Augur had the best crowd-sale models.
Let's see. They can sell out all 250 million shares at say a fair value of $250,000 initial market cap, $250,000 cash, and 0% for themselves. Or they can set prices at $0.1 per share, sell only 0.1% of the shares so they get the $25,000 cash, $2.5 million market cap and 99.9% for themselves. Then as the price drops to a tenth to $0.01 those investors who didn't buy in the ICO come rushing in to buy the dip, and they still get their $250,000 cash and retain 90% for themselves.
Hopefully you understand now why the market cap of Dash is entirely meaningless.
*Note I am not asserting what I think the initial valuation of Iota should be. I have no idea. $1 million? Will depend on many things that are learned between now and launch, etc.. And I have no interest in expressing any opinion on the valuation.
That would include those who can't do arithmetic.
Hopefully you understand now why the market cap of Dash is entirely meaningless.
*Note I am not asserting what I think the initial valuation of Iota should be. I have no idea. $1 million? Will depend on many things that are learned between now and launch, etc.. And I have no interest in expressing any opinion on the valuation.
Then again, as you said, maybe not all investors are equally astute...
That would include those who can't do arithmetic.
Granted, my statements fall into the very subjective matter of what one considers to be a high or low price per share, and in effect, the initial valuation of Iota. Arguing the arithmetic posted is utterly pointless, as we have fundamentally distinct views on the potential realizations of demand and price. Funny enough, going by your own example, I draw quite different investment indicators and conclusions. I will not debate this further as I wish for my particular valuation to remain my own.
Personally, I see unproven technology for emerging markets as being an extremely high risk investment, and I will value it accordingly. Talents and accomplishments might become extremely valuable (if functional success is delivered), but comparatively speaking, the product itself, is of little value, especially when it can be replicated/cloned/forked to exhaustion.
I don't agree. This is a valid concept. Micro transactions will become increasingly relevant in the coming years.
And I don't see copycats as a major threat, or necessarily diminishing a projects value in such a meaningful way as you do.
Reread my post. I did not say this was an invalid concept, nor anything even remotely close.
In fact, I generally agree with your statement over the relevance of micro transactions in the coming years. However, I place no certainties on one technology or product succeeding over another, and I take no future achievements for granted (wide scale adoption being a key one), in this, or any other complex system still in development. So, you know, ... high risk.
Jump to: