Guys,
I'm trying to get my head around MN reward payments. According to PIVX PoS Rewards Breakdown specified on website and github pages, the current Phase (based on current block # 1277292 at the time of writing this) is this :
Phase X 648000-Infinite 5 PIV 90% (4.5 PIV) 10% (0.5 PIV)
taken from https://github.com/PIVX-Project/PIVX
So masternode reward should be 4.5 PIVX, however when I look on masternode payments https://pivx.ccore.online/masternodes , masternodes are getting either 3 PIVX or 2 PIVX.
My questions is why is it 2 or 3 and not a constant single figure and mainly why is it not 4.5 as specified per PIVX POS Rewards.
Cheers.
I'm trying to get my head around MN reward payments. According to PIVX PoS Rewards Breakdown specified on website and github pages, the current Phase (based on current block # 1277292 at the time of writing this) is this :
Phase X 648000-Infinite 5 PIV 90% (4.5 PIV) 10% (0.5 PIV)
taken from https://github.com/PIVX-Project/PIVX
So masternode reward should be 4.5 PIVX, however when I look on masternode payments https://pivx.ccore.online/masternodes , masternodes are getting either 3 PIVX or 2 PIVX.
My questions is why is it 2 or 3 and not a constant single figure and mainly why is it not 4.5 as specified per PIVX POS Rewards.
Cheers.
Unfortunately, you're looking at outdated information--and you're right, there are a few places where the info needs to be updated, so it's not your fault at all for thinking this.
The TL;DR is that with the implementation of zPiv staking earlier this year, the reward system changed slightly. See my recycled response below--the second half may be more technical than you need, but the first half addresses your question:
Now that zPiv staking is implemented, new blocks are found by MNs, regular Piv stakers, and zPiv stakers. While the outcome differs depending on who finds the block, the basic idea of 'finding a block' is the same regardless.
Now, here are some additional factors to consider re: the implementation of zPiv staking (disclaimer: I'm not a dev or in any way associated with the project).
First, the see-saw mechanism was removed because 1 is the smallest zPiv accumulator value, and the block rewards therefore have to be multiples of 1. The dynamic nature of the see-saw approach results in constantly varying fractions, which are unfortunately not compatible with zPiv. This changed the incentive structure somewhat, and in fact the new system is deliberately designed to incentivize the conversion of Piv to zPiv. Which brings up the next point--
Second, block rewards increased from 5 Piv to 6 Piv, distributed as follows:
As you can see, this means that the total 'public' reward increases from 4.5 to 5. Meanwhile, the potential allocation to budget increases from 0.5 to 1 (as is currently the case, each month's budget is created as a single 'superblock', based on whatever proposals have been accepted. Any un-needed budget--e.g. if there are not enough proposals to spend it on--is not created each month, so 1 Piv/block for the budget is a maximum value; in practice, the amount is usually lower). You'll also see that the reward for staking zPiv is 50% greater than for staking regular Piv (3 vs. 2).
Third, the potential increase in supply is offset by the strong incentive to convert Piv to zPiv for the purposes of staking. zPiv transactions are more expensive, and fees will continue to be burnt (plus 'extra' budget will simply not be created in the first place). If you run the math, it turns out that the 'tipping point' between inflation and deflation is somewhere between 2.8 and 10 zPiv (not Piv) transactions per second. (Variation is based on what assumptions you make; most likely numbers are toward the lower end of that range. Note also that because un-needed budget is not created, voting for or against proposals effectively amounts to a choice between implementing a feature or reducing inflation). Whatever the exact tipping point number is, if zPiv transactions/second exceed that number then PIVX will be deflationary, even with the increased reward structure. Less than that number, and it will remain inflationary.
Overall, these changes are in line with PIVX's goal of implementing full-time anonymity features. Stakers are the primary block validators on a PoS network, while masternodes are 'facilitators' that offer an extra layer of verification, improve transaction time, and allow the blockchain to be downloaded faster. In effect, Stakers are 'must haves' while masternodes are 'nice-to-haves'; meanwhile, if full-time anonymity is considered important, then converting most Piv to zPiv is a borderline 'must have' also. The incentive being given to stake zPiv reinforces these facts and takes PIVX closer to full-time anonymity. Note also that non-masternode-based voting options are planned to eventually be rolled out (https://github.com/PIVX-Project/CDG), so any significant increase in staking shouldn't adversely affect the passing of proposals or other governance activities in the long run.
Meanwhile, the allocation to budget was increased to reflect the need for strong, ongoing development during this formative--and competitive--period. It allows PIVX to continue to hire and pay the best Devs (for reference, currently core devs are paid 1000 Piv/mo to work full time) and implement new features faster and more successfully--and if un-needed, it will not be created, further reducing inflation. Long term, especially if/when PIVX's price increases, the budget allocation may be reduced, but even now it's less than the allocation found in many other projects. And the overall increase from 5 to 6 Piv per block is offset by the expected increase in the number of zPiv transactions. Fees will still be burnt, and PIVX will remain barely inflationary, or possibly deflationary as the number of transactions increases.
Now, here are some additional factors to consider re: the implementation of zPiv staking (disclaimer: I'm not a dev or in any way associated with the project).
First, the see-saw mechanism was removed because 1 is the smallest zPiv accumulator value, and the block rewards therefore have to be multiples of 1. The dynamic nature of the see-saw approach results in constantly varying fractions, which are unfortunately not compatible with zPiv. This changed the incentive structure somewhat, and in fact the new system is deliberately designed to incentivize the conversion of Piv to zPiv. Which brings up the next point--
Second, block rewards increased from 5 Piv to 6 Piv, distributed as follows:
- if a Piv staker or masternode finds the block: 3 Piv to MN; 2 Piv to Staker; 1 Piv to budget
- if a zPiv staker finds the block: 2 Piv to MN; 3 Piv to Staker; 1 Piv to budget
As you can see, this means that the total 'public' reward increases from 4.5 to 5. Meanwhile, the potential allocation to budget increases from 0.5 to 1 (as is currently the case, each month's budget is created as a single 'superblock', based on whatever proposals have been accepted. Any un-needed budget--e.g. if there are not enough proposals to spend it on--is not created each month, so 1 Piv/block for the budget is a maximum value; in practice, the amount is usually lower). You'll also see that the reward for staking zPiv is 50% greater than for staking regular Piv (3 vs. 2).
Third, the potential increase in supply is offset by the strong incentive to convert Piv to zPiv for the purposes of staking. zPiv transactions are more expensive, and fees will continue to be burnt (plus 'extra' budget will simply not be created in the first place). If you run the math, it turns out that the 'tipping point' between inflation and deflation is somewhere between 2.8 and 10 zPiv (not Piv) transactions per second. (Variation is based on what assumptions you make; most likely numbers are toward the lower end of that range. Note also that because un-needed budget is not created, voting for or against proposals effectively amounts to a choice between implementing a feature or reducing inflation). Whatever the exact tipping point number is, if zPiv transactions/second exceed that number then PIVX will be deflationary, even with the increased reward structure. Less than that number, and it will remain inflationary.
Overall, these changes are in line with PIVX's goal of implementing full-time anonymity features. Stakers are the primary block validators on a PoS network, while masternodes are 'facilitators' that offer an extra layer of verification, improve transaction time, and allow the blockchain to be downloaded faster. In effect, Stakers are 'must haves' while masternodes are 'nice-to-haves'; meanwhile, if full-time anonymity is considered important, then converting most Piv to zPiv is a borderline 'must have' also. The incentive being given to stake zPiv reinforces these facts and takes PIVX closer to full-time anonymity. Note also that non-masternode-based voting options are planned to eventually be rolled out (https://github.com/PIVX-Project/CDG), so any significant increase in staking shouldn't adversely affect the passing of proposals or other governance activities in the long run.
Meanwhile, the allocation to budget was increased to reflect the need for strong, ongoing development during this formative--and competitive--period. It allows PIVX to continue to hire and pay the best Devs (for reference, currently core devs are paid 1000 Piv/mo to work full time) and implement new features faster and more successfully--and if un-needed, it will not be created, further reducing inflation. Long term, especially if/when PIVX's price increases, the budget allocation may be reduced, but even now it's less than the allocation found in many other projects. And the overall increase from 5 to 6 Piv per block is offset by the expected increase in the number of zPiv transactions. Fees will still be burnt, and PIVX will remain barely inflationary, or possibly deflationary as the number of transactions increases.
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