https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/RREPT
banks in trouble?
Topic: Wall Observer BTC/USD - Bitcoin price movement tracking & discussion - page 20688. (Read 26619975 times)
October 13, 2015, 11:50:14 PM
October 13, 2015, 11:27:53 PM
At least that upside-down Ripple shill is long gone. Remember that guy? 
Extra points if you remember the "not upside down" one too.
You mean Mah87 ?
October 13, 2015, 11:02:42 PM
October 13, 2015, 10:51:28 PM
Bitstamp is the way.
Things on stamp can change quick... It is a liquidity provider for many other companies.
They are actually no longer a liquidity provider and have resorted to wash trade bots in order to make it seem like their exchange has volume and is still relevant.
I dont think they ever recovered since their hack when most traders left their platform and moved elsewhere.
Sources:
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/bitstamp-the-new-okcoin-20-volume-manipulators-fake-wall-observer-1205564
https://www.reddit.com/r/BitcoinMarkets/comments/3lwnyn/the_state_of_trading_in_the_bitcoin_markets/
https://www.reddit.com/r/BitcoinMarkets/comments/3okvda/bitstamp_the_new_okcoin_20_volume_manipulators/
October 13, 2015, 10:40:25 PM
At least that upside-down Ripple shill is long gone. Remember that guy?
Extra points if you remember the "not upside down" one too.
October 13, 2015, 10:33:15 PM
October 13, 2015, 10:02:54 PM
October 13, 2015, 09:05:35 PM
At least that upside-down Ripple shill is long gone. Remember that guy?
October 13, 2015, 09:02:37 PM
October 13, 2015, 08:02:41 PM
October 13, 2015, 07:23:29 PM
Are we on rally now?
I don't think so. I don't think one is imminent either.
October 13, 2015, 07:18:30 PM
We also have a valuable limit used to avoid spam filling up blocks, I'd also like to keep it that way.
OK, so now we have to define what is a valuable limit for *now*, not what was a valuable limit for *then*. You could spam the network with less than 100th of the dollar cost then.
October 13, 2015, 07:02:38 PM
October 13, 2015, 07:01:23 PM
it's a hole (trap).
October 13, 2015, 06:32:02 PM
Bitstamp is the way.
October 13, 2015, 06:21:13 PM
So what if he/they make a decision sometime late 2016/early 2017, and it turns out to be the "wrong" one? Will they spend three years to change that as well?
If it can't offer enough people usability then other systems will and it'll die. It's a trillion miles away from being 'too big to fail'. I can see why they'd grind to a halt but it doesn't exist in a vacuum and the world is a fast moving place that don't give a shit about Bitcoin's nobility.
+1
We are being played against each other. Rough consensus attack:
http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2015-August/026151.html
Quote
It turns out that there is a really nice attack. If the group has a
protocol in mind, then all the attacker has to do is:
a) suggest a new alternate protocol.
b) balance the group so that there is disagreement, roughly evenly
balanced between the original and the challenger.
Suggesting an alternate is really easy - as we know there are dozens of
prototypes out there, just gotta pick one that's sufficiently different.
In this case I can think of 3 others without trying, and 6 people on
this group could design 1 in a month.
Balancing the group is just a matter of phone calls and resources. Call
in favours. So many people out there who would love to pop in and utter
an opinion. So many friends of friends, willing to strut their stuff.
Because of the rules of rough consensus, if a rough balance is
preserved, then it stops all forward movement. This is a beautiful
attack. If the original side gets disgusted and walks, the attacker can
simply come up with a new challenger. If the original team quietens
down, the challenger can quieten down too - it doesn't want to win, it
wants to preserve the conflict.
The attack can't even be called, because all contributors are doing is
uttering an opinion as they would if asked. The attack simply uses the
time-tested rules which the project is convinced are the only way to do
these things.
The only defence I can see is to drop rough consensus. By offering
rough consensus, it's almost a gilt-edged invitation to the attacker.
The attacker isn't so stupid as to not use it.
Can anyone suggest a way to get around this? I think this really puts a
marker on the map - you simply can't do a security/crypto protocol under
rough consensus in open committee, when there is an attacker out there
willing to put in the resources to stop it.
Thoughts?
protocol in mind, then all the attacker has to do is:
a) suggest a new alternate protocol.
b) balance the group so that there is disagreement, roughly evenly
balanced between the original and the challenger.
Suggesting an alternate is really easy - as we know there are dozens of
prototypes out there, just gotta pick one that's sufficiently different.
In this case I can think of 3 others without trying, and 6 people on
this group could design 1 in a month.
Balancing the group is just a matter of phone calls and resources. Call
in favours. So many people out there who would love to pop in and utter
an opinion. So many friends of friends, willing to strut their stuff.
Because of the rules of rough consensus, if a rough balance is
preserved, then it stops all forward movement. This is a beautiful
attack. If the original side gets disgusted and walks, the attacker can
simply come up with a new challenger. If the original team quietens
down, the challenger can quieten down too - it doesn't want to win, it
wants to preserve the conflict.
The attack can't even be called, because all contributors are doing is
uttering an opinion as they would if asked. The attack simply uses the
time-tested rules which the project is convinced are the only way to do
these things.
The only defence I can see is to drop rough consensus. By offering
rough consensus, it's almost a gilt-edged invitation to the attacker.
The attacker isn't so stupid as to not use it.
Can anyone suggest a way to get around this? I think this really puts a
marker on the map - you simply can't do a security/crypto protocol under
rough consensus in open committee, when there is an attacker out there
willing to put in the resources to stop it.
Thoughts?
Hey BJA. Didn't you mean to say Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares ??
I only own about $2 worth of bitshares, but I'm keeping an eye on it. I know how annoying altcoin pushers are, so i'm sorry if that's what I'm doing. I thought it was tangentially related.
October 13, 2015, 06:09:15 PM
So what if he/they make a decision sometime late 2016/early 2017, and it turns out to be the "wrong" one? Will they spend three years to change that as well?
If it can't offer enough people usability then other systems will and it'll die. It's a trillion miles away from being 'too big to fail'. I can see why they'd grind to a halt but it doesn't exist in a vacuum and the world is a fast moving place that don't give a shit about Bitcoin's nobility.
+1
We are being played against each other. Rough consensus attack:
http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2015-August/026151.html
Quote
It turns out that there is a really nice attack. If the group has a
protocol in mind, then all the attacker has to do is:
a) suggest a new alternate protocol.
b) balance the group so that there is disagreement, roughly evenly
balanced between the original and the challenger.
Suggesting an alternate is really easy - as we know there are dozens of
prototypes out there, just gotta pick one that's sufficiently different.
In this case I can think of 3 others without trying, and 6 people on
this group could design 1 in a month.
Balancing the group is just a matter of phone calls and resources. Call
in favours. So many people out there who would love to pop in and utter
an opinion. So many friends of friends, willing to strut their stuff.
Because of the rules of rough consensus, if a rough balance is
preserved, then it stops all forward movement. This is a beautiful
attack. If the original side gets disgusted and walks, the attacker can
simply come up with a new challenger. If the original team quietens
down, the challenger can quieten down too - it doesn't want to win, it
wants to preserve the conflict.
The attack can't even be called, because all contributors are doing is
uttering an opinion as they would if asked. The attack simply uses the
time-tested rules which the project is convinced are the only way to do
these things.
The only defence I can see is to drop rough consensus. By offering
rough consensus, it's almost a gilt-edged invitation to the attacker.
The attacker isn't so stupid as to not use it.
Can anyone suggest a way to get around this? I think this really puts a
marker on the map - you simply can't do a security/crypto protocol under
rough consensus in open committee, when there is an attacker out there
willing to put in the resources to stop it.
Thoughts?
protocol in mind, then all the attacker has to do is:
a) suggest a new alternate protocol.
b) balance the group so that there is disagreement, roughly evenly
balanced between the original and the challenger.
Suggesting an alternate is really easy - as we know there are dozens of
prototypes out there, just gotta pick one that's sufficiently different.
In this case I can think of 3 others without trying, and 6 people on
this group could design 1 in a month.
Balancing the group is just a matter of phone calls and resources. Call
in favours. So many people out there who would love to pop in and utter
an opinion. So many friends of friends, willing to strut their stuff.
Because of the rules of rough consensus, if a rough balance is
preserved, then it stops all forward movement. This is a beautiful
attack. If the original side gets disgusted and walks, the attacker can
simply come up with a new challenger. If the original team quietens
down, the challenger can quieten down too - it doesn't want to win, it
wants to preserve the conflict.
The attack can't even be called, because all contributors are doing is
uttering an opinion as they would if asked. The attack simply uses the
time-tested rules which the project is convinced are the only way to do
these things.
The only defence I can see is to drop rough consensus. By offering
rough consensus, it's almost a gilt-edged invitation to the attacker.
The attacker isn't so stupid as to not use it.
Can anyone suggest a way to get around this? I think this really puts a
marker on the map - you simply can't do a security/crypto protocol under
rough consensus in open committee, when there is an attacker out there
willing to put in the resources to stop it.
Thoughts?
Hey BJA. Didn't you mean to say Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares Bitshares ??
Or something about Bitshares maybe?
October 13, 2015, 06:02:50 PM
October 13, 2015, 05:50:54 PM
So what if he/they make a decision sometime late 2016/early 2017, and it turns out to be the "wrong" one? Will they spend three years to change that as well?
If it can't offer enough people usability then other systems will and it'll die. It's a trillion miles away from being 'too big to fail'. I can see why they'd grind to a halt but it doesn't exist in a vacuum and the world is a fast moving place that don't give a shit about Bitcoin's nobility.
+1
We are being played against each other. Rough consensus attack:
http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2015-August/026151.html
Quote
It turns out that there is a really nice attack. If the group has a
protocol in mind, then all the attacker has to do is:
a) suggest a new alternate protocol.
b) balance the group so that there is disagreement, roughly evenly
balanced between the original and the challenger.
Suggesting an alternate is really easy - as we know there are dozens of
prototypes out there, just gotta pick one that's sufficiently different.
In this case I can think of 3 others without trying, and 6 people on
this group could design 1 in a month.
Balancing the group is just a matter of phone calls and resources. Call
in favours. So many people out there who would love to pop in and utter
an opinion. So many friends of friends, willing to strut their stuff.
Because of the rules of rough consensus, if a rough balance is
preserved, then it stops all forward movement. This is a beautiful
attack. If the original side gets disgusted and walks, the attacker can
simply come up with a new challenger. If the original team quietens
down, the challenger can quieten down too - it doesn't want to win, it
wants to preserve the conflict.
The attack can't even be called, because all contributors are doing is
uttering an opinion as they would if asked. The attack simply uses the
time-tested rules which the project is convinced are the only way to do
these things.
The only defence I can see is to drop rough consensus. By offering
rough consensus, it's almost a gilt-edged invitation to the attacker.
The attacker isn't so stupid as to not use it.
Can anyone suggest a way to get around this? I think this really puts a
marker on the map - you simply can't do a security/crypto protocol under
rough consensus in open committee, when there is an attacker out there
willing to put in the resources to stop it.
Thoughts?
protocol in mind, then all the attacker has to do is:
a) suggest a new alternate protocol.
b) balance the group so that there is disagreement, roughly evenly
balanced between the original and the challenger.
Suggesting an alternate is really easy - as we know there are dozens of
prototypes out there, just gotta pick one that's sufficiently different.
In this case I can think of 3 others without trying, and 6 people on
this group could design 1 in a month.
Balancing the group is just a matter of phone calls and resources. Call
in favours. So many people out there who would love to pop in and utter
an opinion. So many friends of friends, willing to strut their stuff.
Because of the rules of rough consensus, if a rough balance is
preserved, then it stops all forward movement. This is a beautiful
attack. If the original side gets disgusted and walks, the attacker can
simply come up with a new challenger. If the original team quietens
down, the challenger can quieten down too - it doesn't want to win, it
wants to preserve the conflict.
The attack can't even be called, because all contributors are doing is
uttering an opinion as they would if asked. The attack simply uses the
time-tested rules which the project is convinced are the only way to do
these things.
The only defence I can see is to drop rough consensus. By offering
rough consensus, it's almost a gilt-edged invitation to the attacker.
The attacker isn't so stupid as to not use it.
Can anyone suggest a way to get around this? I think this really puts a
marker on the map - you simply can't do a security/crypto protocol under
rough consensus in open committee, when there is an attacker out there
willing to put in the resources to stop it.
Thoughts?
October 13, 2015, 05:18:42 PM
Yet another type (3) of attack may be a miner creating and solving a large bock to cause relay nodes and some clients to crash. Rumor is that the 1 MB limit was introduced to prevent hypothetical type (3) attacks, or some similar one. But there was no such attack during the 20 months or so in 2009 and 2010 that bitcoin operated with a 32 MB block size limit; and it is not clear whether such a rogue miner could do much damage except to himself.
There is also a cap on the number of sigops per block that more directly addresses this concern, but for some reason that seems to never get mentioned.
Jump to: