Topic: JOIN OR DIE! United We Stand... Divided We Fall! (Read 2633 times)

Quoting this statement to archive it as evidence for when Bitshares(TM), the company, is charged with "crimes against humanity".

Reads three times and don't understand what difference between your and Stan bottom lines. Maybe if you put the poster it's will help other to understand the difference.  

BTW probably you miss this thread: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/is-becoming-a-delegate-the-only-way-to-stake-bts-and-a-few-other-questions-1012912

Translation:

Bottom line.  There is no free lunch for the average investor.  If you want a free lunch, you need to accumulate a ton of shares and collude with the wealthy elite so you can turn your businesses into effective monopolies and operate tax free!  Inexperienced investors don't realize that they are financing this new "ruling class" via taxation without representation (see "approval voting") because we at Bitshares(TM), the company, keep telling them that "they must share the costs in order to share the rewards."

I'll have to agree that working for equity it is harder for some people to understand.  Most Silicon Valley startups issue stock to people who put in cash AND to people who put in the equivalent amount of labor.  Cash gets put in up front while labor gets put in over time.  Both types are needed and experienced investors understand that shares need to be issued to all contributors and their percentage of the company must be proportional to their percentage of contribution.  This is Investing 101.

Let's look at several equivalent alternatives:

Alternative #1 - Developers set aside some of their genesis shares "to fund development."  When you analyze that you realize that it means they intend to gradually sell from a pool of pre-issued shares that were not part of the circulating supply in order to raise fiat to pay bills. This produces exactly the same selling pressure. The only difference is whether the new supply is preprinted or printed just in time.  (Printing just in time eliminates the risk that someone can run off with the development fund and is thus the more trustless way to do it.)

Alternative #2 - Paying developers from fees to pay those exact same bills creates the exact same selling pressure.  The only problem is a new system needs time to grow before it can generate enough fees to pay those bills.  So that's a strategy you can only transition to once you reach critical mass.

Alternative #3 - If you do a crowd sale to raise funds you are also generating selling pressure.  Money that might have pursued existing shares (i.e. "demand") is soaked up buying the new shares.

Alternative #4  Get a whale to sacrifice prior shares that they have earned to pay the developers, they are still going to be sold to raise fiat.  Same selling pressure. 

Alternative #5 - Don't pay for anything. Avoid selling pressure!  - Alas, relying on part time volunteers just gives time for some better funded team to make it to the finish line before you.  And isn't it fundamentally unfair to ask volunteers to sacrifice to make you rich?  Where do people get the idea that somebody else, whether whale or volunteer, should sacrifice for their benefit?

Bottom line. There is no free lunch.  Funds to develop the system need to come from somewhere. Experienced investors realize they must share the costs in order to share the rewards.

So, we did our best to create a system that incentivizes the flow of investment dollars to fund those who are doing the work and let the chips fall where they may.  Issuing shares through delegates is our innovation that puts the shareholders in charge of who gets hired and how much they get paid.  It was the most decentralized, trustless way to do it and it was much more cost effective than how Bitcoin is doing the exact same thing.

Like you say.  Time will tell. 

Well yeah mining is a ridiculous waste, but I'm not necessarily convinced that delegate pay is better than 0 inflation with fees going to the appropriate people. Maybe it is, we'll see how it goes, but any sort of downward pressure on an asset drives potential investors out. The only thing 99% of people care about is whether or not they think whatever they buy is going to appreciate over time. At least with zero inflation you know objectively that any downward pressure is a result of individuals selling rather than inflation.

Not saying either system is clearly better than the other, but I can certainly see potential investors being turned off by any sort of systemic downward pressure. Bitcoin is the worst for that of course, and people only seem to be realizing just how bad it is over the last year or so.

You probably also keep reading people responding to those posts who are delighted with owning a blockchain that can fund its own growth by paying contributors of valuable labor instead of wasting issuance on mining electricity.  Proof of Labor instead of Proof of Work, you might say.

The BitShares Loves Puppies thread is where I've been compiling all the evidence that show an amazing ecosystem in bloom.  Much of this is stimulated by motivated delegates adding value everywhere they can.

I keep reading people blaming this system for the price decline. I guess time will tell whether or not the delegates are providing more value than they're taking.

Who was with BitShares from beginning probably knows the history of DPoS, originaly devs plan to implement TaPOS but with TaPOS it's was impossible to have fast (2 sec) transactions, when they invented DPoS, today BitShares has 10 sec transaction confirmation but I participate in test network where was tested 2 second blocks and DPoS handle such kind of load.

Originaly in DPoS all delegates only get transactions fee, and not like in other crypto when block producer get all fees from transactions in produced block, delegates in DPoS share the fees and get same reward per block as other delegates, so no competition for transactions (fees).

Today DPoS brings inflation to BitShares by paing 100% delegates 50 BTS per block, it's give us ability to hire devs and for me it's an excellent idea.

Don't think that DPoS it's final BitShares consensus algorithm, if we invent something better or other community invent something better and BitShares community support it - we will use it.

If anybody knows consensus algorithm which can provide 1-5 seconds transactions confirmation let's me know. Don't try to convince me that transaction confirmation speed not important - after I use BitShares I know how it's nice and important. 

It's my personal opinion about DPoS 

TaPOS white paper:
https://github.com/super3/invictus.io/blob/master/assets/pdf/TransactionsAsProofOfStake10.pdf

No, not now, not tomorrow, not ever!

Some us still believe in the original premise of crypto, that people come first and profits come second.  Regardless of who uses DPoS with approval voting, it will devolve into a situation where a "coalition of the wealthy" will be able to effectively rig the elections and control the crypto-economy via a monopoly.  It seems like free crypto is becoming a lost cause because it is being ever encroached on by corporatization, but to that I say, "I will defend free crypto to the end, because the only causes worth fighting for are lost causes."

I don't think you have been following me, you haven't convinced me that BTS is secure (CfBs word carries mre weight than yours) so why would I contemplate cloning. The only users I have seen saying good things about BTS turn out to be delegates  Toast or tester (?) seemed to be more balanced in their views (though I think they are delegates too). Still, closer to a discussion than a marketing seminar when they are around. Did they not want to drop by?

Let me say it again as as succinctly as I can:

• Anything one group representing x% can do can be offset by forming another group of x%.
• Anybody owning stake has a natural right to vote that stake and collaborate with others who support the same position.
• If large groups alienate smaller groups, the smaller ones can start their own chain and compete for user acceptance.
• People who own BitShares want it that way.  People who don't want it that way don't own BitShares.
• Worst case hostile takeover attempts have remedies that discourage worst case hostile takeover attempts.
• If any of this ever gets to the point where the quality of products and services provided by BitShares are unsatisfactory to its intended customers, it results in an opportunity for someone to clone a competitor that serves those customers better.
• Over time, the fittest solution will be identified by market forces and thrive.
• Rather than complain, why not clone us, implement your preferred approach, and try to compete?

I think you just hit a new low with that misquote Stan.

DE stated that would be their aim to keep themselves in power. You cherry picked it and spun it into business as usual. Then you seem to agree you wouldn't be against this freedom of association.

I know you don't do technical. Is Toast around to factcheck DEs post? I am pretty sure he has the common decency to respond to the points raised.

Bingo!

"They would do everything in their power to keep everything running smoothly."  That's all we ask!

With POW systems, you are guaranteed 100% "evil" misuse of the 10% inflation - they are going to waste it generating mining heat.

The DPOS worst case scenario is that a group of delegates get into power and "burn" all 6.3% (max) by spending it on themselves.

(Of course, this would be detected by the rank and file who would wonder why nothing was being accomplished.)

But even if nobody cared enough to form a lynch mob and overrule them, the net result would be a smoothly running system that wastes half of what POW systems waste.

And as for your coalition of the wealthy, everyone is free to form their own "strategic" coalitions.  So if a group of delegates propose a different strategic vision than what the current set is doing, they simply campaign to all the shareholders and find (in your example) 5% of them who will work together for their agenda.

We believe in freedom and everyone, even the "rich" who invested their funds to make it all possible, should have freedom of association.  

As for the rest of the world that did not decide to place their wealth at risk in the system, they don't care as long as the system runs smoothly and faithfully performs services they find useful.


Where is the coercion?  
Where is the monopoly?

We've all been down this road before, but for the sake of any new people reading this, let's show how the Bitshares Plutocracy really controls the blockchain.


Of course, Stan, you are assuming 100% of the shareholders are voting which they are not.  Last time I checked, you had under 20% of shareholders voting.  Let us assume the following:

- There are 101 delegates
- The first delegate has 20% approval.
- The last delegate has 10% approval.

Now, "approval voting" is counter-intuitive to most people when they think of elections.  With "approval voting", you can vote for as many or as few delegates as you wish.  This allows strategic voters to unduly influence the outcome of the election.  Let us imagine there is a group of shareholders, who for obvious reasons, want to position their own business interests into delegate positions.  It is unknown to the general electorate that these specific businesses are really controlled, funded and backed by this "coalition of the wealthy".  Now, let us furthermore assume that this "coalition of the wealthy" controls 5% of all shares and is participating in the delegate elections.  I'm not a gambling man, but I'd wager that this so called "coalition of the wealthy" would probably control a good amount above 5% of all shares.

The spread between the first delegate and the last delegate is 10%.  We can furthermore assume that a brand new delegate candidate entering the elections will not solely be voted for by this "coalition of the wealthy", but instead will also receive some votes from the general electorate.  Regardless of the proven identities behind these new delegate candidates, it is impossible to know who really controls the so called business of the new delegate candidate.

The "coalition of the wealthy" can remove their 5% share vote from the last fifty delegates and vote them out of power.  In addition, if they can gather >5% support from the general electorate, they can replace the delegate positions with delegates of their own choosing.  Of course, no one really know which delegates are vested business interests of this "coalition of the wealthy".  With increasing profits derived from taxation imposed on the general shareholders, these businesses can further solidify their delegate positions through unrestricted campaigning.  They can also effectively smother out any of their competitors creating a monopoly because their taxation is offset by their collection of revenues from their delegate position.  If a delegate holds >1.01% of all shares, they can operate effectively tax free.

Stan would like for you to believe that this would be detected and stopped by the general shareholders because the delegates would start acting in bad faith.  That is utter nonsense.  This "coalition of the wealthy" and their delegates which they have vested interest wouldn't even conceive of destroying this newly found cash cow that they created and would do everything in their power to keep everything running smoothly to maintain their monopolistic position over the blockchain.

Does this sound like Corporatism to you?

If any group of owners forms a coalition of 51% of the stake, they would be able to lock in their set of delegates.

To the extent that the rest of the owners are unable to unanimously agree on a different slate, that number could be lower.


But, since behavior of a slate of delegates is transparently visible to everybody, a "bad" slate would be immediately apparent.
Outraged wailing and gnashing of teeth would ensue.

Should that happen, someone would surely launch a competing clone by doing a sharedrop on only keys that did not continue to support the evil slate.


Presumably, if the behavior was sufficiently objectionable, the honest chain would win out.  Those "left behind" on the bad chain would have lost their whole attacking stake to the discipline of the marketplace and would have to start over with new capital for their next attack.  Those on the new fork would be compensated by having the shares left behind burned, with a corresponding increase in their percentage of the market cap.  We strongly encourage attackers to do this over and over again.  


Compare that to POW.  You could try to clone an honest fork, but all that rogue hash power remains untouched, and would follow you there.  

Each delegate candidate is evaluated separately.
Each share either approves or does not approve of each and every candidate.
Approving of every candidate is the same as approving of none - you don't change the pecking order at all.

The top 101 candidates with the most number of approving shares serve while they are most approved.
That can change in 10 seconds.

So, if a whale owns 1% it will take just 1% of the other shares agreeing on some other slate of 101 to cancel her out.

How many shares would it take for delegates to be able to vote themselves in indefinitely?

Many shareholders are delegates.
Since delegates get paid in shares, I'd venture to say that ALL delegates are shareholders.
Whether you are a delegate or not you get to vote your shares like anyone else.

Can delegates be shareholders?

Your explantion assumes that they can't.