On the back of Ledger's recent debacle, seems like a good time to bump this thread given this wallet is also based on relying on third parties to store your back ups.
Three new blog posts were published last week:
https://bitkey.build/The first post says nothing of any real note, apart from reminding people just how difficult it is to store a seed phrase.
The second one is filled with increasing amounts of nonsense:
But a newcomer who just went through a lengthy, complex setup process for a self-custody product might not immediately get around to finding a really safe place or format for the seed phrase they wrote down - if they know they should do that in the first place.
In what world is writing down 12 worlds on a piece of paper either lengthy or complex? I can't wait to see how quick and easy their set up process is, given that you need to download an app, register an account, verify your identity, set up and link the hardware device, link it all to an online server, and then set up social recovery with a number of "trusted" contacts. You can do all that in less than the 30 seconds it takes me to write down and double check a seed phrase?
And there are so many ways for people to get tricked with seed phrases, from social engineering to phishing to schemes that trick people into using an attacker-provided seed phrase during wallet setup.
So they want to protect against social engineering and phishing by implementing
social recovery which is possibly the highest risk method when it comes to protecting against social engineering and phishing. Ok.
They often disingenuously compare the worst practices with seed phrases against best practices with their device. People can be social engineered for the seed phrase, but apparently not for their social recovery system? They talk about how people back up seed phrases to the cloud, and that makes them insecure. And what is stopping someone backing up their Bitkey account details to the cloud as well? Or how people leave their seed phrase lying around where it could be found, but apparently no one ever does this with their phone or hardware device?
The third post is particularly interesting. After two previous posts talking about how seed phrases are super complicated and risky and their solution is going to be super simple, they have come up with the most over-complicated design possible to justify not having a screen on their wallet. Basically, every time you want to send or receive coins, your hardware wallet has to sign the sending or receiving address and then transmit that signed message to Block's servers, where they will verify the address has not been tampered with, and then send that address back to the relevant party to be used. The obvious flaws are that Block can spy on literally everything you do and that you have absolutely zero security from a bad actor in Block sending a malicious address. The less obvious flaws are that you now can't make transactions or even generate a new receiving address if Block's servers are down, and it opens a new attack vector for man-in-the-middle attacks if you rely on Block's servers telling you what addresses to use.
But don't forget guys, it's far simpler than just writing down 12 words!