Edit: also I can devise an attack to side-step your protocol rule. Build a chain branch that has no double-spends and make it public. Gradually change my list of witnesses one-by-one on the units I sign as the old witness happily sign units on my chain branch to advance the stability point. I can spam with as many Sybil address signed units as necessary to convince the witnesses that my chain branch is "real". Then once I've got the old witness down to a minority, I can take my chain branch private and complete the attack I explained to you before.
Again, seems like you are assuming you can convince somebody with the number of your Sybil units. And not just somebody -- the acting witnesses. The acting witnesses, and other users likewise, are not going to change their own witness lists to stay compatible with your Sybil units. Your Sybil units will be accepted into the DAG, but, being incompatible, they are not going to be selected as
best parent, hence they have no chance to appear on the MC, hence none of them can ever become
last ball (which necessarily lies on MC).
Okay so you are telling me that the current witnesses on the branch I am trying to create have to agree with 11 of 12 with my list of witnesses when they sign units on my branch? So this means the entire system has to agree on the
same 12 witnesses for all main chains for the entire system?
If that is your design, then yes you can prevent my attack but at the cost of having 12 very entrenched witnesses which can never be migrated away from because political action never reaches 92% agreement.
So why not just use 12 federated servers and name this Visa, Mastercard, or Paypal instead? No need for the facade of a DAG nor to claim/insinuate by association to our Satoshi ecosystem that it is decentralized. Distributed is not same as decentralized.
How have you come to "the
same 12 witnesses"?
To be eligible for inclusion on the MC, you have to agree about 11 witnesses, not 12 (1 mutation allowed).
For a change of the witness list to reach stability, support of the majority, that is 7 out of 12, or 58% witnesses is required.
To reach any significant mutation seems highly improbable.
For example to get 2 mutations, we need 1 of the 11 witness at the last stability point to agree with 1 of the 2 of the mutations we want to make. To get 3 mutations, we need that prior sentence plus 1 of the other 10 witness from the starting stability point to agree with 2 of the 3 mutations we want to make. To get 4 mutations, we need that prior sentence plus 1 of the other 9 witness from the starting stability point to agree with 3 of the 4 mutations we want to make. Etc.
Three mutations seems very unlikely unless those two witness were misbehaving, in which case it seems everyone globally will want to get rid of those two witness. But that presumes there can even be an objective truth about misbehavior and that agreement can be reached. Getting 9% of the witnesses to agree on 2 witness to expel and 18% to agree on 1 witness to expel seems improbable.
Four mutations seems to be extremely unlikely, requiring 9% of the witnesses to agree on 3 witness to expel, 18% to agree on 2 witnesses to expel, and 27% to agree on 1 witness to expel.
And that presumes that the replacements for those expelled witnesses agree with the subsequent mutations. So actually the odds are worse than I just stated. Four mutations actually requires 14% of the witnesses to agree on 3 witness to expel, 27% to agree on 2 witnesses to expel, and 41% to agree on 1 witness to expel.
If there is indeed a proliferation of witnesses, who in the heck is going to have any confidence that a majority of some set of 12 (of the multitudes of such sets) won't go defunct leaving all those addresses (money!) in limbo forever. The cognitive load and worry on the users is unfathomable.
The state of this system will either solidify on 12 witness every where which are highly trusted, or it will devolve into Swiss cheese. You still don't seem to understand the most basic element of monetary theory, which is that the value of money is solely based on the CONFIDENCE that it can be spent later and someone will accept it.
Rube Goldberg machines are intentionally more clever than they need to be.