Obviously I want the users happy, and after seeing the occasional backlash at Tycho for his pool size (through no fault of his own!), I'm working on a way to keep the pool large, but to negate the POTENTIAL for abuse. My proposed solution is keep the large single pool, but split the work load among multiple pool operators' servers.
I don't know that there was a backlash at Tycho; I don't believe he lost any share. There was some discussion and passionate debate, including by me, but at no point did I have negative feelings towards him [other than frustration which probably everybody involved felt]. I did feel he was profit motivated beyond the point of bitcoin network security [rather, blind to it as a possibility]. At the time, it was apparent that stopping slush pool drove everybody to deepbit and thus a two pronged attack, one to disable slush and the other via cracking and hacking deepbit (the more difficult of the two) was proven viable. Deepbit never hit the size it really needed to be used that way as the market cap MUCH smaller than today and the profit motive versus criminal risks probably weren't there. To execute it, the faster you can get in and out, the better, which could mean
significantly over 50% of the total network hashing rate. However, I was frustrated and did blast a few messages out on Twitter which drew some attention. I think several people got the attention of many more people and some of the smaller mines got some migrants and some new people or some users simply added their new hardware to other pools thus mining multiple pools. Six weeks or so later and and we have four major pools and several more small pools that are known about and I am guessing several private pools. It would be much more difficult to do now and would take a lot more work for the double spending attack to occur and succeed. Having said all that; I like and respect Tycho and think he has built a great product and recently told him so. Your pool is in no small way influenced by his work.
My goal, assuming I can make it technically possible without opening it up to fraudulent pool operators, is to create a franchise-type pool. BTC Guild would remain the front-end for all users, handling payouts, reward calculations, and account maintenance. However, their miners will be balanced over a network of servers. Some servers would still be mine, while others would be controlled by third parties.
There would be an authorization process, so I can inspect the hardware their server is running on to ensure that they can handle a reasonable work load. When rewards are calculated by the main pool, the sub-pools would receive a percentage of the donations generated that round, based on their server's share of the load, less a percent-based franchise fee.
With this setup, the pool could surpass the 50% mark of overall network strength, but it would be split among multiple individuals, rather than a single entity. It would be equivalent to the risk we have today of multiple pool operators colluding together.
... and if you have access, to those pools which you just said you would [and obviously, they are all working together on a single round] and you wrote the code, then I don't see that strategy really doing anything other than hindering your development and/or maintenance of the pool. Even if you don't personally do such a thing, the fact that one person can means a good enough cracker probably can get that very same information and a good enough hacker push modified code to all the installations. BTW, the double spending attack would occur with the payout mechanism and of course the block shares pushed to the miners. To have all work from all these pools in one round (which is what a pool's purpose is), that would have to be handled centrally, just as payouts are. So, one point of attack really. Constructive?