Yes there is coin age and a target that decreases (presumably so that it's progressively easier to find a block: the network doesn't get stuck).
What does that have to do with preventing alternate chains?
Sure 10% is smaller than 90%, however not all the transactions in a chain are going to be using all the stake/coin age at any given time, plus its possible for the 10% to have more stake age than the 90%... Seems to me the attacker simply has to wait for the right moment while checking the blockchain constantly with a program.
To explain it more clearly: The issue for the 90% who wants to stop the attacker is that if they are constantly sending coins to each other, then none of their coins gain much age. And if they save up coin age, those coins aren't used in a transaction until they are used, so the attacker can sneak in before that. Very hard to set up a system where there's no "holes", even if all the participants are cooperating.
To simplify things, let's say that there is no coin age involved, as suggested by @achimsmile in a previous post. It's a simple constant to change in the source code anyway.
Could you try to explain to me a bit more in detail in what circumstances the alternate chains could get a chain trust superior to the network one?
To be successful do we agree that these alternate chains should be at least 6 blocks long?
If there's no coin age, then its a totally different implementation right?
So "how to get a superior chain" depends on how the protocol defines it.
In fact you could totally remove coinage from Peercoin without changing implementation.
Just set STAKE_MAX_AGE = STAKE_MIN_AGE +1 and you'll get a time weight of 1:
https://github.com/ppcoin/ppcoin/blob/v0.4.0ppc/src/kernel.cpp#L328The "how to get a superior chain" is described in detail in the
Peercoin chain trust wiki page.
In Peercoin block chain trust is calculated by adding current block trust to previous block chain trust.
As described in the wiki page block trust is directly related to the minted stake coin-days.
I guess we agree that these alternate chains should be at least 6 blocks long.
I think you may be missing my point. Even if the change is a single line of code in a config file, or whatever,
by eliminating coinage as a security component, the implementation of PoS changes, thus changing how
the coin would be attacked.
Talking about different implementations can be very draining and go on forever.
You are already talking in circles because first you suggested removing coinage,
then I told you if you did that, the superior chain would be based on the protocol
rules, and then you referred me back to the peercoin rules which do use coinage.
To make it clear: Either the code as implemented considers coin age or it doesn't.
If it doesn't, then there would have to be an alternate method of deciding what
chain is best.
