Topic: Satoshi Nakamoto: "Bitcoin can scale larger than the Visa Network" - page 3. (Read 18415 times)

Nodes can decide what they relay and do not relay, providing some level of spam control.

For transactions that make it to a miner, really only the miner should decide. It's their block.

Now maybe we could have consensus rules and I support consensus rules for a maximum TX rate but minimum, no, if a miner wants to include some cheap transactions it should be up to them.

That's my opinion.

The only reason I want rules for maximum is to protect users from bugs in clients (or mistakes) and prevent an easy mechanism of money laundering through TX fee.

Well then, as he talked about "other ways" should we disregard this:


Also, while not conclusive at all, notice the hypothetical block number he used, and possibly why he didn't pull 1 million out of that hat.


It's been somewhat mitigated, in the sense that back then, it cost exactly nothing to solve a block, or a trivial amount. Today it takes massive investment, located in massive farms, which are not incentivized to kill Bitcoin by DoSing it with malicious blocks, just for the lels. Blocks that the other miners might as well orphan(stale) anyway. The disagreement is about who determines what is spam. One group thinks it should be the miners deciding the block sizes they produce and the fees they require for admission. The other group thinks it should be an insular group of friends on irc, with a blatant COI.


Which (possibly) makes you wonder if there is some reason it hasn't been released as a software update... Could there be anyone with their fingers on the central planning levers that might have a conflicted interest in a somewhat expensive main chain, via offering the medicine for that disease? Has an extremely well connected group taken $76 million of other peoples' money... to do exactly that?

Shortly before disappearing, Satoshi also repeated over and over that there were more ways that Bitcoin could be successfully DOS attacked than he could count.

The limit (in conjunction with transaction fees) were intended as a DOS attack and spam deterrent. Do you have any evidence that those risks have been mitigated? Do you have any evidence that suggests that 2MB blocks won't be filled to capacity right away? That would leave us where we are today -- with no scaling solutions, wondering how much more un-optimized throughput the network can safely handle.  


Satoshi's description of how to increase the block size limit was also clearly in the context of a software update. Not an incompatible implementation of bitcoin that essentially attacks the network and intentionally forks from all other client nodes. He even thought compatible alternatives were a bad idea.

One could make the argument that Satoshi thought we could raise the limit as/when needed (as if we needed his authority anyway). In that respect, the question of necessity is subjective and debatable, and it is not immediately clear that an increase to 2MB now, with no attempts to make throughput more scalable is necessary.

One could not make the argument that Satoshi thought we should increase the block size limit through a contentious hard fork.

All of this is moot. We should be talking in terms of "what is best for bitcoin" -- with respect to users, nodes and miners -- not talking past each other with interpretations of things Satoshi said 5-6 years ago. Not only was Satoshi wrong about some things, but the state of bitcoin has changed a lot. Hell, if we left the codebase as he originally wrote it, those 184 billion bitcoins from the August 2010 value overflow incident would still be with us. Better to work towards bitcoin's principles than aimlessly trying to fit some arbitrary interpretation of Satoshi's words.

The quote says one thing, reality says another.

Reality = right now you can't get to a blocksize where you can do visa level tx capacity.

And this is similarly true, not only for bitcoin, but bitcoin-based clones and other blockchain-based systems.

Can someone please explain to me how we have these Satoshi quotes and yet there is still any discussion / debate / disagreement on it?  

I don't understand how this can be viewed as anything other than what it is:  A complete deviation from the expected design of Bitcoin for the financial profit of a company that wants to take transactions off the main chain.  

And how the lack of urgency to scale is anything other than what it is:  A means to an end for ensuring the Lightening Network will make money.

This is an honest, genuine question.  Until I found the Satoshi quotes I was on the fence on this issue.  

Now im just like "what the actual fuck?"

-B-

Do you not read what I write to you or is your brain unable to comprehend what I'm saying? I'm not certain which the case is. The number of nodes is not a reliable metric, especially not in a short time frame. This is because people can jump-start a lot of nodes in a very small amount of time. Additionally, it is possible to run fake nodes as well. 

It means nothing. Exactly nothing, especially when a Sybil-attack is being promoted.

Welcome to the club.

Meanwhile they are 66% of network left that are running Bitcoin Core code.

If it gets at 50% what that means? They've lost majority ?

I like CIYAM point of view as well. I don't think he's grumpy. He never used to be like this. He's just like me, he's just sick of the bullshit.

Sure don't sound like Szabo.

I like CIYAM. He's grumpier than I am. Wow. 

I also agree with his ad sig attitude.
And I like his individualism, his strength of mind.
And I like his intelligence.

I have been trying to post in his support.
I failed. No post.

I just don't agree with his take on the way forward, any more, sorry.

I don't even want to get technical, CIYAM will wipe the floor with me.
I doubt CIYAM will therefore hold me in any regard. Unfortunately.

I didn't want a block size increase. I think I do now.
A limited increase. (1.5) 2mb. If it is "easily" doable.
I understand, in the scheme of things, it is.

Leave segwit for now. (and hopefully forever)
2mb is needed, safe, obvious, and simplistic?
(needed for the steady growth we have watched over the years, as I think David R said)

No such assumption was made. In the quoted text a method by which *other* miners who are motivated by money act to thwart this kind of attack by mining a smaller sibling block, building on that and ultimately orphaning the attacker's block.

There are simpler ways that a theoretical bad actor with no profit motivation and lots of money can destroy bitcoin. Setting up a mining operation to craft malicious expensive to validate blocks doesn't seem like a good angle to me!

In 1998 I paid $200 for a 2 GB Seagate SCSI drive so I could install MKLinux DR3 on my 233 MHz Beige G3.

Looking at newegg, I can get a 4 TB platter drive for about $200 or a 1 TB SSD (500 MB for top brand) for $200.

I suspect Moore's law is dead and I'm not sure it ever existed for spinning drives or SSDs which will be the problem, not CPUs.

You are missing my point because you are assuming that the motivations of all participants is that of monetary profit. You can't just ignore the observation that decentralized cryptocurrency represents the only real threat to the central banksters in a very long time. The point is the same for 64MB as it is for 2MB, only more obvious in that the problems 64MB would create are much greater.

nope
i agree with your statement, infact it adds another level ontop of my statement. because my statement was under the premiss that 64mb blocks were acceptable as standard and that there was little to no code to void a competitors solved block due to malicious bloat. and only code for miners to just ignore or accept malicious transactions within their own attempts of making a block.

similar to the 0fee ignore game. some miners ignore transactions without fee's but if a competitor had a block solution and those had tx's without fee's the ignorant miner would still accept its competitors solution.

but you are quite right the miners could also reject a block if it does not like the content of their competitors block,

miners are free to determine if a block is valid or not by whatever standards they choose. they are by no means forced to accept any block. the majority of miners need to accept the block for this block to be valid. therefore any argument that starts with " if a miner is a bad actor " is not valid.  you need to start with " if majority of miners are bad actors ". At best the bad guy miner could cause some disruption during the time it take all the other miners to agree to whatever new rules they need to implement to start ignoring the attackers blocks. these new rules do not need a HF.

is there anything false with this statement?

I do not ask the question because, an attacker intending to destroy the network would not produce such a block, because such a block does not destroy the network.


Knowing that an expensive to validate block is mitigated as an attack vector, the question remains as to why somebody would produce such a block?

The implication being that if you have the money/hardware to produce blocks, your most profitable course of action is to just mine blocks honestly.

EDIT. my now removed statement was on the bases of a 1mb attack. now lets make it 64mb..
if it takes 10minutes to validate a malicious 1mb. then it takes 640 minutes to validate a 64mb.. and so malicious miner is 638 minutes behind the competitors before it even begins to hash a block, because neutral miners will ignore such stupid transactions just like they ignore 0 fee transactions and make a standard block using more rational size transactions

#0 this can be solved by core adding in the code, to not cause the contention they cry about. then with all the different code bases (btcd, bitcoinj, classic, core, etc) having the code, it is then just a waiting game to see if miners decide to upgrade too knowing all the users are ready to accept such changes.

#1 this can be solved by knowing REALISTICALLY the times it actually takes to sort through a transaction with 50 inputs, 100 inputs, 1000 inputs. and then see how many times people have made a genuine(not attack) transaction of such. to set an arbitrary rule to ignore transactions with such amount of inputs, just like they ignore transactions with no fee.

#2 1) also educate people how to code/make transactions with least bloat/random use of inputs. to help them decrease their own cost of sending a tx, aswell as helping reduce chances of verification time problems.
#2 2) its a little too early to push the transaction fee up.. id say it should be a slow process over years-decades, not a rush job to try making 3000+ transactions every 10 minutes have high fee's meaning the fee naturally increases because there are only 2000 transactions(average) allowed in per block.
imagine it. 3000 tx pay 4c.. 2000 get allowed in block1 and 1000 in block2.. then the next 3000 tx only 1000 is in block 2 and 2000 are in block 3. meaning that if the 3rd set of transactions have any hope of getting in block 4 or 5 they are likely to have to pay a premium to fight off competition..
so within 5 blocks the price begins to rise.

the fee is not an essential part of mining income. it is just a small bonus. it does not need to, nor should offset the reward for many years. because the reward is part of the mechanism that helps the speculation of the deflationary price(price rise). by flooding miners with lots of coins will make them spend them just as fast which not only affects the valuation of bitcoin. but also pushes miners to add more ASICS, and raising the difficulty. making bitcoin more centralized due to the smaller pools losing the competition. also pushing customers/users away from bitcoin because a fee does not actually guarantee the very next block(no guarantee of confirmation in 10 minutes)
pushing the fee has a knock on affect on many aspects. and there is no logic to push it too fast.

#3 agreed. allowing twice as much buffer room(2mb) to grow, or even 4x as much buffer room(2mb+segwit) allows for NATURAL SLOW growth without pushing or irritations and without demanding to dev-team for just an extra spoon of buffer every couple months knowing it takes 2 years to get the spoon.

#4 i personally am not in BU camp, xt camp, classic camp or core camp. i just want more buffer space without beeding to be spoonfed by developers. BU is the premiss that there needs no hard limit. and miners can set their own preferential soft limits. but best to ask someone(hopefully they reply unbiasedly) who has researched it in more detail

#5 i agree it doesnt need to be a classic OR core. it needs both. in combination

edit
your final sentence answered the #1 for yourself and more elegantly then i did

I would say the bitcoin network definetly could get bigger then the visa network,  and the time of existance is relativly small so it still has time to grow as well.
And if you look on blockchain.info and you see al the transactions already being made.
You realize this is really big already,  the amount of people all over the world that are using it,  we could form a Bitcoin country already!