This goes far beyond, one account, a measly $1k, and a user database. this is means anyone who used the same password for their email could have the passwords to other accounts recovered to the email without knowing the original. so get access to the email. find where they have accounts. paypal, bitmarket, banks, this forum, their mining sites, dating sites, dwolla, liberty reserve, everything. they might of sent a an ecrypted zip of their wallet to themselves via their email. they might of had a very important conversation with someone. money pak numbers in emails. endless possibilities. amazon accounts, ebay, godaddy, ect ect ect. this spiderwebs out.
even lulzier is bitcoin is a community of people who mine by decoding hashes. someone with a killer mining set up could rainbow table the shit out of any encryption. md5 encryptions can be easily cracked by morons via sites like md5decrypter.co.uk and the freebsdmd5 hashes by process's like this
http://hansatan.com/?d=jtrguideSo theyre going to dictate the price at 17.50 when the exchange comes back. who values this shit at $17 right now? someone bought a fuckload for penny each. and were supposed to buy at $17.50. i mean thats all fine and dandy for everyone getting out of bitcoins, but thats no good for the market in general.
mtgox is a buncha fuckups who lost lots of people alot of money, set back a revolution and wont take responsibility for handing out the database to an auditor for reasons unknown. i know what auditors do, no reason for him to have emails and logins. fucking morons down at mtgox have fucked up big time.
It's a good thing you're long-winded because otherwise you would win my "most fails per word" award...
Let's take these one at a time...
even lulzier is bitcoin is a community of people who mine by decoding hashesNo, we generate hashes until they fall below an arbitrary value, hashes cannot be "decoded" only recreated. This is similar to the way a brute force hash-collision attack works, but not quite the same.
someone with a killer mining set up could rainbow table the shit out of any encryptionNot every encryption schema is susceptible to rainbow tables. As a matter of fact, no one really uses rainbow tables for encryption because you'd have to have a sample for every possible plaintext encrypted with every possible key to do so, which would result in immeasurably large files. We use rainbow tables for hashing algorithms. Furthermore, aside from a handful of very old accounts, Mt. Gox did at least use salt with their MD5 which renders rainbow tables ineffective and requires time be spent to specifically brute force one password at a time. If you had a password of sufficient complexity, you would still be safe from this attack for a pretty reasonable period of time (measured in years).
So theyre going to dictate the price at 17.50 when the exchange comes back. who values this shit at $17 right now?No one does, not even Mt. Gox. The price is rolling back to $17.51 because that's what the top (most recent) transaction in their database was at when the attack occurred. When the system comes back online, it will be free to move in whatever direction the market is currently valuing BTC at. People will cancel their buy/sell orders and place them at more reasonable points surrounding the current trade value.
someone bought a fuckload for penny each. and were supposed to buy at $17.50Yes, but it really only matters what someone was able to
cash out after buying at $0.01. I don't have the post in front of me but "Kevin" claims to have been able to cash out ~600 BTC, worth around $8,000 at current market values. Still quite a bit of cash, but not the "fuckload" you claim or the 263,000 that were actually purchased before the rollback.
mtgox is a buncha fuckups who lost lots of people alot of money, set back a revolution and wont take responsibility for handing out the database to an auditor for reasons unknown. i know what auditors do, no reason for him to have emails and logins. fucking morons down at mtgox have fucked up big time.Now I do at least agree with you a bit here. I might use more "grown-up" language to express my opinion of Mt. Gox but I do feel that they've managed to hurt the bitcoin economy and community via their poor security. I also agree that unless the "auditor" was actually a security auditor, he/she had no business in the login database. It might be the case that Mt. Gox stores their login data within a table in the same database as their trades, which would be one more security failure on their part in my humble opinion.
anyone who used the same password for their email could have the passwords to other accounts recovered to the email without knowing the originalAlthough you wrote this in the most convoluted way possible, I think I understand you to be saying "if people used the same passwords in multiple places, this could lead to the compromise of even more accounts" which would be true. Of course this is why we always say to never use the same password for multiple systems, not that anyone listens. This is one of the few places where the onus of security is placed squarely on the shoulders of the individual; Mt. Gox could have forced secure passwords upon their users, additional authentication factors, all kinds of things - but they can't force their users NOT to use their GMail password at the exchange.