Topic: [ANN][LSK] Lisk | Blockchain Application Platform for JavaScript Developers - page 2123. (Read 3074324 times)

That's not true. If he owns 1% he can't do anything. At Crypti you needed about 20% of all XCR to be at #80 without any other votes. Due to the forging rewards at Lisk, I suspect this number to be higher in our case.

It seems like you not entirely understand our system. Please read https://lisk.io/documentation?i=lisk-docs/README.

If someone owns 1% Lisk and he grabs sit #80 he will also be able to grab all the sits 81-100 without additional investment.  I dont see a single benefit to this.

Yes. If they come to the 50th delegate, they can make a 51% attack. If we now assume the 50th delegate only has an approval of 40%, then an attack indeed only need 40% of all LISK. But 40% is already a big sum, not easy to acquire. And then they have a financial incentive to secure the network.

These "groups" you describe fits very well into the picture for Bitcoin mining and Nxt forging pools I described earlier. If a large enough group of people come together they can attack any system.



That means someone who owns 1% of all LISK will ALWAYS be in the top 101. Someone who owns 2% can ALWAYS provide 2 delegates. Nobody could do something against that ever.

I will think more about it with Oliver.


Edit:

One question to you guys. If we now have your system and a group with 20% of all LISK. These guys can now split the 20% LISK between 20 accounts and vote 20 delegates into the top 101, which will stay there forever.

Where is my thinking error? The current system would be much better, because it could prevent it. Your system couldn't do anything.

Let me get this straight. Fairness will be ensured by linking a specific identity to the ability to sign a distributed ledger.

This is not a good idea. Several countries are beginning to enact serious legislation and take serious interest in distributed ledgers. In Russia, for example, they will send someone to prison simply for using it. Who knows what will happen to a signatory.

In the US, it has been suggested that current laws make signatories liable for filings with the SEC, CFTC, and likely any other agency that unilaterally declares its own jurisdiction.

Fairness must come from game theory, not by exposing the signatories to massive liability. The latter is a way to ensure the absence of fairness.

If game theory means that someone may control a delegate indefinitely, I don't see how that's a problem.

I think that we should figure out how to use this tech to brake into two of the biggest industries in the world. Gambling and porn. Porn drove bitcoins very high because many people want to stay anonymous when they pay for porn... Anyone have any ideas in regards to these tow industries?

If the voting weight was split between selected delegates instead of same weight applied to all selected delegates, there would be more incentive for said whales to accumulate more Lisk to grab more spots and in-process have greater profound interest in its success.  lets put it this way, if they get spot #80, they get addition 21 spots for the price of one.

Glad to see some discussion on this. The entire time Crypti has run I never saw more than about a 35% approval rating (this is percentage of all available votes, or 35M of 100M Crypti total).

The point Kush raises about incumbent corporate boards/top level management being hard to dislodge through voting is a valid one. Retail investors do not typically have the time or inclination to vote their shares, or research the candidates they are presented in a proxy. There is also the issue of brokers actually holding the shares instead of their clients. This leads to large institutional investors and very large individual shareholders being left to pick board members or try to dislodge them in a hostile take-over.

This is an interesting problem in Voting Theory. Someone could probably write a thesis on comparing the two methods for voting for Lisk Delegates - 1 Lisk = 1 vote for 1 delegate, or 1 Lisk = up to 101 votes at 1 for each of 101 delegates.

I don't see it being "unfair" for someone who has the interest to acquire enough Lisk, 1%, to guarantee himself a delegate spot. This helps strengthen the security of the network by having it secured by those who have a vested interest in its long term success. But, then, there are about 7 billion different definitions of the word "fair" on the planet.

Also, it seems like allowing the same large holdings of Lisk to vote for 101 delegates means a large block combined with low voter turnout from small stakeholders can control the entire slate of delegates. So I prefer 1 Lisk = 1 Vote for 1 Delegate.

I will be operating a delegate pool which will offer profit sharing with voters. My submission for a Dapp to enable Delegate Pools and Profit Sharing is at https://forum.lisk.io/viewtopic.php?f=8&t=27 . Please comment there if you have any suggestions for operation or features to be added.

I have been operating delegates on Crypti since DPoS was first introduced to it a year ago, and am currently operating the majority of the delegates on Crypti during the Transition to Lisk (mine are the cloud and rocket names). These will continue to be run for at least the next 6 months following the end of the Lisk ICO.

My initial delegate pool offering will be to hold the earnings for the Lisk Delegate Pool and split them with voters when the Delegate Pool Dapp is available based on the Lisk blockchain records. This data can be accessed via the API calls Max has posted above.

so even if this would happen. those people would own a huge stake in lisk and a profound interest in its success.

I did, there was nothing in-regards to my statement above.  My concern is not for a "51%" attack. Its the fairness of delegation system.

If a group of whales coordinate and put all their voting weight on a specific delegate to get him spot #80, that means they have the ability to do the same for spot 81-101.  The closer they get to #1 spot the more delegate spots they will own.

I hope you saw my post on the last page?

Lets say 5 to 10 whales have enough supply to grab sit #80 that means all they have to do is put the same weight on 21 more delegates of choice and they will also have sit 81-101.

How would the whale groups garner support to win ALL these seats?

If the voting weight is not split, that means that person/group can grab ALL the seats above theirs... It wont matter who people vote for at that point.  This is assuming they full control over their voting weight.

Whales will be whales in any system and don't think this actually aids in their ability to become more of one. In fact, if a whale were to garner support how would they do this? More than likely they would be buying seats which distributes more of the wealth evenly. But let's look at the system in general. It's something where voters essentially have the ability to elect delegates. If the people see and fear too much power from one delegate they have the power to take their vote away.

That is why I would suggest voting for candidates that reveal who they are, know their background, etc.

I would certainly like to hear other input on this too.

We can't disclose this information. It's a matter of the exchanges if they want to announce it already or not.



Yes, this bounty campaign is over. 

It is and I would love to see it addressed.  
It doesn't have to be an exchange either, it could be hand full of whales joining forces given that there is a financial incentive.

In theory, if a person/group has the ability to control enough weight to grab a delegate spot bellow 100, than any sit above that is guaranteed.

However, if they are forced to split the weight, this would decrease the likelihood of such scenario.

Or am I missing something? Lets discuss. I think the last offical comment made on this kinda brushed off the issue with the suggestion of possible dapp that would help midigate this concern.

That is a serious point. Do you know why hostile takeovers became a "thing"? Because it was all-but impossible to dislodge management through a proxy fight. Ben Graham himself noted this phenomenon, which he ascribed to ordinary shareholders being "supine."

Scoff at this fellow if you want, but he does know a thing or two about politics and how votes play out in the real world.

If you're interested, a fellow called landomata came up with a fix for his Nxttycoin. Every vote he runs on the Nxt system, he has a lottery. Each voter gets a number of "tickets" equal to the number of Nxttycoin that he/she votes. If you don't vote, you get no "tickets." The prize is an amount of Nxttycoin.

By so doing, he incentivizes voting and makes the "mere plurality of the vote" higher than it otherwise would have been. Now this fix is a trust-based hack - Nxttycoin holders have to trust landomata to be neutral and to follow through on his promise - but it is a fix.


EDIT: It looks like a similar fix is going to be added to Lisk:


https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.14184427

Max already answered this, see below post :
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.14184427

Nice to meet you. Interesting question.

You can get credit just by putting a link to lisk in your signature.  BUT!  I think the signature bounty is over.