The attack that was described earlier in this thread (re-org attack) is specific to Kimoto's Gravity Well. Coins with low network hash rate are more susceptible to this attack. You wouldn't really need 51%, just a decent amount of hash power and good timing. So I removed KGW.
The main issue with CGA was the fact that there are/were 0 blocks mixed in with blocks of worth. Due to the current protocol, you must know what the block is worth before you mine it. So someone "could" write a script that checks the current block to see if it is worth anything, and if it isn't stop mining. Then wait for a block that is of worth and start mining again. This was fixed by making every block worth something (this doesn't come into effect until block 48,000). All I did was divide the coin up among the blocks that would normally be 0. So, if the diff were to be at 3, you will see the block reward = 0.333333 when before/now it was/is the first 2 blocks would be worth 0 and the third would be worth 1.
Ok I understand that change. That makes a lot of sense. But I guess my concern was, since the higher the difficulty the lower the reward it would deter large mining farms and allow people to mine it with their home computers. I guess the coin would be "resistant to popularity" since if miners jump on it, it becomes too difficult. So with that in mind, if the coin ever becomes valuable and nobody is mining it aggressively enough then isnt it very very easy to quickly mine the living shit out of it and take over the network with higher than 51% and even do a selfish mining attack? I can see this happening especially if the coins ever get valuable because of their rarity. Thats why I proposed my proof of stake solution above. Give a phony account a large stake (like premining millions of coins way beyond what the total supply will ever reach) and pretend like it doesnt even exist. Mind you, I'm still trying to understand all the different algorithms so I would really like to know your feedback on this and if I am making sense or not.