Topic: [ANN][CLAM] CLAMs, Proof-Of-Chain, Proof-Of-Working-Stake, a.k.a. "Clamcoin" - page 241. (Read 1151373 times)

I don't have any sock-puppets... are you kidding me?

I really don't understand why someone wants to take over your account / position? Can't they just start there own coin. ......... I mean nobody is holding a gun to anyone's head making them hold Clam

Jon  

1. No. Unvoting blocks are unvoting blocks, and should not be counted (either as part of the total, or as default.) Democracy entails involvement, and liberty entails responsibility.

2. Dependent on the issue being voted upon. I suggest a "scale of severity" to weigh issues against, and to determine the "weight" needed to carry said issues. This "weight" could offset the negatives of not having a default -- I think.
 
I have held two jobs where the ultimate goal was elimination of my own position, and people wonder why I prefer self-employment. 

I would tend to agree with your assessment on the default thing, but for me it comes back to the "digger." If this person's motivation is purely greed; a default vote in this manner would support that position. I think votes should only be counted for those willing to participate. The mouth should be where the money is so to speak IMO.

I absolutely love this idea. If done well it will not only be good for clam, but good for crypto as a whole. Thank the Great CLAM.

There are at least two different issues at hand:
1. Is there a default vote? How are unvoting blocks counted?
2. Do we consider a majority as enough? A super-majority? Complete consensus?

Complete consensus is a non-starter, in my opinion.
One can not expect the entire network to vote at all, let alone support ANYTHING.
In that case, have a good day; no development team is needed at all.

The debate about default votes and what is considered a majority are underway at the moment.

I personally believe that a rather long rolling window with "No Change" as the default vote would make the most sense. This allows anyone to propose a petition and over time rally support for that change.  

I would also argue that we do not require too large of a majority, lest we get nothing done whatsoever.

Regardless, the specifics haven't been worked out yet.  
Only a passing agreement that allowing the network to voice their opinions in a verifiable way is the best, unified way forward.

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It very well may.
Thank the Great CLAM this system is designed to move methodically.
Those paying attention will have plenty of time to realize that they do not agree with the opinion of others in the network.
That leaves them plenty of time to choose a network with which they have more in common.
Or, alternatively, evangelize and convince their peers otherwise.

I can only speak for myself, not anyone else voicing opposition to changes. From the perspective that you have determined to make changes, obviously to be successful you have to target the propositions which have a likelihood for support. So yes, I agree with you that this is reasonable, but that doesn't mean it's fair. Tyranny by the majority is still tyranny. For me, the issue is that people want to change the rules because they don't like the benefit that one person (or a small number of people) are deriving from the rules as they stand, and that arbitrary determination undermines the legitimacy of the system. It may be politically popular to take away someone else's rights, but that's not fair.

It is in the best interest of stakeholders to make the choice for "No Change" because it preserves the integrity of the foundational ideals of clam. Clam was founded as a "democratic" coin with "fair distribution." Deviation from this with no better reason than "self preservation" (read: greed) destroys the integrity of the coin. A coin with no integrity is a dead coin (worthless instead of worth less.)

I do not want a "benevolent dictator". I just don't want to see 51% of Clam-holdings be held by greed-based life forms, and the coin be ruined for everyone for their short-term gains. I admire the Clam devs for their actions and behavior during this ordeal, and I do not envy them. I hope to one day be so constituted.


Yes, fundamentally changing the coin unnecessarily is a bad idea.



I would ask that certain decisions require more than a majority to offset the short comings of democracy -- to protect Clam against those who care more for themselves than ideas. Something like a change to the core as is being considered here should be unanimous IMO, or require a two-thirds majority at the very minimum.

An interesting side-note:

Once we get the petition system implemented you are welcome to petition that someone else controls the "SuperCLAM" account.

Can you do it without all of your sock-puppets?
Possibly.

If so, I think that is reasonable and will comply.

I agree that coins are not corporations.
I don't think that means that there cannot be parallels between the two systems.



I would argue, given how liquid exchange is between crypto markets and the transfer-ability of advantage between networks, that coin holders have more control.
It is a near zero fee (ignoring spread) proposition to reallocate resources.

The debacle around Bitcoin XT illustrates just how 'legal' it is to 'elect a board'.
If Bitcoin XT had dominated the nodes and stakeholders on the network, it would have been the equivalent of "electing" Gavin and Hearn to the board of directors.


I categorically disagree.
I do not believe there is any redeemable argument against creating a system in which network participants can express their opinion about the direction of development.
The alternative is that the development team pays no mind what-so-ever to the users of the network.

I think one of the points of contention here is a misunderstanding about what is intended by this process.
We are debating different points.

Every single soft-fork in crypto history (though there have been few) has relied on this metric.
The primary difference is that we are suggesting there be a method to expose this network intent data prior and during the development process.
This is in contrast to a change which is mandated by the development team and then evangelized to get over a threshold for activation on chain.

All of the remaining hurdles which must be overcome to implement a change still exist.
This process does not effect network protocol consensus at all.
Changes must still be developed.
Updates must still be executed by network participants at their choice.
Services must still be informed and also choose to update.

This does not "lower the bar" for a successful forking change.
It simply provides a provable and fair means for the CLAM community and development team to propose and express support for potential changes.

We prefer to target our development energies towards propositions which have a likelihood for support.
I don't think that is unreasonable.
In fact, I think it is the only way forward that is "fair" and makes any sense whatsoever.

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What is the alternative?
We take a poll of "shills" on BTTalk?

Here's the chart I remember. It looks like eliminating the lottery slightly increased the overall staking rate. I don't see any evidence that staking during the lottery period was an advantage compared with after the lottery period. But I could be wrong, and I'm relying on information that is posted to the thread. I have not checked any of this myself.

SuperClam, coins are not corporations. In the latter case, there is a legal right to elect a board, which in turn gives control over management and ultimately the assets (shareholders can even vote to dissolve the corporation, which gives them access to the assets directly).

There are no such powers that exist on the part of coin holders. There are really only two things that coin holders can do:

1. Stake according to the network rules and their own individual best interests and without collusion, which makes the network secure provided that the stake is adequately distributed.

2. Individually or in collusion with other coin holders, stake maliciously and "51% attack" the network. This can include: a) blocking all transactions in a sort of doomsday button to destroy the coin, b) selectively blocking transactions (and/or blocks) to gain some advantage for the attacker, c) rewrite the chain to perform double spend attacks.

This idea of coin holder voting is creating a system that facilities and to an extent legitimizes #2. It makes the entire system less secure and therefore ultimately less valuable, even though it may seem expedient in the short term for the purposes of "governance", especially if you happen to be in the majority.

As I've already stated earlier, the best ways to make changes to a coin are:

1. By overwhelming consensus of the community (such that there is no significant opposition and everyone just goes along with the change). This obviously does not exist for rewriting the digging rules. It does often exist for other changes that are routinely made to coins such as bug fixes, tweaks to transaction fees, some forms of new features, etc.

2. By creating a new coin with different rules such that the people can decide via a market process which to support. This requires permission from no one since anyone can create a new coin.

My scammy side business... How is it scammy? Last I checked we are paying the most per fresh dig on the market if dug right. (including diggin with your own CLIENT or Just-dice)

I built a service around the core of CLAM. These people have the right to dig the coins that were given to them... rights shouldn't be voted on.

I guess I have no vote in CLAM because I was smart and sold off high... there is no way I'd buy back in (via markets) with all this sclamming going on between Dooglus and pals.

It's very obvious that voting doesn't matter. So just do what yall are going to do and ppl can close their businesses/leave feedback.

smooth and other "No Change" advocates,

Your arguments are persuasive and well thought out.
I can see myself making some of the same arguments.

Sharpen them and target them for stakeholders.
Explain in clear language why it is in THEIR interest to make that choice.
Everyone will have a voice as this process continues.

If you want a 'benevolent dictator' this may not be the right network for you.
That said, I am personally thankful to have you participating and involved

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navaman,

Thank you for the detailed response.

I believe your argument against "stakeholder democracy" could use some depth and introspection.

Fundamentally, you are correct given certain assumptions.
When actors in the system are bereft of choice, "trapped" as it were, such systems inevitably devolve into "might is right" rule.
This "might is right" rule rarely reflects the interests of small stakeholders.
These small stakeholders have no recourse.

I believe this system differs in important respects.
Let us assume that a petition takes place which severely negatively impacts a minority interest.
The outcome of the petition will likely be quite clear well before it is over, let alone implemented.
This minority interest is not trapped and can freely leave the CLAM eco-system if they so choose.
A tyranny with open immigration/emigration and a nearby "better" neighbor quickly only tyrannizes themselves.

Further, though this petition process is not binding and serves to inform development, in a way it IS publicly binding.
The results of petitions will be public and transparent.
They will signify a provable sentiment of the stakeholders of CLAM.
In the corporate world, how long does an executive retain their position if they ignore the mandates of shareholders?
If support is established publicly for a change and an alternative client is released which implements that change..
That alternative client, by definition, would likely be adopted.
This is regardless of the "tyranny" of the development team.

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It isn't perfect; but, this gives the community a voice without the concern for "shills" and non-stakeholder manipulation.
I can think of no better way to inform development energy and direction.

Oh come on mate, you're trying to make the case that it's a distinction without a difference, but there is a huge difference. Let's call them potential and actual CLAMs to differentiate, like potential and kintetic energy. Potential energy can't hurt you until it becomes kinetic energy. In the same fashion, it is clearly established that only actual CLAMs affect price. Potential CLAMs are hypothetical (potential) until they're dug and become actual. The potential CLAMs aren't undergoing inflation, but the actual CLAMs absolutely are, and they're the ones that affect price.

I agree with you on the the reset of expectations, I raised that point earlier and suggested the falling price was a foreseeable risk. That doesn't change the above though.


I agree with you. This has kinda been my point. There's talk about Doogcoin and yada yada, which baffles me because CLAM is a de facto Doogcoin. CLAM has virtually no value without JD. There are a couple other places you can gamble with it, but they only started after JD gave it legitimacy and brought the audience. No doubt that was not Doog's intention, I'm sure he liked the fair distribution model and the attributes of the coin, but by adopting such a tiny coin that was the inevitable result. I don't fault him necessarily for seeing that's the way it would turn out (that's nobody's fault), it just is what it is. Whether JD starts a new coin and abandons CLAM or keeps accepting CLAM along side it, or only accepts CLAM, CLAM's long-term prospects are terrible if all you can do with it is play at JD and stake more CLAMs. That has value in a CLAM-JD system, but not outside it.