how did you solve the zerocoin flaws?
Can you give us a specific flaw that you would like to know ?
Zerocoin as currently implemented requires configuration with a trusted non-secret integer of 1,026 bits in length generated by multiplying together two factors p and q. That means you need a "trusted party" to configure Zerocoin; more importantly, if this trusted party decides to hold on to the p and q factors they used (rather than destroying them) or shares them with anybody, then they will be able to double spend any zerocoins. This is a fatal flaw if you wish Zerocoin to operate in a zero-trust manner. afaik
That's the problem that we already have taken into account since project beginning. We have tried to use RSA-UFO [1], Secure
Multiparty Computations [2]. Finally, we decided to use RSA factor challenging [3] instead because, It is the best way to guarantee that we don't hold "p" and "q". Moreover, if you can crack, you can claim 200k with RSA Laboratories. In our plan, to prevent double spending, we can easily take a look global balance between Mint and Spend transactions. If you have spend transactions more than mint, which is impossible, we will know that they are double spending occur in the network.
[1] http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.28.4015
[2] https://daim.idi.ntnu.no/masteroppgaver/004/4699/masteroppgave.pdf
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_Factoring_Challenge
not waste time giving explanations to these trolls and fudsters from shadowcoin, they will destroy your reputation, steal your ideas and try to launch before.
