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Topic: [ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency - page 6181. (Read 9724097 times)

hero member
Activity: 546
Merit: 500
01100100 01100001 01110011 01101000

Ok, I have verified it works.

Start darkcoind on remote machine.
On your local machine specify the IP at launch with -masternodeaddr=YOUR_SERVER_IP
Unlock your local machine wallet with your passphrase.
On your local machine, ./darkcoind masternode start

Slickness indeed.

So you have to keep it running on another machine, presumably your home machine, with the wallet unlocked?  


You don't have to keep your local machine's wallet unlocked permanently, or even open. Once the remote machine master node starts you can close the local machine's wallet and hide it away for safe keeping.

I look forward to this being officially explained with tutorial.  But thanks for this!

But if we need 1000DRK on our local machine, or another server, to get the main master node running (which has 0 DRK), .... what is there to stop us making multiple nodes with empty wallets from one set of 1000 DRK.

All I can think is we need the 1000DRK wallet to start each empty master node running.  Then use a different wallet with 1000DRK locally to fire up another one.  I look forward to understanding more lol.

I think that you have to run both simultaneously. The advantage is that the IP of the machine containing 1000 DRK is not public.
hero member
Activity: 784
Merit: 1005
In the last 10 pages I read a lot of people asking how to setup a masternode, and many started to offer to pay for someone to help them setting up a masternode. There is an awesome tutorial made by chaeplin in DRKtalk, but I think many of us, and many to come, would love to have a video of it, so I thought that we could organize sort of an event, a webinar, where one of us could explain and setup a masternode (in testnet so that we could see 100% of the steps and still be secure), and then record the webinar and leave it in the official site for future reference (in the future many people will need this)

There are sites like webex.com or gotomeeting.com (both are paid I believe) were we could do this with an acceptable amount of viewers. Because it takes time to prepare it and do it, I think we could organize a donation for the speaker (or if it matches something in the bounty list by LimLims then we have it already).

Is it a good idea? Does anyone feel like doing it? And would it be better to do it already or wait until RC2 is out?
sr. member
Activity: 546
Merit: 250

Ok, I have verified it works.

Start darkcoind on remote machine.
On your local machine specify the IP at launch with -masternodeaddr=YOUR_SERVER_IP
Unlock your local machine wallet with your passphrase.
On your local machine, ./darkcoind masternode start

Slickness indeed.

So you have to keep it running on another machine, presumably your home machine, with the wallet unlocked?  


You don't have to keep your local machine's wallet unlocked permanently, or even open. Once the remote machine master node starts you can close the local machine's wallet and hide it away for safe keeping.

I look forward to this being officially explained with tutorial.  But thanks for this!

But if we need 1000DRK on our local machine, or another server, to get the main master node running (which has 0 DRK), .... what is there to stop us making multiple nodes with empty wallets from one set of 1000 DRK.

All I can think is we need the 1000DRK wallet to start each empty master node running.  Then use a different wallet with 1000DRK locally to fire up another one.  I look forward to understanding more lol.
full member
Activity: 224
Merit: 100
Me thinks we need to issue a few bounties for hackers to test the possible attack vectors against masternode operation, cheating, payments etc, prior to going live (perhaps RC3+?). There's too much new stuff in there and code does have the annoying tendency to break, so... better harden it now than have nasty surprises later on.


I'm pretty sure this was already in the plans, but yes it will definitely need to happen. I don't remember where exactly in the timeline it was planned for - once DarkSend is open source I think?
hero member
Activity: 546
Merit: 500
01100100 01100001 01110011 01101000
I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.

Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win.

If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win.

Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into.

My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB.

I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network.



If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine?

If it was like this nothing could prevent someone to build thousand masternodes with the same 1000 DRK.

Network would reject a masternode registering twice with the same address, and if you think about moving the 1k DRK to another wallet, network would detect it and stop accepting you as a masternode.


Register a masternode with a wallet with 1000 DRK ----> send the 1000 DRK to an other wallet ----> Register a new masternode with the new wallet ---->  send the 1000 DRK to an other wallet ----> etc.
hero member
Activity: 784
Merit: 1005
I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.

Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win.

If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win.

Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into.

My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB.

I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network.



If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine?

If it was like this nothing could prevent someone to build thousand masternodes with the same 1000 DRK.

Network would reject a masternode registering twice with the same address, and if you think about moving the 1k DRK to another wallet, network would detect it and stop accepting you as a masternode.
legendary
Activity: 1008
Merit: 1000
can we raise the price a bit?

I don't like how you leech the money out for DRK for your tropical vision. Go to economics section for your brewing, minidumps, price alteration wishes please

Want to shut your mouth? I can say that I am one of the earlier adopters and hold over 100k darks. Im trying to get more darks so people like you don't fuck the growth of this coin.

gtfo douchebag
hero member
Activity: 546
Merit: 500
01100100 01100001 01110011 01101000
I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.

Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win.

If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win.

Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into.

My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB.

I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network.



If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine?

If it was like this nothing could prevent someone to build thousand masternodes with the same 1000 DRK.
sr. member
Activity: 364
Merit: 250
Pre-sale - March 18
Me thinks we need to issue a few bounties for hackers to test the possible attack vectors against masternode operation, cheating, payments etc, prior to going live (perhaps RC3+?). There's too much new stuff in there and code does have the annoying tendency to break, so... better harden it now than have nasty surprises later on.


agreed
legendary
Activity: 1708
Merit: 1049
Me thinks we need to issue a few bounties for hackers to test the possible attack vectors against masternode operation, cheating, payments etc, prior to going live (perhaps RC3+?). There's too much new stuff in there and code does have the annoying tendency to break, so... better harden it now than have nasty surprises later on.
hero member
Activity: 1302
Merit: 502
My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB.

I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network.

If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine?

Because why ever have them on the machine at all? You could use TOR to send the message to your remote master node and no one would know your native IP. As long as you aren't running services off your local machine and have pretty much all your ports closed down you are better protected than on a server.
hero member
Activity: 560
Merit: 500
www.OroCoin.co
Darkcoin is #3 as far as volume for last 24 hours, only behind BTC and LTC. Watchout! DRK could take over LTC spot very quickly!

It is Darkcoin rightful place. LTC became ASIC b!tch and its going down .

LTC is still a functional coin... What makes it unusable? Pretty sure there are a bunch of ASICs hashing BTC...

Miners live in their own cryptobubble... just because they can't mine a coin as well "it's dead"... lol. We all know that BTC *really* died when ASICs came onboard, lol.

Then again, LTC "sold" itself as the solution to the |ASIC problem" and failed. So, in a sense, it fails to deliver on it's core promise.

DRK, on the other hand, makes no promise for long-term ASIC resistance (as litecoin devs admitted, anything GPU mineable is ASIC-able) neither is ASIC immunity its main selling point.

Waaahhhh I lost my money hose!!!

ASICs ensure CPU server farms can't break a coin. It's a good, and inevitable, thing for any cryptocoin. DGW should keep any X11 ASIC's price down enough that people can afford them. Maybe low enough that nobody makes an ASIC for it. Speculative, of course. If the value goes high enough, even DGW won't stop an ASIC from being made.
hero member
Activity: 784
Merit: 1005
I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.

Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win.

If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win.

Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into.

My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB.

I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network.



If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine?


I'm not saying it is, that should be Evan, because he hasn't left details about it, but my guess is that the idea should be something like that.

You need the second machine because it must run the masternode, if you run the initial verification but then close the wallet you are also closing the masternode (masternode code is within the wallet).

sr. member
Activity: 364
Merit: 250
Pre-sale - March 18
can we raise the price a bit?

I don't like how you leech the money out for DRK for your tropical vision. Go to economics section for your brewing, minidumps, price alteration wishes please
sr. member
Activity: 1204
Merit: 272
1xbit.com
I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.

Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win.

If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win.

Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into.

My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB.

I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network.



If that's how it works, then I wonder why a second machine is necessary? If you only need the wallet present at the initial verification step, why not have a single masternode that verifies the wallet, closes it, and allows you to remove it from the machine?
hero member
Activity: 784
Merit: 1005
TMB multipool now mining DRK, further X11 coins to follow.

https://pool.trademybit.com/

On Switchercoin open Darkcoin Pool with autochange your earned coins on Litecoin! Reward type - PPLNS, 1% - pool fee. For connect to pool - stratum+tcp://switchercoin.com:2222.
More details about mining and settings for popular video cards Getting Started page.
Now we already find first block.

We would like it the other way around, mine other coins and have DRK as payment Wink
hero member
Activity: 784
Merit: 1005
I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.

Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win.

If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win.

Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into.

My guess is that masternodeA (the one holding the coins) registers in the network like "hey, I want to be a masternode, and I hold 1k DRK, you can check it, and my "masternodeaddr" is this 'masternodeB' (which has 0DRKs)", then the network verifies that masternodeA has 1k DRKs and registers masternodeB in the list of masternodes. When you get the list of masternodes you only get masternodeB.

I guess someone could sniff that initial part of the protocol and find out that masternodeA has 1k DRKs masternodeB has 0 DRKs, but I would say that you don't really even need to have masternodeA available in the network as long as the wallet holds the 1k DRKs, so (and this is just thinking and writing the same time) you could probable even disconnect masternodeA from the network after the initial registration and just leave masternodeB in the network.

sr. member
Activity: 1204
Merit: 272
1xbit.com
I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.

Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win.

If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win.

Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into.

I very much doubt the remote master node knows the private keys, because as you have pointed out, it would be of no advantage.

The way I'm thinking about this is that an attacker follows this path:

Get static IP of masternode --> compromise masternode --> figure out IP of secondary node by [magic] --> compromise secondary node

The [magic] part I'm assuming must be possible because the masternode must at some point communicate with the secondary node. But maybe there's some reason why this is infeasible?
legendary
Activity: 2646
Merit: 1722
https://youtu.be/DsAVx0u9Cw4 ... Dr. WHO < KLF
This is off topic but bitcoinfx is your avatar from desert punk?

Yes. Sunabōzu - https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Desert_Punk  Grin
hero member
Activity: 1302
Merit: 502
I don't get how the 2 machine masternode setup is more secure. If someone can break into either, your setup is toast. And the wallet's security is independent of the machines hosting it -- it relies on the strength of your password & the encryption algorithm. I can't see how the 2 machine configuration helps at all.

Because your master node IP is static, broadcast to the network, and an attacker knows 1000 DRK is on it. Your local machine IP is not listed on the master node list with the 2 machine setup and there are no coins on the server that's running the master node. Double win.

If we could get a port of Armory for Darkcoin you could theoretically do all this with the coins in cold storage. Triple win.

Masternode has to communicate with the node holding the coins, to verify the 1000 DRK are there. So if the masternode can do that, so can an attacker who has compromised the masternode. From there, they just need to break into the secondary node holding the wallet, which will presumably have no better security than the one they already broke into.

I very much doubt the remote master node knows the private keys, because as you have pointed out, it would be of no advantage.
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