What does that have to do with preventing alternate chains?
Sure 10% is smaller than 90%, however not all the transactions in a chain are going to be using all the stake/coin age at any given time, plus its possible for the 10% to have more stake age than the 90%... Seems to me the attacker simply has to wait for the right moment while checking the blockchain constantly with a program.
To explain it more clearly: The issue for the 90% who wants to stop the attacker is that if they are constantly sending coins to each other, then none of their coins gain much age. And if they save up coin age, those coins aren't used in a transaction until they are used, so the attacker can sneak in before that. Very hard to set up a system where there's no "holes", even if all the participants are cooperating.
To simplify things, let's say that there is no coin age involved, as suggested by @achimsmile in a previous post. It's a simple constant to change in the source code anyway.
Could you try to explain to me a bit more in detail in what circumstances the alternate chains could get a chain trust superior to the network one?
To be successful do we agree that these alternate chains should be at least 6 blocks long?