nobodies..
nobodies..
hypocrites.
for the record, you people are trying to convince "the nobodies" in investing in this instamined snake oil coin.
why don't you hug each other? <<
Topic: [ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency - page 1570. (Read 9723858 times)
November 23, 2015, 01:50:29 AM
hypocrites.
for the record, you people are trying to convince "the nobodies" in investing in this instamined snake oil coin.
why don't you hug each other? <<
November 23, 2015, 01:24:23 AM
It's quote obvious the bitcointalk moderators are fist deep involved failero coin, thats probably they reason they're deleting post by Otoh but keep posts from failero trolls visible.
I'll repost this which will explain the mods behavior.
----------------------------------------------------------
More mass deletions happening.
Yet troll comments are still up.
Interesting....
Yet troll comments are still up.
Interesting....
After further review, there is a fairly simple explanation.
Bitcoin Maximalism
Bitcoin Maximalism is the belief that Bitcoin is in fact the One Coin To Rule Them All. The "first mover advantage" is strong with this one. Bitcoin was the first crypto currency to gain world wide attention. According to this belief, all problems within Bitcoin can be solved either internally (block size debate) or as a supplementary feature (sidechains). The true believers of Bitcoin Maximalism must use strategies of crush and absorb when better ideas come along. This will maintain their position for as long as possible. There are VERY large stake holders that are betting on Bitcoin.
An excellent example of this problem solving is DASH. There are inherent weaknesses in Bitcoin that have been revealed after field testing. Transaction speed and fungibility are easy to point out. DASH has implemented vast improvements in these (and other) areas that Bitcoin will find challenging to absorb. Therefore, it must be crushed.
The Mods of this forum are true believers in Bitcoin Maximalism, and they have far and away the most popular crypto forum on the Internet. Why not use the platform to your own advantage? Some of the best and brighest minds in the industry freely post their ideas here. This helps Bitcoin by getting free business intelligence. Trolling on online forums is not new, and is even worse in some corners of the web. People who have time and money invested in Altcoin A sometimes think that trolling Altcoin B will help A succeed. This in turn starts all out war when Alcoin B attacks Altcoin C, who in turn attacks Altcoin A. Ask yourself who stands to gain by this activity? The Bitcoin Maximalists of course. The term for the army of Monero trolls congregating here is "useful idiots".
What can be done?
The initial first-mover advantage will last for a period of time, only to be replaced by the "Fast Follower". Ford Motor Company was the first mass produced manufacturer of cars. Within a short time, General Motors was outselling them by offering something Ford would not. By following a stragtegy of innovation, combined with focusing on getting the word out, DASH has an excellent chance of succeeding in the Digital Cash realm.
November 23, 2015, 01:18:33 AM
This thread has received over 5 MILLION views. Think about that. I'd like to thank the "trolls" for doing that, and bringing new investors to Dash. We are well on our way, and in no small part thanks to them.
The great thing is that no matter how hard they blow their horns, the price is staying rock steady in anticipation of the great announcements to come at the two conferences.
Cheers to 5 MILLION views!
The great thing is that no matter how hard they blow their horns, the price is staying rock steady in anticipation of the great announcements to come at the two conferences.
Cheers to 5 MILLION views!
I'd also like to thank the "trolls" for doing that, and bringing new investors to Dash.
Thanks "trolls" really. increase troll number to make DASH popular.
November 23, 2015, 12:57:06 AM
This thread has received over 5 MILLION views. Think about that. I'd like to thank the "trolls" for doing that, and bringing new investors to Dash. We are well on our way, and in no small part thanks to them.
The great thing is that no matter how hard they blow their horns, the price is staying rock steady in anticipation of the great announcements to come at the two conferences.
Cheers to 5 MILLION views!
The great thing is that no matter how hard they blow their horns, the price is staying rock steady in anticipation of the great announcements to come at the two conferences.
Cheers to 5 MILLION views!
November 22, 2015, 11:34:57 PM
iPhone DashWallet Release
downloaded yet ?
https://dashpay.atlassian.net/wiki/display/DOC/iPhone+-+DashWallet+v.0.8.8
downloaded yet ?
https://dashpay.atlassian.net/wiki/display/DOC/iPhone+-+DashWallet+v.0.8.8
Well done dev's, going to have a crack at installing.
Hopeful one day it will be published in the store.
This is real news!
November 22, 2015, 11:30:38 PM
Love this....the other want-to-be crypto guys spend more time on bere then developing their own crypto...or working on real world solutions...LOL hahahahaha 
For those not used to our awesome thread...welcome. Please visit us at DASHTalk.org I'll post a massive list shortly of all the trolls we have attracted. Its actually quite amazing.
For those not used to our awesome thread...welcome. Please visit us at DASHTalk.org I'll post a massive list shortly of all the trolls we have attracted. Its actually quite amazing.
November 22, 2015, 11:20:09 PM
IMO you are right on that, however this is a failure of all cryptocurrencies, not DASH exclusively. Cryptocurrencies rely on attacker economist rationale, including Monero, Bitcoin etc. "Honest miners", bloat attacks vs fees increase (Bytecoin attackers (?) on Monero), etc etc.
Actually, AlexGR, he isn't at all right. Mostly because he presents one attack vector, which is nearly impossible to acheive, as the only issue. The point isn't to get a majority control over all masternodes, but rather a 90%+ minimum for less than 1% chance of deanonymizing a transaction.
It's not a matter of how much it costs to gain control over the MN network enough to either deanonymize a transaction or other malicious actions (such as double spends, etc...) It's a matter of ability, and there is no way any entity can do this without just about everyone selling off their Masternodes, and only to this malicious entity in a free market. You think that's going to happen?
The nature of the dis-incentive is of the type he originally described. In other words, a rival with tremendous amount of money can theoretically attack the system. We are counting that this is not "realistic" to happen.
But the same is true for all cryptocurrencies (PoW, PoS) and their entire operation.
The same is also true for all mixing-based anonymity systems, due to the possibility of sybil attacks.
What are Monero guys saying against Bytecoin? "Ohhh the preminers hold 80something % of the first coins which can be used to deanonymize the mixin of later users..."...
Now, of course, there are degrees of chance, probabilities, etc etc on what might happen. But, in the end of the day, even a 0.000000000000000001% chance that something might go wrong, is proof that the system is not designed to be 100% robust in itself, instead if operates with certain assumptions on the economical behavior of the users of the network.
Somewhat agree. However, what you are missing from djb's point is that these sorts of arguments can be very fragile. The cost of attacking a transaction by spending a lot of money may be very small and therefore not feasible. But if you can spend the same "a lot of money" and in doing so attack many transactions, perhaps in a clever way that no one previously thought of, the cost may then become feasible. This applies to other cryptocurrencies in various ways, yes, but we are discussing Dash here.
I've argued before that there is really no cost to attacking masternodes (it is a variation of the nothing-at-stake attack that bedevils all PoS systems, which is what masternodes are). You don't have to buy them all up right now, fighting liquidity all the way up. You can slowly accumulate over time since your return-on-investment is higher if you are an attacker with ulterior motives (you still get the same rewards everyone else gets, so financially you are on equal footing). So you can always afford to pay slightly more for masternodes and accumulate a majority or all of them over time, while others find their ROI slightly lagging and over time drop out. In effect, the structure dictates a race to the bottom.
Bolded. Is that what you meant to say? "small"?
Typo. I'll edit above
November 22, 2015, 11:19:29 PM
Nothing but red for poor tired old Dash 
November 22, 2015, 11:18:02 PM
Yes I agree that at the mining level or forking the block chain with enough computational power is an issue (inherent with any coin using a similar consensus model for verification of transactions), BUT that is not the issue we are discussing as that is merely determining the block/ledger for which a coin stores transactions. The item of topic was "privacy" and how Dash's approach has been an "attacker economist" approach.
As far as I am aware, the "attacker economist" approach would also be used for dealing with the possibility of Sybil attacks in a cryptonote coin.
The fee structure would also be an "attacker economist" approach to prevent the blockchain from being bloated to DOA levels (and the coin / transaction network going to the grave), due to the problematic scaling and bloat of ring signatures at high mixing level.
What scaling problem exactly are you referring to here? ^
lol, what scaling problem. are you serious?
y'all have so many scaling problems it's hard to know which one to address i guess. i'm sure your devs will fix all the "easy" to solve scaling problems right after they figure out how to throw together a "complicated" official GUI wallet.
O hai.... Hypocrite.
How are you doing knowing that you support Dash's instamine but not another coin's instamine?
November 22, 2015, 11:14:00 PM
IMO you are right on that, however this is a failure of all cryptocurrencies, not DASH exclusively. Cryptocurrencies rely on attacker economist rationale, including Monero, Bitcoin etc. "Honest miners", bloat attacks vs fees increase (Bytecoin attackers (?) on Monero), etc etc.
Actually, AlexGR, he isn't at all right. Mostly because he presents one attack vector, which is nearly impossible to acheive, as the only issue. The point isn't to get a majority control over all masternodes, but rather a 90%+ minimum for less than 1% chance of deanonymizing a transaction.
It's not a matter of how much it costs to gain control over the MN network enough to either deanonymize a transaction or other malicious actions (such as double spends, etc...) It's a matter of ability, and there is no way any entity can do this without just about everyone selling off their Masternodes, and only to this malicious entity in a free market. You think that's going to happen?
The nature of the dis-incentive is of the type he originally described. In other words, a rival with tremendous amount of money can theoretically attack the system. We are counting that this is not "realistic" to happen.
But the same is true for all cryptocurrencies (PoW, PoS) and their entire operation.
The same is also true for all mixing-based anonymity systems, due to the possibility of sybil attacks.
What are Monero guys saying against Bytecoin? "Ohhh the preminers hold 80something % of the first coins which can be used to deanonymize the mixin of later users..."...
Now, of course, there are degrees of chance, probabilities, etc etc on what might happen. But, in the end of the day, even a 0.000000000000000001% chance that something might go wrong, is proof that the system is not designed to be 100% robust in itself, instead if operates with certain assumptions on the economical behavior of the users of the network.
Somewhat agree. However, what you are missing from djb's point is that these sorts of arguments can be very fragile. The cost of attacking a transaction by spending a lot of money may be very small and therefore not feasible. But if you can spend the same "a lot of money" and in doing so attack many transactions, perhaps in a clever way that no one previously thought of, the cost may then become feasible. This applies to other cryptocurrencies in various ways, yes, but we are discussing Dash here.
I've argued before that there is really no cost to attacking masternodes (it is a variation of the nothing-at-stake attack that bedevils all PoS systems, which is what masternodes are). You don't have to buy them all up right now, fighting liquidity all the way up. You can slowly accumulate over time since your return-on-investment is higher if you are an attacker with ulterior motives (you still get the same rewards everyone else gets, so financially you are on equal footing). So you can always afford to pay slightly more for masternodes and accumulate a majority or all of them over time, while others find their ROI slightly lagging and over time drop out. In effect, the structure dictates a race to the bottom.
Bolded. Is that what you meant to say? "small"?
November 22, 2015, 11:12:41 PM
What scaling problem exactly are you referring to here? ^
Bloat in particular. There was an attack exploiting this generation of bloated mixings and the response was to increase fees so as to make the attack less feasible.
Isn't this an "attacker economist" response to the problem of generating bloat from the mixing?
Quote
...
It gives an example of how the math and probabilities (keyword) of the level of mixing increasing decreases the probability an attacker would be able to successfully link addresses together on the monero block chain in a non-liner fashion.
It gives an example of how the math and probabilities (keyword) of the level of mixing increasing decreases the probability an attacker would be able to successfully link addresses together on the monero block chain in a non-liner fashion.
In other words, the system is not 100% robust in itself. It is not designed to be 100% safe. It is designed with the assumption that someone doesn't have a lot of funds to sybil the shit out of the system.
Quote
In DJB's block post he states the following:
...
The "attacker will probably fail" approach. People taking this approach say things like this: "We're designing this system so that the cost of breaking it is larger than the resources available to the attacker."
...
The "attacker will probably fail" approach. People taking this approach say things like this: "We're designing this system so that the cost of breaking it is larger than the resources available to the attacker."
...and this is precisely how sybil attacks are dealt with in Monero.
Yes you could say that about the fees being raise. But how is that a problem? Can you specifically detail how raising the min fee is still within the "attacker economist" approach? As it wont be a problem for an annoying-person to spam the monero network if they choose. The block size will adjust accordingly up and down.
Monero is counting on the possibility that the resources of the attacker will not be sufficient to sybil attack and unmask those trying to be anonymous.
Quite the contrary it isn't about the "possibility that the resources of the attacker will not be sufficient"....
it is...
"the probability that the attacker will not have enough resources to successfully execute the attack...ever"
Those two statements mean very different things ^.
Another snippet from DJB's post concerning an attacker having enough resources:
Quote
Can an attacker actually carry out 280 or 290 or 2100 operations? Here are some back-of-the-envelope numbers that help put attack possibilities into perspective. Mass-market GPUs use state-of-the-art chip technology, are optimized for floating-point operations, and perform about 258 floating-point multiplications per watt-year. The number of floating-point multiplications that the attacker can carry out in a year with this technology is limited by the number of watts available:
226 watts (284 mults/year): the power substation for one of NSA's computer centers.
230 watts (288 mults/year): the power available to a botnet that has broken into millions of computers around the Internet.
244 watts (2102 mults/year): the power actually used by the human race at this instant.
256 watts (2114 mults/year): the power that the Earth's surface receives from the Sun.
257 watts (2115 mults/year): the power that the Earth's atmosphere receives from the Sun.
226 watts (284 mults/year): the power substation for one of NSA's computer centers.
230 watts (288 mults/year): the power available to a botnet that has broken into millions of computers around the Internet.
244 watts (2102 mults/year): the power actually used by the human race at this instant.
256 watts (2114 mults/year): the power that the Earth's surface receives from the Sun.
257 watts (2115 mults/year): the power that the Earth's atmosphere receives from the Sun.
The idea is to make sure that an attacker doesn't have sufficient resources to even attack.
The difference between that approach and the "economist attacker" approach is that the attitude of it "being good enough" as opposed to "being overly sure an attack could never take place" is executed.
It's like standing near a cliff and hoping the cliff doesn't collapse and you are at the edge within a certain "safe" distance.
Distance of the "economic attacker" approach: 20 feet
Distance of the "attacker will probably fail" approach: 20,000 feet.
November 22, 2015, 11:09:21 PM
Yes I agree that at the mining level or forking the block chain with enough computational power is an issue (inherent with any coin using a similar consensus model for verification of transactions), BUT that is not the issue we are discussing as that is merely determining the block/ledger for which a coin stores transactions. The item of topic was "privacy" and how Dash's approach has been an "attacker economist" approach.
As far as I am aware, the "attacker economist" approach would also be used for dealing with the possibility of Sybil attacks in a cryptonote coin.
The fee structure would also be an "attacker economist" approach to prevent the blockchain from being bloated to DOA levels (and the coin / transaction network going to the grave), due to the problematic scaling and bloat of ring signatures at high mixing level.
What scaling problem exactly are you referring to here? ^
lol, what scaling problem. are you serious?
y'all have so many scaling problems it's hard to know which one to address i guess. i'm sure your devs will fix all the "easy" to solve scaling problems right after they figure out how to throw together a "complicated" official GUI wallet.
November 22, 2015, 11:05:15 PM
You and your scam busters will not control the narrative on our DASH communities.
Too late. You guys already spend half your time Duffsplaining the "accidental" instamine and the rest of Dash's bad crypto.
A couple of True Believers even put links to their favorite "accidental" instamine Duffpslanations in their sigs! Now that's devotion.
November 22, 2015, 11:03:12 PM
IMO you are right on that, however this is a failure of all cryptocurrencies, not DASH exclusively. Cryptocurrencies rely on attacker economist rationale, including Monero, Bitcoin etc. "Honest miners", bloat attacks vs fees increase (Bytecoin attackers (?) on Monero), etc etc.
Actually, AlexGR, he isn't at all right. Mostly because he presents one attack vector, which is nearly impossible to acheive, as the only issue. The point isn't to get a majority control over all masternodes, but rather a 90%+ minimum for less than 1% chance of deanonymizing a transaction.
It's not a matter of how much it costs to gain control over the MN network enough to either deanonymize a transaction or other malicious actions (such as double spends, etc...) It's a matter of ability, and there is no way any entity can do this without just about everyone selling off their Masternodes, and only to this malicious entity in a free market. You think that's going to happen?
The nature of the dis-incentive is of the type he originally described. In other words, a rival with tremendous amount of money can theoretically attack the system. We are counting that this is not "realistic" to happen.
But the same is true for all cryptocurrencies (PoW, PoS) and their entire operation.
The same is also true for all mixing-based anonymity systems, due to the possibility of sybil attacks.
What are Monero guys saying against Bytecoin? "Ohhh the preminers hold 80something % of the first coins which can be used to deanonymize the mixin of later users..."...
Now, of course, there are degrees of chance, probabilities, etc etc on what might happen. But, in the end of the day, even a 0.000000000000000001% chance that something might go wrong, is proof that the system is not designed to be 100% robust in itself, instead if operates with certain assumptions on the economical behavior of the users of the network.
Somewhat agree. However, what you are missing from djb's point is that these sorts of arguments can be very fragile. The cost of attacking a transaction by spending a lot of money may be very
I've argued before that there is really no cost to attacking masternodes (it is a variation of the nothing-at-stake attack that bedevils all PoS systems, which is what masternodes are). You don't have to buy them all up right now, fighting liquidity all the way up. You can slowly accumulate over time since your return-on-investment is higher if you are an attacker with ulterior motives (you still get the same rewards everyone else gets, so financially you are on equal footing). So you can always afford to pay slightly more for masternodes and accumulate a majority or all of them over time, while others find their ROI slightly lagging and over time drop out. In effect, the structure dictates a race to the bottom.
EDIT: typo small -> large
November 22, 2015, 10:54:40 PM
What scaling problem exactly are you referring to here? ^
Bloat in particular. There was an attack exploiting this generation of bloated mixings and the response was to increase fees so as to make the attack less feasible.
Isn't this an "attacker economist" response to the problem of generating bloat from the mixing?
Quote
...
It gives an example of how the math and probabilities (keyword) of the level of mixing increasing decreases the probability an attacker would be able to successfully link addresses together on the monero block chain in a non-liner fashion.
It gives an example of how the math and probabilities (keyword) of the level of mixing increasing decreases the probability an attacker would be able to successfully link addresses together on the monero block chain in a non-liner fashion.
In other words, the system is not 100% robust in itself. It is not designed to be 100% safe. It is designed with the assumption that someone doesn't have a lot of funds to sybil the shit out of the system.
Quote
In DJB's block post he states the following:
...
The "attacker will probably fail" approach. People taking this approach say things like this: "We're designing this system so that the cost of breaking it is larger than the resources available to the attacker."
...
The "attacker will probably fail" approach. People taking this approach say things like this: "We're designing this system so that the cost of breaking it is larger than the resources available to the attacker."
...and this is precisely how sybil attacks are dealt with in Monero.
Monero is counting on the possibility that the resources of the attacker will not be sufficient to sybil attack and unmask those trying to be anonymous.
November 22, 2015, 10:50:43 PM
Good sir... No we will not put you on ignore. You and your abusive thugs/trolls will not control the narrative on our DASH communities. Your thinly masked contempt for our superior currency and community will in the end be your undoing. DASH talk is the forum to get real information. Everyone knows it. In fact I'm seriously thinking of paying for a bunch of banner ads on all of bitcointalk to point that out.
Wow you sure showed me.
Quote
Everyone knows it.
Proof?
Quote
Your thinly masked contempt for our superior currency and community will in the end be your undoing.
My undoing? Been here 4.5 years...I plan to be here a long long time. But please continue with your thinly-veiled threats.
What community/currency?
What contempt? <---- you mean my disagreeing with what you and some others think/say?... Pretty sure that isn't contempt
Quote
con·tempt
kənˈtem(p)t/
noun
the feeling that a person or a thing is beneath consideration, worthless, or deserving scorn.
"he showed his contempt for his job by doing it very badly"
synonyms: scorn, disdain, disrespect, scornfulness, contemptuousness, derision; More
antonyms: respect
disregard for something that should be taken into account.
"this action displays an arrogant contempt for the wishes of the majority"
synonyms: disrespect, disregard, slighting
"he is guilty of contempt of court"
kənˈtem(p)t/
noun
the feeling that a person or a thing is beneath consideration, worthless, or deserving scorn.
"he showed his contempt for his job by doing it very badly"
synonyms: scorn, disdain, disrespect, scornfulness, contemptuousness, derision; More
antonyms: respect
disregard for something that should be taken into account.
"this action displays an arrogant contempt for the wishes of the majority"
synonyms: disrespect, disregard, slighting
"he is guilty of contempt of court"
Quote
In fact I'm seriously thinking of paying for a bunch of banner ads on all of bitcointalk to point that out.
Okay go for it. I'm sure that Theymos will thank you for your kind business. Please let us know when to expect the banners.
November 22, 2015, 10:49:50 PM
slow and fair distribution that you like.
lol, no. over half your monero coins were fastmined in the first year and a half and 1.5+ million of those were cripplemined.
me no likey.
November 22, 2015, 10:45:46 PM
Yes I agree that at the mining level or forking the block chain with enough computational power is an issue (inherent with any coin using a similar consensus model for verification of transactions), BUT that is not the issue we are discussing as that is merely determining the block/ledger for which a coin stores transactions. The item of topic was "privacy" and how Dash's approach has been an "attacker economist" approach.
As far as I am aware, the "attacker economist" approach would also be used for dealing with the possibility of Sybil attacks in a cryptonote coin.
The fee structure would also be an "attacker economist" approach to prevent the blockchain from being bloated to DOA levels (and the coin / transaction network going to the grave), due to the problematic scaling and bloat of ring signatures at high mixing level.
What scaling problem exactly are you referring to here? ^
Concerning your first statement, have you read through the monero lab papers? This is to address your cryptonote comment since Monero is cryptonote based.
https://lab.getmonero.org/pubs/MRL-0001.pdf
It gives an example of how the math and probabilities (keyword) of the level of mixing increasing decreases the probability an attacker would be able to successfully link addresses together on the monero block chain in a non-liner fashion.
In DJB's block post he states the following:
Quote
Cutting things too close: the "attacker economist" philosophy. There are three common approaches to choosing cryptographic key sizes:
The "attacker will probably fail" approach. People taking this approach say things like this: "We're designing this system so that the cost of breaking it is larger than the resources available to the attacker."
The "attacker will definitely fail" approach, producing larger key sizes. I take this approach, and I say things like this: "We're designing this system so that the attacker has chance at most one in a billion of breaking it using the available resources."
The "attacker economist" approach, producing smaller key sizes. People taking this approach say things like this: "We don't need attacks to be infeasible; that would be overkill. We're designing this system so that the attacker's expected cost of carrying out an attack exceeds the attacker's expected benefit from doing so."
For some attacks, notably the number-field sieve (NFS) for integer factorization, the success probability jumps very quickly from 0 to 1 as the cost increases past a particular threshold. It's then clear what the "attacker will probably fail" approach says, namely that the key size has to be chosen so that this threshold is beyond the attacker's resources.
However, for many other attacks the success probability grows much more gradually, and then it's not clear what the "attacker will probably fail" approach means. If "the cost of breaking" is defined as the median cost then the "attacker will probably fail" approach ends up saying that the attacker has chance below 50% of breaking the system; but cryptographic users aren't happy to hear that they've been given a cryptographic system that the attacker can break with probability 40%. NIST seems to focus on the average cost ("an algorithm that provides X bits of security would, on average, take 2X-1 T units of time to attack"), and with this definition the attacker's success probability could be 60% or even larger.
The "attacker economist" approach provides a rationale for focusing on averages. It views the attacker as rationally deciding whether to carry out attacks, saying "I will carry out this attack because its average benefit to me is larger than its average cost" or "I will skip this attack because its average benefit to me is smaller than its average cost". Of course, if the attacker carries out an attack of the second type, the attacker might still end up luckily gaining something (maybe the benefit turns out to be unusually large or the cost turns out to be unusually small), but after a long series of such attacks the attacker expects to lose.
The attraction of the "attacker economist" approach is that it produces smaller key sizes. The attack cost is limited to min{B,C}, where B is the attacker's benefit and C is the attacker's resources; for comparison, in the "attacker will definitely fail" approach, the attack cost is limited to C, which is usually much larger than min{B,C}. In other words, the "attacker economist" approach excludes not merely infeasible attacks, but also uneconomical attacks.
The "attacker will probably fail" approach. People taking this approach say things like this: "We're designing this system so that the cost of breaking it is larger than the resources available to the attacker."
The "attacker will definitely fail" approach, producing larger key sizes. I take this approach, and I say things like this: "We're designing this system so that the attacker has chance at most one in a billion of breaking it using the available resources."
The "attacker economist" approach, producing smaller key sizes. People taking this approach say things like this: "We don't need attacks to be infeasible; that would be overkill. We're designing this system so that the attacker's expected cost of carrying out an attack exceeds the attacker's expected benefit from doing so."
For some attacks, notably the number-field sieve (NFS) for integer factorization, the success probability jumps very quickly from 0 to 1 as the cost increases past a particular threshold. It's then clear what the "attacker will probably fail" approach says, namely that the key size has to be chosen so that this threshold is beyond the attacker's resources.
However, for many other attacks the success probability grows much more gradually, and then it's not clear what the "attacker will probably fail" approach means. If "the cost of breaking" is defined as the median cost then the "attacker will probably fail" approach ends up saying that the attacker has chance below 50% of breaking the system; but cryptographic users aren't happy to hear that they've been given a cryptographic system that the attacker can break with probability 40%. NIST seems to focus on the average cost ("an algorithm that provides X bits of security would, on average, take 2X-1 T units of time to attack"), and with this definition the attacker's success probability could be 60% or even larger.
The "attacker economist" approach provides a rationale for focusing on averages. It views the attacker as rationally deciding whether to carry out attacks, saying "I will carry out this attack because its average benefit to me is larger than its average cost" or "I will skip this attack because its average benefit to me is smaller than its average cost". Of course, if the attacker carries out an attack of the second type, the attacker might still end up luckily gaining something (maybe the benefit turns out to be unusually large or the cost turns out to be unusually small), but after a long series of such attacks the attacker expects to lose.
The attraction of the "attacker economist" approach is that it produces smaller key sizes. The attack cost is limited to min{B,C}, where B is the attacker's benefit and C is the attacker's resources; for comparison, in the "attacker will definitely fail" approach, the attack cost is limited to C, which is usually much larger than min{B,C}. In other words, the "attacker economist" approach excludes not merely infeasible attacks, but also uneconomical attacks.
I'm still convinced that Dash is taking the "attacker economist" approach that is the approach that "the privacy Dash has is good enough why bother making things any more difficult/bigger/complex for an attacker.
Is there any actual Math-based proof of how the probabilities of attacking dash play out in different scenarios?
Has there been any research into this at all? If so please link me there.
November 22, 2015, 10:42:31 PM
Good sir... No we will not put you on ignore. You and your abusive thugs/trolls will not control the narrative on our DASH communities. Your thinly masked contempt for our superior currency and community will in the end be your undoing. DASH talk is the forum to get real information. Everyone knows it. In fact I'm seriously thinking of paying for a bunch of banner ads on all of bitcointalk to point that out.
November 22, 2015, 10:32:40 PM
Yes I agree that at the mining level or forking the block chain with enough computational power is an issue (inherent with any coin using a similar consensus model for verification of transactions), BUT that is not the issue we are discussing as that is merely determining the block/ledger for which a coin stores transactions. The item of topic was "privacy" and how Dash's approach has been an "attacker economist" approach.
As far as I am aware, the "attacker economist" approach would also be used for dealing with the possibility of Sybil attacks in a cryptonote coin.
The fee structure would also be an "attacker economist" approach to prevent the blockchain from being bloated to DOA levels (and the coin / transaction network going to the grave), due to the problematic scaling and bloat of ring signatures at high mixing level.
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