Author

Topic: [ANN][XCP] Counterparty - Pioneering Peer-to-Peer Finance - Official Thread - page 348. (Read 1276826 times)

legendary
Activity: 861
Merit: 1010
What sucks is that while the term Decentralized exchange let imagine the possibility of the elimination of third party risk, actually there is a lot more counterparty risk by using it. (I prefer trust Bitstamp or Cryptsy than a random asset issuer on top of counterparty, and it's not even close).
hero member
Activity: 700
Merit: 500
Here is a post just now by Mark F.- a BTC core developer explaining the issue as JGarzik did in previous posts here. I only bring it because even-though, again, I dont really like a paragraph such as his last one, I think that we should continue and speak to them as partners. so... his writing also requires a response in my book. 

Mark Friedenbach • 5 minutes ago
You say that "Counterparty users pay fees to Bitcoin miners who process their transactions." However it is not miners which process their transactions, it is the set of fully-validating nodes of which large mining pools make up a mere 0.01%. To the rest of these participants in the bitcoin network, processing of transactions is a fully externalized cost - you have electricity and storage expenses for running a full node but don't see a single satoshi of transaction fees in compensation.
(snip)

My reply on the letstalkbitcoin comment thread:

"Yes, and any and all of those nodes are free to stop running at any time and to delete the blockchain from their hard drives. They run bitcoind/Bitcoin-QT and store the blockchain because they have some incentive to do so. The fact that this incentive is not explicit (i.e., direct compensation) does not mean that it does not exist. The cost of running a node is miniscule compared to the cost of mining. And there are plenty of minimal wallet programs out there that do not store the entire blockchain."
hero member
Activity: 647
Merit: 510
Counterpartying
Newbie here.  So is proof-of-burn still how people are buying these?  Or should I buy through Poloniex? Wink

I was a rookie
Hope to get help from others
Someone to help us? Smiley Smiley Smiley Smiley Smiley

Proof of burn is over. The easiest way to buy is on Poloniex or Bter.
newbie
Activity: 39
Merit: 0
For anyone who is interested in making such a peg, I have come up with a few examples which would show how you do it.

Quote

It's still a good service! And indeed I think that if a trusted exchange (or even a trusted community member) were to implement something like this on Counterparty, it would gain adoption.


Great, maybe you could drop us a link / point us to your examples? Smiley
full member
Activity: 216
Merit: 100
Does any sort of collateralization requirement denominated in XCP limit the total amount of assets that can be traded on the exchange to the market cap of XCP? How do you work out the margin requirement? Or is the idea that any asset in one's possession can be used as collateral, but represented as an XCP equivalent?

In a world with XCP backed assets, one way I could imagine this working would be that the current market price of the asset (based on a price feed) would be locked away when the asset was created, and the issuer would place a bet to cover future variations in the price, up to a disclosed bet size, and future date.

An issuer could choose the amount of margin they want to put up, and when they run out, the asset would be automatically liquidated. This would have the side effect of dumpling an asset holder back into XCP if a market got volatile, but I think it could dramatically reduce counterparty risk, and everyone would know were they stood.

When issuing, an issuer would lock away $1 worth of XCP to create the asset, and might choose to commit, say, another 25% to cover variation. So $1.25 worth of XCP might be locked away per USD token. They could sell the token to get $1 of XCP back, so they'd basically be net a long XCP bet.

I can imagine that this kind of usage would increase the scarcity of XCP and push the price up (so in the next round a unit of XCP could back a larger dollar value of assets, and so on).

You cannot eliminate counterparty risk from an asset-backed currency peg, as there is no mechanism at the protocol level to stop the issuer (i.e. the user with the private key of the address with the XCP backing) from withdrawing funds. I still think though that is a really good use-case.

A currency peg that actually requires no trust is making a CFD on the price of an asset to which you would like to peg your holdings in XCP. The effectiveness of the peg, however, depends on one's leverage, which in turn increases one's risk. For anyone who is interested in making such a peg, I have come up with a few examples which would show how you do it.

Thanks cityglut, pity, something like this would have been very cool  Cool

It's still a good service! And indeed I think that if a trusted exchange (or even a trusted community member) were to implement something like this on Counterparty, it would gain adoption.
newbie
Activity: 39
Merit: 0
Does any sort of collateralization requirement denominated in XCP limit the total amount of assets that can be traded on the exchange to the market cap of XCP? How do you work out the margin requirement? Or is the idea that any asset in one's possession can be used as collateral, but represented as an XCP equivalent?

In a world with XCP backed assets, one way I could imagine this working would be that the current market price of the asset (based on a price feed) would be locked away when the asset was created, and the issuer would place a bet to cover future variations in the price, up to a disclosed bet size, and future date.

An issuer could choose the amount of margin they want to put up, and when they run out, the asset would be automatically liquidated. This would have the side effect of dumpling an asset holder back into XCP if a market got volatile, but I think it could dramatically reduce counterparty risk, and everyone would know were they stood.

When issuing, an issuer would lock away $1 worth of XCP to create the asset, and might choose to commit, say, another 25% to cover variation. So $1.25 worth of XCP might be locked away per USD token. They could sell the token to get $1 of XCP back, so they'd basically be net a long XCP bet.

I can imagine that this kind of usage would increase the scarcity of XCP and push the price up (so in the next round a unit of XCP could back a larger dollar value of assets, and so on).

You cannot eliminate counterparty risk from an asset-backed currency peg, as there is no mechanism at the protocol level to stop the issuer (i.e. the user with the private key of the address with the XCP backing) from withdrawing funds. I still think though that is a really good use-case.

A currency peg that actually requires no trust is making a CFD on the price of an asset to which you would like to peg your holdings in XCP. The effectiveness of the peg, however, depends on one's leverage, which in turn increases one's risk. For anyone who is interested in making such a peg, I have come up with a few examples which would show how you do it.

Thanks cityglut, pity, something like this would have been very cool  Cool
full member
Activity: 210
Merit: 100
Here is a post just now by Mark F.- a BTC core developer explaining the issue as JGarzik did in previous posts here. I only bring it because even-though, again, I dont really like a paragraph such as his last one, I think that we should continue and speak to them as partners. so... his writing also requires a response in my book. 

Mark Friedenbach • 5 minutes ago
You say that "Counterparty users pay fees to Bitcoin miners who process their transactions." However it is not miners which process their transactions, it is the set of fully-validating nodes of which large mining pools make up a mere 0.01%. To the rest of these participants in the bitcoin network, processing of transactions is a fully externalized cost - you have electricity and storage expenses for running a full node but don't see a single satoshi of transaction fees in compensation.

This is a fundamental incentive problem with bitcoin today, and the parasitic use of the block chain as a publication system for Counterparty, Mastercoin, etc. is exacerbating the problem without any attempt to provide a solution. If and until the incentive problem is fixed (it's not clear it can be!) these groups should be doing their transactions on a separately validated side-chain, so only those users who opt-in to running the side chain incur the cost. Hopefully using 2-way pegging so their currency can be bitcoins, if they want to avoid the scummy currency issuance investment model.

If they don't do this, they are forceably extracting a rent from those current users of the bitcoin network which did not expect to be processing these transactions without pay when they started using bitcoin.

We are not hostile to this kind of innovation. In fact, I co-authored a distributed p2p exchange model using bitcoin side-chains accomplishing the same things as Counterparty and published six months before Counterpart started their development:

http://freico.in/docs/freimark...

What we are against is extorting other participants of the bitcoin network into processing your transactions which were not in the original social contract of bitcoin, especially when clearly explained alternatives exist. That is frankly evil, although I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and chalk it up to ignorance. This time.

Mark Friedenbach
Bitcoin Core developer
 
full member
Activity: 216
Merit: 100
Does any sort of collateralization requirement denominated in XCP limit the total amount of assets that can be traded on the exchange to the market cap of XCP? How do you work out the margin requirement? Or is the idea that any asset in one's possession can be used as collateral, but represented as an XCP equivalent?

In a world with XCP backed assets, one way I could imagine this working would be that the current market price of the asset (based on a price feed) would be locked away when the asset was created, and the issuer would place a bet to cover future variations in the price, up to a disclosed bet size, and future date.

An issuer could choose the amount of margin they want to put up, and when they run out, the asset would be automatically liquidated. This would have the side effect of dumpling an asset holder back into XCP if a market got volatile, but I think it could dramatically reduce counterparty risk, and everyone would know were they stood.

When issuing, an issuer would lock away $1 worth of XCP to create the asset, and might choose to commit, say, another 25% to cover variation. So $1.25 worth of XCP might be locked away per USD token. They could sell the token to get $1 of XCP back, so they'd basically be net a long XCP bet.

I can imagine that this kind of usage would increase the scarcity of XCP and push the price up (so in the next round a unit of XCP could back a larger dollar value of assets, and so on).

You cannot eliminate counterparty risk from an asset-backed currency peg, as there is no mechanism at the protocol level to stop the issuer (i.e. the user with the private key of the address with the XCP backing) from withdrawing funds. I still think though that is a really good use-case.

A currency peg that actually requires no trust is making a CFD on the price of an asset to which you would like to peg your holdings in XCP. The effectiveness of the peg, however, depends on one's leverage, which in turn increases one's risk. For anyone who is interested in making such a peg, I have come up with a few examples which would show how you do it.
newbie
Activity: 39
Merit: 0
Does any sort of collateralization requirement denominated in XCP limit the total amount of assets that can be traded on the exchange to the market cap of XCP? How do you work out the margin requirement? Or is the idea that any asset in one's possession can be used as collateral, but represented as an XCP equivalent?

In a world with XCP backed assets, one way I could imagine this working would be that the current market price of the asset (based on a price feed) would be locked away when the asset was created, and the issuer would place a bet to cover future variations in the price, up to a disclosed bet size, and future date.

An issuer could choose the amount of margin they want to put up, and when they run out, the asset would be automatically liquidated. This would have the side effect of dumpling an asset holder back into XCP if a market got volatile, but I think it could dramatically reduce counterparty risk (and everyone would know were they stood).

When issuing a $1 USD token, an issuer would lock away $1 worth of XCP to create the asset, and might choose to commit, say, another 25% to cover variation. So $1.25 worth of XCP might be locked away per USD token. They could sell the token to get $1 of XCP back, so they'd basically be net a long XCP bet.

I can imagine that this kind of usage would increase the scarcity of XCP and push the price up (so in the next round a unit of XCP could back a larger dollar value of assets, and so on).

Something like this could work in parallel with unbacked assets, and I could also imagine having fractionally backed assets, so users would have greater choice.

EDIT: Clarity
member
Activity: 64
Merit: 10
So one day in the near future, maybe 2 - 5 years out, when 1% - 5% of online transactions take place in Bitcoin, and 1% - 5% of the stock market has moved to Counterparty, I think it becomes obvious that pretty quickly it will no longer be feasible to run your own node that actually keeps the entire blockchain. Anyone have any thoughts on that ?

You think I think it is very creative
Why can you talk about your ideas
Very interested in
full member
Activity: 210
Merit: 100
full member
Activity: 216
Merit: 100

A recent comment on the LTB article (good one by the way except that it is abit too emotional in its 2nd part in my view):

"Firstly... Just ignore Luke-JR, everyone should do this and we will all be better for it.

Secondly... Mike Hearn seemed to have a good compromise solution where OP_Return was used to store a pointer to the data that is stored elsewhere...

So you get the benefits of being on the blockchain, and lessen the load on the network. Win win?


Dear DEVS: is this being discussed? is there an internal dialogue/discussion beyond the REDDIT and the articles?

Peter Todd has already explained why this is not a good idea: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.5824434

Fine. I have to admit that the technical details are above my head. I trust that the you guys with the other devs will determine what is possible even if not ideal to all. What i keep trying to find out is whether there is a dialouge going on or is this a stalemate or will it develop to a cat and mouse game.

As I expressed in several places throughout the past 25 pages: the best solution is to find the common path and create a win win. CP has a great interest to stay on top of BTC and not have to look elsewhere. While we all know that CP is great for bitcoin.

This is why we need to reach consensus with the BTC team

Counterparty is in no danger of being kicked off the Bitcoin blockchain.

We have contacted some of the Bitcoin core developers, though there is nothing in particular to report. We will let the community know if something comes up.
full member
Activity: 210
Merit: 100

A recent comment on the LTB article (good one by the way except that it is abit too emotional in its 2nd part in my view):

"Firstly... Just ignore Luke-JR, everyone should do this and we will all be better for it.

Secondly... Mike Hearn seemed to have a good compromise solution where OP_Return was used to store a pointer to the data that is stored elsewhere...

So you get the benefits of being on the blockchain, and lessen the load on the network. Win win?


Dear DEVS: is this being discussed? is there an internal dialogue/discussion beyond the REDDIT and the articles?

Peter Todd has already explained why this is not a good idea: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.5824434

Fine. I have to admit that the technical details are above my head. I trust that the you guys with the other devs will determine what is possible even if not ideal to all. What i keep trying to find out is whether there is a dialouge going on or is this a stalemate or will it develop to a cat and mouse game.

As I expressed in several places throughout the past 25 pages: the best solution is to find the common path and create a win win. CP has a great interest to stay on top of BTC and not have to look elsewhere. While we all know that CP is great for bitcoin.

This is why we need to reach consensus with the BTC team
newbie
Activity: 24
Merit: 0

Secondly... Mike Hearn seemed to have a good compromise solution where OP_Return was used to store a pointer to the data that is stored elsewhere...

So you get the benefits of being on the blockchain, and lessen the load on the network. Win win?


Dear DEVS: is this being discussed? is there an internal dialogue/discussion beyond the REDDIT and the articles?

If I am not mistaken, most of the simple operations should take less than 40 bytes already for both MSC and XCP.

It just makes it unnecessarily complicated for feeds, asset issuances, etc..when a few more bytes could keep things simple.

e.g. for some operations like asset issuance we could make two or more OP_RETURN40 operations.  But it's even more bloat.
sr. member
Activity: 386
Merit: 250
What about requiring the issuer to put collateral (xcp) into the system. For example: I issue LTC within Counterparty and have to put up xcp worth the amount of LTC that is bought from me. This would make the system more safe/reliable and boost the demand for xcp.  

Funnily enough, I just posted a similar idea in the main Counterparty forums.

+1 Smiley

@xnova, thanks for your post above. Any comment form developers on the collateral idea? Ad- and disadvantages? Posibility of implementation?  

I like this idea a lot. It's almost like a margin call, where the issuer needs to keep putting up collateral as the value changes. Maybe the details about max funding amount, duration, etc. could be specified in new asset fields? If the issuer didn’t want to be long XCP vs. the other asset they could also raise money on the DEX, buy LTC (or whatever) with the XCP they raise and keep that as side collateral so that they are never better or worse off as the asset changes in value.

There is nothing to stop people from issuing LTC (or whatever) trading derivatives, similar to how XBTC has been created on Counterparty as essentially a proxy for BTC. We encourage folks in the community to come up with and enact these kinds of use-cases (in a thoughtful, responsible manner, not unlike how XBTC was created and is operated).

What I meant was to (medium/long term option) hardcode the need for collateral (xcp as collateral)...  

Does any sort of collateralization requirement denominated in XCP limit the total amount of assets that can be traded on the exchange to the market cap of XCP? How do you work out the margin requirement? Or is the idea that any asset in one's possession can be used as collateral, but represented as an XCP equivalent?
full member
Activity: 224
Merit: 100
CabTrader v2 | crypto-folio.com
No rush just curious if we're on target for first week of April with the web wallet on mainnet? And is there anything I can do to help ?
full member
Activity: 216
Merit: 100

A recent comment on the LTB article (good one by the way except that it is abit too emotional in its 2nd part in my view):

"Firstly... Just ignore Luke-JR, everyone should do this and we will all be better for it.

Secondly... Mike Hearn seemed to have a good compromise solution where OP_Return was used to store a pointer to the data that is stored elsewhere...

So you get the benefits of being on the blockchain, and lessen the load on the network. Win win?


Dear DEVS: is this being discussed? is there an internal dialogue/discussion beyond the REDDIT and the articles?

Peter Todd has already explained why this is not a good idea: https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.5824434
newbie
Activity: 24
Merit: 0
Actually quite sad to see this, and wish it will be never used. I understand why Devs implemented it, but this method introduces a lot of unspendable outputs and can never be pruned from the blockchain. Kinds of like ' if you don't let me to do this, I have no choice but to do the worse thing.'

Don't think this method cannot be filtered by bitcoin core dev. This is an open source project, any miner can parse counterparty protocol and filter it as easy as us.

BTW, even if we really want to use it, it's slightly better to use PayToPubKey instead. One pub key has 32 bytes, larger than 20 bytes (the size of key hash).

FYI: you could also use uncompressed pubKeys. 0400...0 is not a valid ECDSA point in the first place, thus it might be possible to drop the prefix, too.

https://blockchain.info/tx/2de38a49f0079d0aaa8a0b9cfec71b1af935752b609eee0dc1eae56b2162a7e2

 Grin , dexX7 must have dozens of nefarious tricks up his sleeves already if it ever gets to the cat and mouse game as someone puts it earlier.

What else does it take for the devs to realize that OP_RETURN is the OP_SCRIPT_SUPER_EXTENSION for transactions at the upper layers?
Instead the simple OP_RETURN is still being painted as just storing data when there are countless ways to do that already.


full member
Activity: 210
Merit: 100

A recent comment on the LTB article (good one by the way except that it is abit too emotional in its 2nd part in my view):

"Firstly... Just ignore Luke-JR, everyone should do this and we will all be better for it.

Secondly... Mike Hearn seemed to have a good compromise solution where OP_Return was used to store a pointer to the data that is stored elsewhere...

So you get the benefits of being on the blockchain, and lessen the load on the network. Win win?


Dear DEVS: is this being discussed? is there an internal dialogue/discussion beyond the REDDIT and the articles?
Jump to: