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Topic: The severity of the Ordinals Attack is increasing - page 5. (Read 1029 times)

legendary
Activity: 2674
Merit: 1226
Livecasino, 20% cashback, no fuss payouts.
Ok wow I had no idea it was going to be this bad.

Quite worrying right now because I have bitcoin in a few places and I remember very well the last time this type of fee war happened, I had btc stuck in many places.

Problem now is to plan ahead of what you need and to just leave btc alone unless you want to get things stuck.

252k transactions now waiting o god.
copper member
Activity: 2226
Merit: 915
White Russian
So, you are sure that in this section one more topic is needed to discuss the current situation. What are your constructive proposals for overcoming this crisis?
The fact that you have to ask this question proves you haven't seen my proposals ergo we did need a new topic.

To summarize the way to prevent this attack should have been the same method we have been using forever to prevent similar attacks and exploits. It could have been introduction of standard rules that would have made such malicious transactions non-standard hence majority of full nodes would have refused to relay them and that would have successfully prevented this attack from growing.
Standard rules are easy to implement too since they don't need a fork, we just had to get full nodes to run a patch for their old clients or run the newest release to enforce the new rule.

However, I don't see this method being effective anymore considering how the scam has grown big and the market size of it is considerable enough to encourage the scammers to run full nodes themselves without enforcing the said standard rule to relay their spam. There is also incentive for them to pay the miners behind the scene to mine their malicious transactions.

At this point I'm afraid we need a soft fork to make these transactions invalid/illegal as part of the consensus rules which is much more challenging since it requires implementation, locked-in period, getting miners to vote and accept this fork, etc.
But that effectively and easily prevent this attack whilst keeping the protocol flexible for future improvements. For example the rule can only limit the witness size for version 1 program (similar to version 0) and leave any bigger size for any future possible usages (if they arise) to future versions which are already non-standard and not relayed by any of the full nodes.
Let's be realistic, even if your initiative is implemented in the form of a new version of the bitcoin core, we will not be able to reach a consensus in voting for its implementation, given that the current situation is beneficial for miners. But you can always initiate a hard fork and create your own little improved lamp version of bitcoin with blackjack and whores, it just won’t be quite bitcoin anymore. And the real true bitcoin is exactly the same as it is now - with expensive and slow transactions and with a small block size filled to the brim with stupid pictures.
legendary
Activity: 3472
Merit: 10611
So, you are sure that in this section one more topic is needed to discuss the current situation. What are your constructive proposals for overcoming this crisis?
The fact that you have to ask this question proves you haven't seen my proposals ergo we did need a new topic.

To summarize the way to prevent this attack should have been the same method we have been using forever to prevent similar attacks and exploits. It could have been introduction of standard rules that would have made such malicious transactions non-standard hence majority of full nodes would have refused to relay them and that would have successfully prevented this attack from growing.
Standard rules are easy to implement too since they don't need a fork, we just had to get full nodes to run a patch for their old clients or run the newest release to enforce the new rule.

However, I don't see this method being effective anymore considering how the scam has grown big and the market size of it is considerable enough to encourage the scammers to run full nodes themselves without enforcing the said standard rule to relay their spam. There is also incentive for them to pay the miners behind the scene to mine their malicious transactions.

At this point I'm afraid we need a soft fork to make these transactions invalid/illegal as part of the consensus rules which is much more challenging since it requires implementation, locked-in period, getting miners to vote and accept this fork, etc.
But that effectively and easily prevent this attack whilst keeping the protocol flexible for future improvements. For example the rule can only limit the witness size for version 1 program (similar to version 0) and leave any bigger size for any future possible usages (if they arise) to future versions which are already non-standard and not relayed by any of the full nodes.
legendary
Activity: 2422
Merit: 1191
Privacy Servers. Since 2009.
There has been a speculation that this attack is going to fade away slowly and there won't be any need for intervention to fix the protocol where it is being exploited by the Ordinals Attack. That seems like wishful thinking now.

As I've feared the market around this scam is growing hence creating the incentive to attack Bitcoin more and with more people. According to brc-20[dot]io website the trading volume of this scam has surpassed $10 million daily with a total of 14,079 scams at the moment.

We can see the effects of this attack on the mempool with the fees surpassing 300 satoshi/vbytes.
https://jochen-hoenicke.de/queue/#BTC,24h,weight
https://mempool.space/

This will only get worse as the scam grows and the scammers and idiots trading this garbage don't care about paying $50, $100+ for a transaction if they are laundering money with a fake transaction they call a token that is worth $1100+ or have a chance of scamming an idiot who would pay them that much for this garbage.
Regular users on the other hand do care about being forced to pay such outrageous fees just because scammers are spamming the chain.



The full nodes will also start being put under pressure as the spam will increase cost of running a full node for many reasons. From the increased traffic putting high pressure on their mempool and transaction relays to their chainstate (UTXO database) growing with a lot of dust outputs that can not be spent but they have to load in their memory for transaction processing.



https://statoshi.info/d/000000009/unspent-transaction-output-set?orgId=1&from=1682080884686&to=1683521607397

Both of the above charts show a very fast slope of how this attack is growing in size and severity.

I wonder how much more should we wait to stop this attack? The fees are ridiculous, 100sat/vbyte is a reality already now (if you want reasonable transaction times). I'm waiting for the core devs to respond to this hostile action against Bitcoin. Taproot bug must be fixed.
hero member
Activity: 854
Merit: 663
These people are really crazy for overpaying the Bitcoin fees in order to get their worthless NFT, due to decentralized Bitcoin network, there's no way to reject it and the miners obviously prefer to broadcast the transactions for people who willing to pay higher.

But I think this ordinals is just a hype, I guess a year later people will not really interested again and the transaction will be cheaper, but it can't back like when before ordinals attack started.

The current situation like forcing people to adopt lightning network.
copper member
Activity: 2226
Merit: 915
White Russian
So, you are sure that in this section one more topic is needed to discuss the current situation. What are your constructive proposals for overcoming this crisis?
legendary
Activity: 3472
Merit: 10611
There has been a speculation that this attack is going to fade away slowly and there won't be any need for intervention to fix the protocol where it is being exploited by the Ordinals Attack. That seems like wishful thinking now.

As I've feared the market around this scam is growing hence creating the incentive to attack Bitcoin more and with more people. According to brc-20[dot]io website the trading volume of this scam has surpassed $10 million daily with a total of 14,079 scams at the moment.

We can see the effects of this attack on the mempool with the fees surpassing 300 satoshi/vbytes.
https://jochen-hoenicke.de/queue/#BTC,24h,weight
https://mempool.space/

This will only get worse as the scam grows and the scammers and idiots trading this garbage don't care about paying $50, $100+ for a transaction if they are laundering money with a fake transaction they call a token that is worth $1100+ or have a chance of scamming an idiot who would pay them that much for this garbage.
Regular users on the other hand do care about being forced to pay such outrageous fees just because scammers are spamming the chain.



The full nodes will also start being put under pressure as the spam will increase cost of running a full node for many reasons. From the increased traffic putting high pressure on their mempool and transaction relays to their chainstate (UTXO database) growing with a lot of dust outputs that can not be spent but they have to load in their memory for transaction processing.



https://statoshi.info/d/000000009/unspent-transaction-output-set?orgId=1&from=1682080884686&to=1683521607397

Both of the above charts show a very fast slope of how this attack is growing in size and severity.
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