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Topic: [XMR] Monero - A secure, private, untraceable cryptocurrency - page 43. (Read 4671575 times)

copper member
Activity: 630
Merit: 2614
If you don’t do PGP, you don’t do crypto!

Now what are you trying to tell us without any significant evidence  Roll Eyes Wink

Among other things, AES is broken!!  Shocked

Do you think Vincent Rijmen exploded with anger when AES was broken? No, he congratulated the authors.

Say what!?  When was AES broken?  Roll Eyes

(Just a guess:  If you are talking about related-key cryptanalysis, then you are mentally retarded and you know nothing about cryptography.)

I dearly wish that Monero were exactly as “broken” as AES!

badcaca is also demonstrably dishonest:

The monero-badcaca.net homepage prominently displays a cherry-picked out-of-context quote of fluffypony (Richard Spagni).  That is dishonest!  It casts fluffypony and Monero in a false light.

False light:

(archival snapshot)

The portion selectively quoted on the monero-badcaca.net homepage is hereby highlighted in light green; the important missing context is highlighted in yellow:

Spagni told CoinDesk:

I don’t care about the price increase, that shouldn’t be the thing that makes people interested. In terms of transactional growth, in new contributors, in transactions per day, those have far more meaning.”

[...]

Odd origins

But the journey to this point for monero is a long one.

[...]

Spagni said that he became interested in the “fair relaunch” of the network called BitMonero, which was later forked away from its lead developer in April 2014, again under suspicious of improprieties.

Yet, at the time, even he notes that his intentions weren’t entirely altruistic.

“I thought, ‘I’m going to pump it and dump it,’ because I was interested and taking the ideas and implementing them in bitcoin. The bitcoin code base was far more interesting to me than monero, and I thought, ‘I’m not going to work on this codebase, it’s terrible,'” he recalls.

Changing course

After of all this, however, monero miraculously emerged, growing slowly over time into a project that’s now one of the more reputable in the field, despite use cases that may be unsavory to some.

The credit lies with how monero’s team made adjustments along the way.

[...]

Spagni largely credits the movement on the development front to cultural differences, and the fact that monero adopted a development process where any contribution that isn’t “dumb or obviously bad” is added to the code base.

“Because of that open structure, we have had people pitch up and people work on it, sometimes they’re there for a few weeks, sometimes they’re there for three years,” he said.

There’s an attitude difference as well, in that the project has a bleacher-seat distaste for vested interests.

“I think there’s a lot of respect from the wider audience because we don’t make decisions based on stakeholders interested in short or long-term profit,” he said, adding:

“We’re getting that social capital because we hacked away at stuff and aren’t idiots, I can’t think of another reason.”

I tried to be fair, for I am serious about this:

I should preface this by noting that I myself have been known to make moderately deprecating remarks about Monero’s practical security.  For example, I do think that the Monero community is underestimating the practical threat from CipherTrace.  I also use Monero sometimes—with careful coin control in the CLI wallet.  Thus, I am quite interested in seeing actual evidence of weaknesses that can be exploited in practice.

However, unless badcaca coughs up something credible, I must conclude that I should avoid wasting more time here:

For this to be treated as anything more than noise, it needs to be presented with more than noise.  [...]  badcaca, I will NOT hereby claim that you can’t do what you say you are doing.  You don’t even provide up front sufficient information to evaluate such a question!  That, in itself, is reason to write this off as “probably just dumb FUD”.


User tagged.  I will review the tag if evidence is presented that he is actually exploiting any significant weakness in Monero’s practical privacy.
legendary
Activity: 2268
Merit: 1141
Dear devs,

just checking the binaries for 17.1.3 and i need to mention that your hashes for the GUI Version are incorrect. One time i am downloading Version 17.1.3 one time 17.1.4 and in the hashes.txt file there is only 17.1.4 stated.
Please correct that, thank you  Grin

Probably a local caching issue. Try a hard refresh on the Monero website or use incognito / private mode.

Dear dEBRUYNE,

i did this whit a script, not with the browser.
Doing it again....
Both CLI and GUI downloaded as 17.1.3, the hashes text file has the SHA sums for GUI 17.1.4 not for 17.1.3, i would recomend to fix that

Code:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

# This GPG-signed message exists to confirm the SHA256 sums of Monero binaries.
#
# Please verify the signature against the key for binaryFate in the
# source code repository (/utils/gpg_keys).
#
#
## CLI
38a04a7bd00733e9d943edba3004e44730c0848fe5e8a4fca4cb29c12d1e6b2f  monero-android-armv7-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
0e94f58572646992ee21f01d291211ed3608e8a46ecb6612b378a2188390dba0  monero-android-armv8-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
ae1a1b61d7b4a06690cb22a3389bae5122c8581d47f3a02d303473498f405a1a  monero-freebsd-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
57d6f9c25bd1dbc9d6b39fcfb13260b21c5594b4334e8ed3b8922108730ee2f0  monero-linux-armv7-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
a0419993fbc6a5ca11bcd2e825acef13e429824f4d8c7ba4ec73ac446d2af2fb  monero-linux-armv8-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
cf3fb693339caed43a935c890d71ecab5b89c430e778dc5ef0c3173c94e5bf64  monero-linux-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
d107384ff7b1f77ee4db93940dbfda24d6045bf59c43169bc81a0118e3986bfa  monero-linux-x86-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
79557c8bee30b229bda90bb9ee494097d639d60948fc2ad87a029359b56b1b48  monero-mac-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
3eee0d0e896fb426ef92a141a95e36cb33ca7d1e1db3c1d4cb7383994af43a59  monero-win-x64-v0.17.1.3.zip
c9e9dde61b33adccd7e794eba8ba29d820817213b40a2571282309d25e64e88a  monero-win-x86-v0.17.1.3.zip
#
## GUI
8c9a820fd7dc228807f8ecc46973350d3d5d871c6f8dd67ef066d04407575d14  monero-gui-install-win-x64-v0.17.1.4.exe
abe94552803fd6646e934d1248e6ef33d8d6e2ac9a725c600fa7e8d4bfcc21a3  monero-gui-linux-x64-v0.17.1.4.tar.bz2
4e319a9dfb5e1caa42b52f6503480af3b44403f3bf4691da523880c6a6ec38a9  monero-gui-mac-x64-v0.17.1.4.dmg
df78006226d21e70ea5d342b0f6d4335cf398e94cb3d0f750aec4db2d2b3f7f9  monero-gui-win-x64-v0.17.1.4.zip
#
#
# ~binaryFate
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=K/kS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Code:
ls -la *monero*
-rw-r--r-- 1  118929135 Nov  9 23:52 monero-gui-linux-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
-rw-r--r-- 1  77817808 Nov  8 21:43 monero-linux-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2

We cannot really debug your issue if you do not post the content of your script.
legendary
Activity: 2268
Merit: 1141
The CLI download on getmonero.org is 17.1.3. GUI is 17.1.4.  Shouldn't CLI be 17.1.4 too?

No, CLI v0.17.1.3 is the latest version.
hero member
Activity: 870
Merit: 585
The CLI download on getmonero.org is 17.1.3. GUI is 17.1.4.  Shouldn't CLI be 17.1.4 too?
full member
Activity: 1179
Merit: 210
only hodl what you understand and love!
Monero BADCACA sybil attack is still here, despite the claims that it has been fixed. If your tansaction is waiting for a few minutes in the mempool, badcaca node got it.

Here is 100 Monero users who trusted in its privacy yesterday, are you on that list?:


Now what are you trying to tell us without any significant evidence  Roll Eyes Wink
full member
Activity: 1179
Merit: 210
only hodl what you understand and love!
Dear devs,

just checking the binaries for 17.1.3 and i need to mention that your hashes for the GUI Version are incorrect. One time i am downloading Version 17.1.3 one time 17.1.4 and in the hashes.txt file there is only 17.1.4 stated.
Please correct that, thank you  Grin

Probably a local caching issue. Try a hard refresh on the Monero website or use incognito / private mode.

Dear dEBRUYNE,

i did this whit a script, not with the browser.
Doing it again....
Both CLI and GUI downloaded as 17.1.3, the hashes text file has the SHA sums for GUI 17.1.4 not for 17.1.3, i would recomend to fix that

Code:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

# This GPG-signed message exists to confirm the SHA256 sums of Monero binaries.
#
# Please verify the signature against the key for binaryFate in the
# source code repository (/utils/gpg_keys).
#
#
## CLI
38a04a7bd00733e9d943edba3004e44730c0848fe5e8a4fca4cb29c12d1e6b2f  monero-android-armv7-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
0e94f58572646992ee21f01d291211ed3608e8a46ecb6612b378a2188390dba0  monero-android-armv8-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
ae1a1b61d7b4a06690cb22a3389bae5122c8581d47f3a02d303473498f405a1a  monero-freebsd-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
57d6f9c25bd1dbc9d6b39fcfb13260b21c5594b4334e8ed3b8922108730ee2f0  monero-linux-armv7-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
a0419993fbc6a5ca11bcd2e825acef13e429824f4d8c7ba4ec73ac446d2af2fb  monero-linux-armv8-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
cf3fb693339caed43a935c890d71ecab5b89c430e778dc5ef0c3173c94e5bf64  monero-linux-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
d107384ff7b1f77ee4db93940dbfda24d6045bf59c43169bc81a0118e3986bfa  monero-linux-x86-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
79557c8bee30b229bda90bb9ee494097d639d60948fc2ad87a029359b56b1b48  monero-mac-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
3eee0d0e896fb426ef92a141a95e36cb33ca7d1e1db3c1d4cb7383994af43a59  monero-win-x64-v0.17.1.3.zip
c9e9dde61b33adccd7e794eba8ba29d820817213b40a2571282309d25e64e88a  monero-win-x86-v0.17.1.3.zip
#
## GUI
8c9a820fd7dc228807f8ecc46973350d3d5d871c6f8dd67ef066d04407575d14  monero-gui-install-win-x64-v0.17.1.4.exe
abe94552803fd6646e934d1248e6ef33d8d6e2ac9a725c600fa7e8d4bfcc21a3  monero-gui-linux-x64-v0.17.1.4.tar.bz2
4e319a9dfb5e1caa42b52f6503480af3b44403f3bf4691da523880c6a6ec38a9  monero-gui-mac-x64-v0.17.1.4.dmg
df78006226d21e70ea5d342b0f6d4335cf398e94cb3d0f750aec4db2d2b3f7f9  monero-gui-win-x64-v0.17.1.4.zip
#
#
# ~binaryFate
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=K/kS
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Code:
ls -la *monero*
-rw-r--r-- 1  118929135 Nov  9 23:52 monero-gui-linux-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
-rw-r--r-- 1  77817808 Nov  8 21:43 monero-linux-x64-v0.17.1.3.tar.bz2
member
Activity: 116
Merit: 66
Here is 100 Monero users who trusted in its privacy yesterday, are you on that list?
I set up a new node 2 days ago, using v0.17.1.3, and added the IP ban list. Then I set up a simple script that was (and still is) sending transactions every 5 minutes on average, with random intervals. Out of the 400+ transactions sent so far, none ended up on your list Tongue
jr. member
Activity: 154
Merit: 2
e34ecdc56ae72af55bd745aeceda03d5d42657f0393ab6cfb86960c9cb6a0dee

OK for 1 of the addresses at random, why don't you fill us in a few details.

What is the balance of the address? what are their recent transactions

Where did the funds come from or go to before and after they were in this address?

etc.

I only track transactions, identities, and if they watch kinky porn. But sure you can escalate that attack, there are dozens way to track Monero, you say so yourself https://www.monerooutreach.org/breaking-monero/
legendary
Activity: 2702
Merit: 2053
Free spirit
e34ecdc56ae72af55bd745aeceda03d5d42657f0393ab6cfb86960c9cb6a0dee

OK for 1 of the addresses at random, why don't you fill us in a few details.

What is the balance of the address? what are their recent transactions

Where did the funds come from or go to before and after they were in this address?

etc.
legendary
Activity: 2268
Merit: 1141
Dear devs,

just checking the binaries for 17.1.3 and i need to mention that your hashes for the GUI Version are incorrect. One time i am downloading Version 17.1.3 one time 17.1.4 and in the hashes.txt file there is only 17.1.4 stated.
Please correct that, thank you  Grin

Probably a local caching issue. Try a hard refresh on the Monero website or use incognito / private mode.
full member
Activity: 1179
Merit: 210
only hodl what you understand and love!
Dear devs,

just checking the binaries for 17.1.3 and i need to mention that your hashes for the GUI Version are incorrect. One time i am downloading Version 17.1.3 one time 17.1.4 and in the hashes.txt file there is only 17.1.4 stated.
Please correct that, thank you  Grin
legendary
Activity: 3836
Merit: 4969
Doomed to see the future and unable to prevent it
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1326130648491417602.html

Quote
Riccardo Spagni Profile picture
Riccardo Spagni
Follow @fluffypony
Twitter logo
14h, 17 tweets, 5 min read
Recently, a largely incompetent attacker bumbled their way through a Sybil attack against Monero, trying to correlate transactions to the IP address of the node that broadcast it. Whilst novel in that it is the 1st Sybil attack of this sort, it was also quite ineffective. 1/n
First off, this clumsy attack had no effect on any of Monero's on-chain privacy mechanisms (ring signatures, stealth addresses, confidential transactions). Additionally, it is important to note that this is an attack that you could execute against nearly every cryptocurrency, 2/n
even privacy-focused cryptocurrencies. This makes it of particular interest, not just to Monero, but to all cryptocurrencies. Naturally, as we've all been aware of the possibility there is lots of work that has been done over the years to mitigate it. 3/n
The biggest mitigation is to use Tor or i2p for your node to broadcast its transactions, and this has been easily supported in Monero for 2 years (see: github.com/monero-project…) and in Bitcoin for over 8 years (see: github.com/bitcoin/bitcoi…) 4/n
bitcoin/bitcoin
Bitcoin Core integration/staging tree. Contribute to bitcoin/bitcoin development by creating an account on GitHub.
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/tor.md
monero-project/monero
Monero: the secure, private, untraceable cryptocurrency - monero-project/monero
https://github.com/monero-project/monero/blob/master/ANONYMITY_NETWORKS.md
Of course, this isn't a silver bullet, and there are a class of attacks that can still be used to correlate a Tor address with a real-world IP address, & so an excellent group of researchers (Brad Denby, @giuliacfanti, @socrates1024, Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan, & others) 5/n
created Dandelion in 2017 (see: arxiv.org/pdf/1701.04439…). In 2018 they followed it up with Dandelion++ (see: arxiv.org/pdf/1805.11060…) which fixed many of the weaknesses of the original proposal. 6/n
Dandelion (and, by extension, Dandelion++) has been proposed for Bitcoin as BIP-156 (see: github.com/bitcoin/bips/b…), but is not yet implemented. Dandelion++ was implemented in Monero in a PR merged in April this year (see github.com/monero-project…). 7/n
Adding Dandelion++ support to public networks: by vtnerd · Pull Request #6314 · monero-project/monero
New flag in NOTIFY_NEW_TRANSACTION to indicate stem mode Stem loops detected in tx_pool.cpp Embargo timeout for a blackhole attack during stem phase
https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/6314
bitcoin/bips
Bitcoin Improvement Proposals. Contribute to bitcoin/bips development by creating an account on GitHub.
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0156.mediawiki
Without getting technical, Dandelion++ works by randomly "diffusing" transaction broadcasts. This means that for a Sybil attack to link a transaction to a node's IP address it has to be intercepted at the very first node in the "stem" phase of a Dandelion++ broadcast. 8/n
This attack, whilst novel in that it is a live Sybil attack against a network, was simply not large enough to be broadly effective against Dandelion++ - the attacker would have had to launch many thousands more nodes. 9/n
Even if they did do this, they would still not have been able to demonstrably prove a link between a node and a transaction, and it would be a "best guess" heuristic. Naturally this attack was entirely useless against anyone using a light node (eg. MyMonero), 10/n
against anyone using Tor / i2p for their node, against anyone who runs their node behind a VPN, or against anyone using pushtx on a Monero block explorer to broadcast their transactions. It was also largely useless for anyone using a node remotely (eg. Monerujo or the GUI). 11/n
Still, it did teach us some valuable lessons as the Sybil nodes also tried to disrupt the flow of transactions (by not rebroadcasting them), and tried to disrupt nodes syncing up by not serving them blocks. 12/n
Thus, the latest Monero release (0.17.1.3) has fine-tuned the way a node deals with misbehaving peers. If you are running a Monero or Bitcoin node (or a node for any other currency), it is important to be aware that Sybil attacks can be more subtle & less clumsy than this. 13/n
They can also be much harder to detect in practice if the attacker has enough money to deploy reasonable infrastructure. There has also been purpose-built Sybil node software created for Bitcoin (see: github.com/basil00/Pseudo…) that actually behaves pretty well. 14/n
basil00/PseudoNode
PseudoNode - A full node emulator. Contribute to basil00/PseudoNode development by creating an account on GitHub.
https://github.com/basil00/PseudoNode
They do this without even requiring much in the way of server resources (eg. by proxying block requests through to another peer), and thus fully support initial sync, transaction broadcasts, and so on. They are a little diabolical in their ability to masquerade as a node. 15/n
If you are truly concerned about the efficacy of a Sybil attack (whether you're a Bitcoin or a Monero user) then I strongly recommend you run your node behind Tor, or at least broadcast your transactions on a block explorer's pushtx functionality (also accessible via Tor). 16/fin
Bootnote: here's a Reddit thread on the attack, which also includes a link to a flat file of the attacker's IP addresses that you can pass to --ban-list if you want to make sure your node doesn't connect to these.
legendary
Activity: 2702
Merit: 2053
Free spirit
Surely your leaders would not want to allow you to become irrelevant.

USA is a key player just like china, china is the power dollars is the funding.

Anyone banning new technologies is in danger to be left behind.



legendary
Activity: 2268
Merit: 1141
Is this legit ?
https://monero-badcaca.net/

Tx ids linked to IP & purchases

Looks like FUD, right before a sell off.

But if you can't attack the tech then mindshare is the next best vector.




They could be running a honey pot site and get that many customers to "reveal" nothing very interesting.


Yeah, if you went to that url with an open IP don't be surprised if you see your IP on the next FUD update. Wink

See:

https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/jrh7mv/psa_informational_thread_on_the_recently_observed/
legendary
Activity: 3122
Merit: 1492
Binance appears to also have a sudden reaction of banning all Americans.

Link?

Sorry, it is from this article.

https://www.theblockcrypto.com/post/84020/binance-blocking-us-users-exchange-email-2

You reckon that this is one of the signals to be careful and prepare for what might come to the cryptospace?
legendary
Activity: 3836
Merit: 4969
Doomed to see the future and unable to prevent it
Binance appears to also have a sudden reaction of banning all Americans.

Link?
legendary
Activity: 3122
Merit: 1492
Does everyone reckon that Erik Voorhees will tell the public what the real reasons for delisiting Monero? Is this connected to the change of administration in America?

Binance appears to also have a sudden reaction of banning all Americans. This could imply that Biden might not be friendly to the cryptospace market and development.

Decrypt's article also mentioned that US based exchange Kraken has Monero still listed. That might be the central piece of information to know if this is in some way connected to Biden's presidency.



For reasons like these, major US exchanges such as Gemini and Coinbase have not made Monero available for trading, despite the fact that it’s the 14th-largest cryptocurrency by market cap and does healthy trading volumes elsewhere. (Monero is, however, available on US-based exchange Kraken.)

https://decrypt.co/47508/shapeshift-quietly-delists-monero-privacy-coin
legendary
Activity: 2016
Merit: 1259
That looks really desperate and vague.

The have only about 10 examples linked to a word, that's it.

They could be running a honey pot site and get that many customers to "reveal" nothing very interesting.

It is known you can take extra security if you chose. TCPIP is TCPIP.

Monero is in constant development and is always maturing. I expect this to continue.



Year seven of lies, old news, and poor attempts at FUD.  Yawn.  I'm not saying it's not possible, but the smartest, most creative people in the world are constantly working for and achieving improvements for Monero and crypto in general.  Monero seems to evolve faster than they can FUD it.  Amazing, and powerfully satisfying.
legendary
Activity: 3836
Merit: 4969
Doomed to see the future and unable to prevent it
Is this legit ?
https://monero-badcaca.net/

Tx ids linked to IP & purchases

Looks like FUD, right before a sell off.

But if you can't attack the tech then mindshare is the next best vector.




They could be running a honey pot site and get that many customers to "reveal" nothing very interesting.


Yeah, if you went to that url with an open IP don't be surprised if you see your IP on the next FUD update. Wink
legendary
Activity: 2702
Merit: 2053
Free spirit
That looks really desperate and vague.

The have only about 10 examples linked to a word, that's it.

They could be running a honey pot site and get that many customers to "reveal" nothing very interesting.

It is known you can take extra security if you chose. TCPIP is TCPIP.

Monero is in constant development and is always maturing. I expect this to continue.

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