Topic: Writing down seed phrase: printer ink or pen ink ? - page 2. (Read 1198 times)

My understanding is when you will create a 3-of-5 multi-sig, all five need to have all public master key to get the wallet created first. Or you are saying I create a 3-of-5 wallet and carefully give them the public key and public master key?

My understanding is when you will create a 3-of-5 multi-sig, all five need to have all public master key to get the wallet created first.

Or you are saying I create a 3-of-5 wallet and carefully give them the public key and public master key?

Part of my OPSEC is not sharing the exact details. It feels better that way.

Let's take 3-of-5 as an example since that's what we've been using so far.

Back up 1: Seed A, xpub B, xpub C
Back up 2: Seed B, xpub C, xpub D
Back up 3: Seed C, xpub D, xpub E
Back up 4: Seed D, xpub E, xpub A
Back up 5: Seed E, xpub A, xpub B

Any 3 of those 5 back ups gives you 3 seeds and the other 2 xpubs, allowing you to fully recover the wallet, while preventing any person from viewing the contents of the multi-sig wallet.

I am interested to learn how you are handling your crypto.

My wife knows about all my back ups.

I am interested to learn how you are handling your crypto.

I really do not want other people except my wife to know how much bitcoin I have. With the x of y multi-sig wallet I can not hide my numbers LOL

This sounds overly complicated.

overly complicated to me

Your suggested set up is better because you now have some redundancy in the system, but it still seems overly complicated to me and if it were me I would still prefer to use a 3-of-5 multi-sig set up.

I second the suggestion to use multisig. People take it for granted here in bitcoin but some cryptos can't do it for example ethereum. multisig can increase transaction fees slightly but ... it's no big problem.

Your suggested set up is better because you now have some redundancy in the system, but it still seems overly complicated to me and if it were me I would still prefer to use a 3-of-5 multi-sig set up.

Need to study the Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme.

Need to study the Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme. I was thinking it was good enough only to split the seed to two person but then I had to involve another person to answer the twisted words. The only thing I am lacking here is one of the person lives with me who is holding half of the seed. Means if in our house by any chance if we both become a victim of a sudden accident then the one who has other half of the seed will not find anything. He can not access the fund.

Card 1: under stomach XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX dust struggle ugly XXXX rocket XXXX hedgehog sponsor produce hello border limb appear mixture XXXX peanut live XXXX
Card 2: under XXXX peace humble weather flip XXXX struggle ugly dinosaur XXXX voyage hedgehog sponsor XXXX hello XXXX limb XXXX XXXX ladder XXXX live normal
Card 3: XXXX stomach peace humble weather flip dust XXXX XXXX dinosaur rocket voyage XXXX XXXX produce XXXX border XXXX appear mixture ladder peanut XXXX normal

It is now involving 5 people.

From my understanding, this is a 3 out of 3 setup.  I see this as yet another problem.  If the connection between THREE persons is necessary in order to find the full combination, have you considered other possible issues they could encounter in the event of you losing your life?  It is not very rare that after the loss of a loved one relatives start arguing about what the deceased has left behind for the living ones.  Some are more greedy than others.  The trust you have in your relatives may not be equal to the trust these relatives have for each other.  What if you die together with one of these three persons that are NEEDED for the recovery of the seed?  What if the third person will request a premium for sharing their key part of the puzzle?  You have ensured the recovery if an accident happens to YOU, but you have not taken into account the possibility of an accident also happening to one or more of them.

As others have pointed out, I would keep the seed phrase backup as simple yet safe as possible without reinventing the wheel.  I would definitely not rely on humans for the recovery.  There is maybe more vulnerability to three humans having to connect for the combination than there is for an improperly stored paper wallet.  It is enough for one of the three to say 'no' and now everything goes wrong.

I remember Trezor offered a backup method that requires 'x out of y' backup sheets with a variable x or y based on your needs.  I can not remember the name of this method however, although I do think the name was something similar to 'Schnorr'.  Maybe someone with more knowledge can help me with the confirmation that this method is safer and less vulnerable than a 3 out of 3 sheets setup?

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Regards,
PrivacyG

I remember Trezor offered a backup method that requires 'x out of y' backup sheets with a variable x or y based on your needs.  I can not remember the name of this method however, although I do think the name was something similar to 'Schnorr'.  Maybe someone with more knowledge can help me with the confirmation that this method is safer and less vulnerable than a 3 out of 3 sheets setup?

I remember Trezor offered a backup method that requires 'x out of y' backup sheets with a variable x or y based on your needs.  I can not remember the name of this method however, although I do think the name was something similar to 'Schnorr'.  Maybe someone with more knowledge can help me with the confirmation that this method is safer and less vulnerable than a 3 out of 3 sheets setup?