I do not have the impression that the authorities are so eager to sanction "official" banks that launder money from illicit activities
They just get a fine and move on. In The Netherlands, banks process €16 billion criminal money per year. ING paid a €775 million fine 5 years ago, ABN AMRO €480 million 2 years ago. The Dutch government still owns 56.3% of the latter. How ironic is that?Using a database from a chain analysis company to filter out addresses so they can block out transactions, IP filter, and so on. I'm responding to the question of how a mixer might defend itself from government scrutiny. I don't think any mixer is going to implement them though, since the cost to run them is likely expensive and it might affect their branding too.
This is literally what CoinJoin wallet Wasabi did. See Wasabi blacklisting update - open letter / 24 questions discussion thread.Quote
Zo had een klant van ABN AMRO, die de laagste risicoclassificatie had gekregen, voor 49 van zijn vennootschappen tussen 2014 en 2018 in totaal 192 bankrekeningen geopend bij ABN AMRO. Deze rekeningen waren grotendeels inactief. Deze klant pleegde fiscale fraude waardoor hij bijna 200.000 euro van de Belastingdienst ontving op de zakelijke rekeningen. Het geld werd door de klant na overboekingen naar zijn privérekeningen bij ABN AMRO grotendeels uitgegeven of contant opgenomen. De risicoclassificatie bleef laag ondanks verschillende signalen en twijfels die er binnen ABN AMRO waren over deze klant. De bank maakte pas melding van ongebruikelijke transacties bij de FIU na aanvang van het strafrechtelijk onderzoek naar deze klant.
I remember these fraud schemes in Russia, when several firms were opened for one person in each region, region and various tax and other fraud schemes were turned. There was no single centralized data base for all regions, subjects, regions of the country, and there were more than 80 of these subjects. I do not remember that banks were responsible for this.
And the mixer is not to blame for anything. 
