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Topic: New video: Why the blocksize limit keeps Bitcoin free and decentralized - page 5. (Read 15248 times)

hero member
Activity: 772
Merit: 501
Natural monopolies are...well...natural in some environment.  Namely one's where the barrier to entry is high.  They are also artificially created when possible.  Visa/MC are probably a little bit of both.

I conjecture that efforts based on a freely accessible Bitcoin network will have a very low barrier to entry and can arrange an endless array of unique incentives so I very much doubt that they would fall victim to the natural monopoly effect.

You haven't explained why the tendency for a few dominant networks to arise, which we see in Visa/MC, would not exist with payment processors handling BTC-credit. BTC-credit is not BTC. BTC's decentralization doesn't make credit held by centralized BTC-banks less centralized. The handling of credit happens through traditional off-the-chain channels, where BTC's decentralization has no benefit.

Again with all due respect, it seems like the 'offchain' crew is making assumptions that are not supported by any real substance. The safer assumption, in my opinion, is that centralized parties handling BTC-credit will act like banks that handle other types of credit now, and will be vulnerable to the same type of pressure.

And as I say, with all due respect, you seem to also.  I reject (fairly vociferously) that there would be a mechanism to promote significant centralization while you assume it would be the case.

I believe there would be a mechanism that promotes centralization, because there is a mechanism in traditional payment markets that promotes centralization, and traditional payment processors handle fiat-credit, which has almost exactly the same properties as BTC-credit.

You haven't explained why this mechanism, which we see in fiat payment processing, wouldn't be seen in BTC-credit payment processing, even though they both use the same type of trust-based credit relationships.

Going full circle, the 1MB (or reasonable) limit is simply to keep the kernel of the distributed crypto-currency ecosystem widely distributed and having a realistic chance of survival under the most significant and coordinated of attacks.

There is very little to attack if there's a 1 MB block size limit. BTC won't be a major player. It'll be centralized banks that handle credit redeemable in BTC that dominate the BTC economy, if indeed BTC becomes widely accepted, which I don't believe it will if transaction fees need to reach $20 to handle global scale traffic.

I'll grant that in the unlikely event that bitcoin succeeded under a 1 MB block cap, and this kind of economy came to be, at least the currency wouldn't be inflated by governments, but everything else will be like the modern financial system, as far as I can see.

Bitcoin is not free, it's about $129 /BTC at the moment. The block size limit won't keep it free but it will surely keep it from rising much above $400, since as we hit the 7tps limit with actual useful (non-SD) transactions the limit will cap the adoption at that level.

Bitcoin is not THAT useful as a technology. Never was, never will be. If we artificially cap the transactions to some level (as opposed to letting the market decide) it will certainly make bitcoin even less useful.

That's exactly how I see it.
hero member
Activity: 501
Merit: 500
Bitcoin is not free, it's about $129 /BTC at the moment. The block size limit won't keep it free but it will surely keep it from rising much above $400, since as we hit the 7tps limit with actual useful (non-SD) transactions the limit will cap the adoption at that level.

Bitcoin is not THAT useful as a technology. Never was, never will be. If we artificially cap the transactions to some level (as opposed to letting the market decide) it will certainly make bitcoin even less useful.
legendary
Activity: 4690
Merit: 1276
Natural monopolies are...well...natural in some environment.  Namely one's where the barrier to entry is high.  They are also artificially created when possible.  Visa/MC are probably a little bit of both.

I conjecture that efforts based on a freely accessible Bitcoin network will have a very low barrier to entry and can arrange an endless array of unique incentives so I very much doubt that they would fall victim to the natural monopoly effect.

You haven't explained why the tendency for a few dominant networks to arise, which we see in Visa/MC, would not exist with payment processors handling BTC-credit. BTC-credit is not BTC. BTC's decentralization doesn't make credit held by centralized BTC-banks less centralized. The handling of credit happens through traditional off-the-chain channels, where BTC's decentralization has no benefit.

Again with all due respect, it seems like the 'offchain' crew is making assumptions that are not supported by any real substance. The safer assumption, in my opinion, is that centralized parties handling BTC-credit will act like banks that handle other types of credit now, and will be vulnerable to the same type of pressure.

And as I say, with all due respect, you seem to also.  I reject (fairly vociferously) that there would be a mechanism to promote significant centralization while you assume it would be the case.  I am certain that we won't see the kind of regulatory capture and verndor strong-arming that has put VISA and MC where they are.

Now, it may well be the case that people choose, en-mass, to use one payment processor for the other services they offer (authentication, convenient wallet access, whatever.)  That's lamentable, but it would remain a free choice since any number of alternatives would exist.

I actually think that a very likely outcome would be that people would choose a payment processor who was affiliated with causes they believe in for one reason or another.  Jesuscoin.org, greenpeacecoin.org, nracoin.org, etc.  (The latter will be for sale someday, BTW Smiley )

I'll be using some combination of native Bitcoin, some off-chain processor who respects privacy, one who is jurisdictional secure, and probably several who are associated with causes I believe in.  I expect to have a simple UI to effortlessly and inexpensively transfer value between the various off-chain solutions I use.

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We may have to agree to dis-agree on this, but it is pretty clear to me that we are both handwaving to some extent.

Ultimately, yes.

Soon.  As soon as we can find it in our hearts to stop stawman-ing one another.

OK, even if Bitcoin growth happened to stop at a point when a few thousand entities could still operate it...

As I've mentioned on previous threads, there is much more value in having a broad footprint in the network and using it to harvest business intelligence information than there would be in collecting penny-ante fees.  So, entities who have a realistic ability to tap into this source of value will be able to subsidize the services they offer.  This will drive out competition and create a vicious circle of centralization.

A 1 MB block size limit is not a solution to that. Whatever the risks are of having high-bandwidth requirements for nodes, they are nothing compared to the risks that would face unregulated high throughput payment processors.

Going full circle, the 1MB (or reasonable) limit is simply to keep the kernel of the distributed crypto-currency ecosystem widely distributed and having a realistic chance of survival under the most significant and coordinated of attacks.

I cannot say that I don't care about the 'spending money' second-tier organs (or 'off-chain processors') but they are in my mind very secondary and very dispensable relative to the actual value core.  They need to compete and offer more options to end-users which I see as a good thing and a much more safe outlet for the urge that everyone feels to have things grow and improve.

hero member
Activity: 772
Merit: 501
Natural monopolies are...well...natural in some environment.  Namely one's where the barrier to entry is high.  They are also artificially created when possible.  Visa/MC are probably a little bit of both.

I conjecture that efforts based on a freely accessible Bitcoin network will have a very low barrier to entry and can arrange an endless array of unique incentives so I very much doubt that they would fall victim to the natural monopoly effect.

You haven't explained why the tendency for a few dominant networks to arise, which we see in Visa/MC, would not exist with payment processors handling BTC-credit. BTC-credit is not BTC. BTC's decentralization doesn't make credit held by centralized BTC-banks less centralized. The handling of credit happens through traditional off-the-chain channels, where BTC's decentralization has no benefit.

Again with all due respect, it seems like the 'offchain' crew is making assumptions that are not supported by any real substance. The safer assumption, in my opinion, is that centralized parties handling BTC-credit will act like banks that handle other types of credit now, and will be vulnerable to the same type of pressure.

OK, even if Bitcoin growth happened to stop at a point when a few thousand entities could still operate it...

As I've mentioned on previous threads, there is much more value in having a broad footprint in the network and using it to harvest business intelligence information than there would be in collecting penny-ante fees.  So, entities who have a realistic ability to tap into this source of value will be able to subsidize the services they offer.  This will drive out competition and create a vicious circle of centralization.

A 1 MB block size limit is not a solution to that. Whatever the risks are of having high-bandwidth requirements for nodes, they are nothing compared to the risks that would face unregulated high throughput payment processors.

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I'm looking forward to his work along these lines.

Good luck. If you succeed, then you would have no reason to be concerned about a lifting of the 1 MB cap, as off-chain solutions that are as provably secure as the Bitcoin network would be the preferred payment mechanism of users, and most activity will take place off the chain.
sr. member
Activity: 461
Merit: 251
I can't see why it matters if an evil miner fills his blocks with transactions that he hasn't relayed.  It doesn't put the Tor miner at any relative disadvantage, as he's still safe receiving the block data without Tor, correct?  Am I missing something here, retep?

That's only true if Tor miners are the majority. If they are the minority, and >50% of hashing power has fast connections, doing so puts that Tor miner at a big disadvantage, and is good for the miners with the fast connection by reducing competition. Keep in mind that it's likely that large well-connected miners will offer SPV node connection services in return for you not giving the competition a chance at mining those transactions and collecting the fees: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/how-you-will-pay-for-bitcoin-network-access-services-in-the-future-197169
I'm not following why Tor is an issue at all in this proposed attack, since they're receiving all incoming data without Tor, at the same speed as non-Tor miners.  I'm really sorry if I'm just being thick here.

The miner on bandwidth limited anonymous connections will always receive an incoming block slower than someone located in a non-anonymous datacenter.
Um...  These attack blocks would be received on non-anonymous connections, as this behavior is indistinguishable from a non-mining node's.  Only sending has to be done via an anonymous connection, and as you mentioned earlier, this can be done quite efficiently (I thought transactions were more like 500 bytes, giving a 15x boost to scalability, but whatever.  Actually, as Mike Hearn mentioned somewhere on the forum before, only the first few bytes of transaction hashes actually need to be sent, so this boost can actually be quite a lot larger.).

Unless you mean the anonymous miner's non-anonymized bandwidth is likely smaller than a non-anonymous miner's, since the latter can use an efficient data center.  In which case, how much extra on-demand bandwidth beyond the usual steady transaction flow are you estimating is necessary to thwart these attack blocks?  Is this amount of bandwidth really only available to people who are willing to give up physical control of their machines?  Don't you think that any extra cost due to lowered economic efficiency might be externally funded by parties interested in preventing censorship?
sr. member
Activity: 461
Merit: 251
I'm sure there is a decent algorithm that will allow for an increasing sized block without it ruining bitcoin's decentralization.

Actually it seems pretty clear already how this can be done.  Some of us have been thinking ahead Smiley  Here's a good summary of it by gmaxwell: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.1596626  Follow the thread/links back for more details.

One further improvement on this proposal is for nodes to partially verify blocks in order to make the block auditing more decentralized.
legendary
Activity: 2632
Merit: 1023
Someday people are going to look at 1 MB like they do a 1 KB. Keeping it at that arbitrary size doesn't help anybody. I'm sure there is a decent algorithm that will allow for an increasing sized block without it ruining bitcoin's decentralization.

Furthermore, I still don't understand why full nodes don't receive some compensation? Why only miners?


this is what I thought as well
...

need is the mother of invention
legendary
Activity: 1120
Merit: 1152
I can't see why it matters if an evil miner fills his blocks with transactions that he hasn't relayed.  It doesn't put the Tor miner at any relative disadvantage, as he's still safe receiving the block data without Tor, correct?  Am I missing something here, retep?

That's only true if Tor miners are the majority. If they are the minority, and >50% of hashing power has fast connections, doing so puts that Tor miner at a big disadvantage, and is good for the miners with the fast connection by reducing competition. Keep in mind that it's likely that large well-connected miners will offer SPV node connection services in return for you not giving the competition a chance at mining those transactions and collecting the fees: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/how-you-will-pay-for-bitcoin-network-access-services-in-the-future-197169
I'm not following why Tor is an issue at all in this proposed attack, since they're receiving all incoming data without Tor, at the same speed as non-Tor miners.  I'm really sorry if I'm just being thick here.

The miner on bandwidth limited anonymous connections will always receive an incoming block slower than someone located in a non-anonymous datacenter.
sr. member
Activity: 461
Merit: 251
I can't see why it matters if an evil miner fills his blocks with transactions that he hasn't relayed.  It doesn't put the Tor miner at any relative disadvantage, as he's still safe receiving the block data without Tor, correct?  Am I missing something here, retep?

That's only true if Tor miners are the majority. If they are the minority, and >50% of hashing power has fast connections, doing so puts that Tor miner at a big disadvantage, and is good for the miners with the fast connection by reducing competition. Keep in mind that it's likely that large well-connected miners will offer SPV node connection services in return for you not giving the competition a chance at mining those transactions and collecting the fees: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/how-you-will-pay-for-bitcoin-network-access-services-in-the-future-197169
I'm not following why Tor is an issue at all in this proposed attack, since they're receiving all incoming data without Tor, at the same speed as non-Tor miners.  I'm really sorry if I'm just being thick here.
sr. member
Activity: 461
Merit: 251
Personally, I'm fine with a situation where miners anonymously connect to pools that migrate to friendly jurisdictions, but that's just me.  And that's only the worst case scenario if the assumption that Tor can't scale is correct, which I've seen no argument for.  Perhaps retep or jdillon could explain this assumption here?

You know, if you are happy with just assuming pools and nodes in general migrate to friendly jurisdictions you do have a lot of options. But Liberty Reserve just showed how seemingly friendly jurisdictions don't always stay friendly.
I certainly don't assume they would.  But mining pools are a dime a dozen, and it's not really a big deal if a jurisdiction turns unfriendly and takes one or two out, as miners can seamlessly migrate to another pool in a friendly jurisdiction.  Engineering for the scenario that all jurisdictions across the planet have become unfriendly toward Bitcoin is kind of silly IMHO.
legendary
Activity: 4690
Merit: 1276
I do NOT believe that this is why we see centralization in mainstream banking institutions (to the extent that we do.)  The entire mainstream monetary system is built on a system of trusting the power of governments (and having the capitalization to influence them.)

A lot of arguments could be made about the causes of centralization, so I'll try to give a more specific example: Visa/Mastercard dominate credit card payments, and would dominate even with no regulations. Networks like this have a network effect. Whoever controls the network then becomes the central power in payment processing.

Merchants have to use their services if they hope to have access to the majority of consumers, and consumers prefer to use their network over those of smaller competitors, even if the smaller competitors offer significant advantages, because whatever those advantages are, they can't make up for the disadvantage of having a smaller network.

It's a snowball effect that's going to lead to a few large networks dominating. Unlike the bitcoin network, a BTC-bank network will require some combination of regulatory approval, trust-building, and fees to the party controlling the network for a participant to join.

This makes it very likely in my opinion to become something similar to the modern payments system, notwithstanding the absence of central bank control over the base currency.

Natural monopolies are...well...natural in some environment.  Namely one's where the barrier to entry is high.  They are also artificially created when possible.  Visa/MC are probably a little bit of both.

I conjecture that efforts based on a freely accessible Bitcoin network will have a very low barrier to entry and can arrange an endless array of unique incentives so I very much doubt that they would fall victim to the natural monopoly effect.

We may have to agree to dis-agree on this, but it is pretty clear to me that we are both handwaving to some extent.

With all due respect, you're missing my point. I'm comparing a few thousand nodes, requiring enterprise-grade hardware to operate, to a large trust-based network of payment processors, that need to stay online and undisturbed for their BTC-credit to maintain its value.

With the latter, there is serious disruption when payment processors within the major network(s) go offline: the BTC-credit they hold can become worthless. And it's not easily repaired (trust-based relationships take time to build).

The former is safe as long as the majority of nodes are operating. If one node goes down, there is no disruption at all to BTC transactions.

Given you need to have one or the other (a network of large nodes or a large trust-based network of payment processors), I would much rather have the former.

OK, even if Bitcoin growth happened to stop at a point when a few thousand entities could still operate it...

As I've mentioned on previous threads, there is much more value in having a broad footprint in the network and using it to harvest business intelligence information than there would be in collecting penny-ante fees.  So, entities who have a realistic ability to tap into this source of value will be able to subsidize the services they offer.  This will drive out competition and create a vicious circle of centralization. 

For an example of this, consider how e-mail has evolved over the past 10 years ago.  Relatedly, look at how much more centralized the e-mail solutions most of us use have become.  You think that this happens just because some CEO felt like giving something back to the community?  Think again.

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And as the OP points out and is in the process of demonstrating, it is perfectly possible for off-chain providers to provide as much proof (and as little 'trust') as they need in order to attract the users they want.

I need MUCH more convincing demonstrations that off chain providers can provide "as much proof" as nodes in the bitcoin network can.

I'm looking forward to his work along these lines.

legendary
Activity: 1120
Merit: 1152
I can't see why it matters if an evil miner fills his blocks with transactions that he hasn't relayed.  It doesn't put the Tor miner at any relative disadvantage, as he's still safe receiving the block data without Tor, correct?  Am I missing something here, retep?

That's only true if Tor miners are the majority. If they are the minority, and >50% of hashing power has fast connections, doing so puts that Tor miner at a big disadvantage, and is good for the miners with the fast connection by reducing competition. Keep in mind that it's likely that large well-connected miners will offer SPV node connection services in return for you not giving the competition a chance at mining those transactions and collecting the fees: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/how-you-will-pay-for-bitcoin-network-access-services-in-the-future-197169
sr. member
Activity: 461
Merit: 251
...
Quote from: retep
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Quote from: Mike Hearn on April 03, 2013, 12:03:11 AM
I was referring to the gathering of transactions stage, which is arguably the expensive part, bandwidth wise. If blocks are represented efficiently (eg, list of hashes or deltas against remote expected blocks) then almost all your bandwidth would go on receiving transaction broadcasts, and that doesn't require Tor.

...which means if I want to prevent mining behind Tor, all I have to do is fill my blocks with transactions that I haven't relayed to them. On the other hand, if it's a rule that you only mine to extend blocks if the transactions were broadcast first, anything that even makes transaction propagation slower, like a bunch of fake nodes, but far from 100%, causes orphan rates to jump. Not to mention I can make it very risky, due to orphaning, to mine blocks containing transactions that a large fraction of the nodes out there have decided to blacklist for whatever reason. You also create new forking risks if transaction propagation is ever prevented, when block propagation isn't.
...

I can't see why it matters if an evil miner fills his blocks with transactions that he hasn't relayed.  It doesn't put the Tor miner at any relative disadvantage, as he's still safe receiving the block data without Tor, correct?  Am I missing something here, retep?
legendary
Activity: 1120
Merit: 1152
Despite my disagreements with the video I thought it was really well done. I hope somebody does something as equally good for the opposition.

My video was made by stonecanoe - give them a shout.

Personally, I'm fine with a situation where miners anonymously connect to pools that migrate to friendly jurisdictions, but that's just me.  And that's only the worst case scenario if the assumption that Tor can't scale is correct, which I've seen no argument for.  Perhaps retep or jdillon could explain this assumption here?

You know, if you are happy with just assuming pools and nodes in general migrate to friendly jurisdictions you do have a lot of options. But Liberty Reserve just showed how seemingly friendly jurisdictions don't always stay friendly.

Any form of encrypted data transmission, including Tor, has problems in jurisdictions like China which simply throttle encrypted data. The cost to banning encrypted data entirely is just too much, let alone when you include stuff like steganography, (thanks tvbcof) P2P radio links and other exotics. A small blocksize, and off-chain transactions, gives you options.

After all, I've seen people argue that with tx hashes we could easily have a blocksize 5-10x bigger and still mine over anonymous data connections efficiently. That argument is based on taking the average tx size, (160 to 320 bytes) and just passing around tx hashes (32 bytes) instead when you create a block. (this assumes mempools are fairly well synchronized, a problematic assumption, let alone under attack) Well, that's great, but it just gives you 5x-10x better scaling. That doesn't buy you much exponential growth, let alone abusive uses of Bitcoin for things like timestamping that we just can't stop.

What do you do next if 10MB isn't enough? I firmly believe I don't really know what the future of Bitcoin is. I know I don't have a magic crystal ball, but I do believe in having options: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Z902nIOvL0
hero member
Activity: 772
Merit: 501
I do NOT believe that this is why we see centralization in mainstream banking institutions (to the extent that we do.)  The entire mainstream monetary system is built on a system of trusting the power of governments (and having the capitalization to influence them.)

A lot of arguments could be made about the causes of centralization, so I'll try to give a more specific example: Visa/Mastercard dominate credit card payments, and would dominate even with no regulations. Networks like this have a network effect. Whoever controls the network then becomes the central power in payment processing.

Merchants have to use their services if they hope to have access to the majority of consumers, and consumers prefer to use their network over those of smaller competitors, even if the smaller competitors offer significant advantages, because whatever those advantages are, they can't make up for the disadvantage of having a smaller network.

It's a snowball effect that's going to lead to a few large networks dominating. Unlike the bitcoin network, a BTC-bank network will require some combination of regulatory approval, trust-building, and fees to the party controlling the network for a participant to join.

This makes it very likely in my opinion to become something similar to the modern payments system, notwithstanding the absence of central bank control over the base currency.

Nodes on the other hand, because they are only one of thousands of nodes storing and propagating the same data, can be taken down without any disruption to the bitcoin economy. A node can also easily pop up to replace any that is taken down. It's only a matter of mustering the technical resources. No one has to be able to trust a node operator for the node to be immediately plugged into the p2p network. Hashes and digital signatures don't lie.

You are basically making my argument for me here.  That is why it is critically important to me that the system remains lite enough such that the barrier to entry is minimal AND that the communication protocol is conduce to reliable function even under coordinated attack by network carriers.  Or at least the kernel of the system (i.e., Bitcoin) because if that remains functional, auxiliary systems can be re-born overnight if they are somehow killed off.


With all due respect, you're missing my point. I'm comparing a few thousand nodes, requiring enterprise-grade hardware to operate, to a large trust-based network of payment processors, that need to stay online and undisturbed for their BTC-credit to maintain its value.

With the latter, there is serious disruption when payment processors within the major network(s) go offline: the BTC-credit they hold can become worthless. And it's not easily repaired (trust-based relationships take time to build).

The former is safe as long as the majority of nodes are operating. If one node goes down, there is no disruption at all to BTC transactions.

Given you need to have one or the other (a network of large nodes or a large trust-based network of payment processors), I would much rather have the former.

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And as the OP points out and is in the process of demonstrating, it is perfectly possible for off-chain providers to provide as much proof (and as little 'trust') as they need in order to attract the users they want.

I need MUCH more convincing demonstrations that off chain providers can provide "as much proof" as nodes in the bitcoin network can.
legendary
Activity: 4690
Merit: 1276
< I apologize, but I must trim a little for brevity. >


I don't believe that things would play out as you imagine as long as the barrier to entry for being a payment processor is low (which, of course, facilitates both competition and the ability for a processor to take bigger risks as they have less to lose.)

The OP has a conception of payment processors being able to demonstrate proof of stake in backing store ownership.  I like this, but also things could work well with 'off chain' meaning being more completely de-coupled or trust-based.


The barrier to become a payment processor that has trust-based relationships with other BTC-banks would be much higher than the barrier to become a Node.

We see in the real world that financial systems built on trust become highly centralized, for reasons independent of regulations, like, well, payment processors, and the way people rely only on the largest networks (Visa/Mastercard/ACH).

This is because trust takes time to build. Centralized BTC-banks are also much more attractive to government as targets for regulatory action, because a takedown of one causes a disruption to the activity it's involved in and is not easily repaired (trust takes time to build).


I do NOT believe that this is why we see centralization in mainstream banking institutions (to the extent that we do.)  The entire mainstream monetary system is built on a system of trusting the power of governments (and having the capitalization to influence them.)  To me, the centralization at the institutional level is most a reflection of the propensity for capital itself to centralize.

A system backed by Bitcoin (and thus, mathematics) will not be prone to the same innate pressures to centralize.  To me, the struggle to keep Bitcoin free of the pernicious effects of monopolization via the necessity for capital intensive systems.

Nodes on the other hand, because they are only one of thousands of nodes storing and propagating the same data, can be taken down without any disruption to the bitcoin economy. A node can also easily pop up to replace any that is taken down. It's only a matter of mustering the technical resources. No one has to be able to trust a node operator for the node to be immediately plugged into the p2p network. Hashes and digital signatures don't lie.

You are basically making my argument for me here.  That is why it is critically important to me that the system remains lite enough such that the barrier to entry is minimal AND that the communication protocol is conduce to reliable function even under coordinated attack by network carriers.  Or at least the kernel of the system (i.e., Bitcoin) because if that remains functional, auxiliary systems can be re-born overnight if they are somehow killed off.

And as the OP points out and is in the process of demonstrating, it is perfectly possible for off-chain providers to provide as much proof (and as little 'trust') as they need in order to attract the users they want.

Lastly, with a very solid core (like Bitcoin of today) the trust between off-chain providers themselves needs to be minimal.  At most they need to trust one another only until the square up, and it would be foolish to put one's solvency at risk by extending this interval.

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I seem to have a little more confidence in the potential for crypto-currencies to de-couple themselves from fiat than do you.
I'm not quite sure what you mean here. In which way have I shown little faith in de-coupling from fiat?
That was mostly a mistaken interpretation on my part of what you wrote.
sr. member
Activity: 461
Merit: 251
If anyone's interested in the anonymous mining issue, here's an informative exchange found in this thread: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/funding-of-network-security-with-infinite-block-sizes-157141
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Quote from: Mike Hearn
I think you are massively over-estimating the difficulty of mining anonymously (as is usual with these debates).

Firstly, there is no particular reason mining on a pool requires a lot of bandwidth. Stratum with high difficulty shares already cut bandwidth usage very low.

For running the full node/pool itself, resource requirements are low. You can connect to the P2P network to gather transactions just like any other client. Nobody knows you are mining, even without Tor, as your behaviour is indistinguishable from any other node. Nodes can synchronise their mempools are startup and then know what each peers preferred block contents is likely to be: once solved, a block can be transmitted as a delta against the expected contents. This has the side effect of increasing bandwidth requirements for people who want to mine empty blocks, which is satisfying.

However, even without that change, I can't see a time when mining anonymously is impossible. Your argument, as always, relies on the assumption that "things" cannot possibly scale up, where the thing here is Tor. Tor can scale, so even if mining ends up requiring a lot of bandwidth it doesn't change anything.

Quote from: retep
Mike, lets suppose for a second that I am correct, and Tor bandwidth and other anonymity technologies do not scale with the bandwidth possible at VPN/co-location providers, and thus running mining (not hashing) operations is not possible anonymously.

What do you expect to happen?

Quote from: Mike Hearn
Not much?

In the event that some jurisdictions with aggressive regulators try to impede mining, it will migrate elsewhere. Only if all mining is made illegal everywhere would it be a problem, and that's equivalent to a worldwide ban on Bitcoin, at which point it doesn't matter anymore.

Quote from: jgarzik
Quote
Quote from: Mike Hearn on April 02, 2013, 10:05:44 PM
Nobody knows you are mining, even without Tor, as your behaviour is indistinguishable from any other node.

Not true.  Sites already track the first node relaying a particular block.  Targeted observation (wiretap) makes the activity even more transparent, when you find a block.

Quote from: Mike Hearn
Quote
Quote from: jgarzik on April 02, 2013, 11:50:02 PM
Not true.  Sites already track the first node relaying a particular block.  Targeted observation (wiretap) makes the activity even more transparent, when you find a block.

I was referring to the gathering of transactions stage, which is arguably the expensive part, bandwidth wise. If blocks are represented efficiently (eg, list of hashes or deltas against remote expected blocks) then almost all your bandwidth would go on receiving transaction broadcasts, and that doesn't require Tor.

Quote from: retep
Quote
Quote from: Mike Hearn on April 03, 2013, 12:03:11 AM
I was referring to the gathering of transactions stage, which is arguably the expensive part, bandwidth wise. If blocks are represented efficiently (eg, list of hashes or deltas against remote expected blocks) then almost all your bandwidth would go on receiving transaction broadcasts, and that doesn't require Tor.

...which means if I want to prevent mining behind Tor, all I have to do is fill my blocks with transactions that I haven't relayed to them. On the other hand, if it's a rule that you only mine to extend blocks if the transactions were broadcast first, anything that even makes transaction propagation slower, like a bunch of fake nodes, but far from 100%, causes orphan rates to jump. Not to mention I can make it very risky, due to orphaning, to mine blocks containing transactions that a large fraction of the nodes out there have decided to blacklist for whatever reason. You also create new forking risks if transaction propagation is ever prevented, when block propagation isn't.

Personally, I'm fine with a situation where miners anonymously connect to pools that migrate to friendly jurisdictions, but that's just me.  And that's only the worst case scenario if the assumption that Tor can't scale is correct, which I've seen no argument for.  Perhaps retep or jdillon could explain this assumption here?
newbie
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Wow i learned a whole lot reading this whole thread!
sr. member
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Merit: 250
"to survive, we must live and fly"
I like this but I do not see where you fix the transaction fee problem. The video states that transaction fees will continuously rise due to small block size and increased adoption. So, you are basically advocating transaction fees in order to keep Bitcoin decentralized? This is where Ripple shines - no mining necessary. We need to reexamine other protocols as a community and stop trashing technological progress.
hero member
Activity: 614
Merit: 500
jdillon, tbvconf and others: Thank you!

FWIW As it stands at I've gotten about $5750 worth of donations for the video, including the initial $3000 committed prior to making it, so I'm only about $1250 away from breaking even. I knew going into the project that I was taking a big risk, but in the end it's all worked out.

Again, thank you!

Despite my disagreements with the video I thought it was really well done. I hope somebody does something as equally good for the opposition.
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