Private message me please if interested
Topic: Bitcoin puzzle transaction ~32 BTC prize to who solves it - page 305. (Read 240606 times)
Anyone with a fast GPU (nvidia) and linux who can give me ssh for a % share of #85? The system needs to have cuda installed.
Private message me please if interested
Private message me please if interested
Arulbero
could you give us all the private keys for 160 bits
could you give us all the private keys for 160 bits
Well, what is the sacramental meaning of the step through 5? And he just brute force? because, it seems, it is necessary that the address be translated to its public key lit up. Arulbero could not until there is no output, find the number or could?)).
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80 ----------------------------- Unknown Private Key spent ----------------------------- 1BCf6rHUW6m3iH2ptsvnjgLruAiPQQepLe
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85 ---------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 0.85001 BTC ------------ 1Kh22PvXERd2xpTQk3ur6pPEqFeckCJfAr
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90 ---------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 0.90001 BTC ------------ 1L12FHH2FHjvTviyanuiFVfmzCy46RRATU
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95 ---------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 0.95001 BTC ------------ 19eVSDuizydXxhohGh8Ki9WY9KsHdSwoQC
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100 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.00001 BTC ------------ 1KCgMv8fo2TPBpddVi9jqmMmcne9uSNJ5F
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105 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.05001 BTC ------------ 1CMjscKB3QW7SDyQ4c3C3DEUHiHRhiZVib
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110 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.10001 BTC ------------ 12JzYkkN76xkwvcPT6AWKZtGX6w2LAgsJg
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115 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.15001 BTC ------------ 1NLbHuJebVwUZ1XqDjsAyfTRUPwDQbemfv
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120 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.20001 BTC ------------ 17s2b9ksz5y7abUm92cHwG8jEPCzK3dLnT
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125 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.25001 BTC ------------ 1PXAyUB8ZoH3WD8n5zoAthYjN15yN5CVq5
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130 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.30001 BTC ------------ 1Fo65aKq8s8iquMt6weF1rku1moWVEd5Ua
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135 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.35001 BTC ------------ 16RGFo6hjq9ym6Pj7N5H7L1NR1rVPJyw2v
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140 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.40001 BTC ------------ 1QKBaU6WAeycb3DbKbLBkX7vJiaS8r42Xo
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145 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.45001 BTC ------------ 19GpszRNUej5yYqxXoLnbZWKew3KdVLkXg
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150 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.50001 BTC ------------ 1MUJSJYtGPVGkBCTqGspnxyHahpt5Te8jy
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155 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.55001 BTC ------------ 1AoeP37TmHdFh8uN72fu9AqgtLrUwcv2wJ
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160 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.60001 BTC ------------ 1NBC8uXJy1GiJ6drkiZa1WuKn51ps7EPTv
80 ----------------------------- Unknown Private Key spent ----------------------------- 1BCf6rHUW6m3iH2ptsvnjgLruAiPQQepLe
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85 ---------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 0.85001 BTC ------------ 1Kh22PvXERd2xpTQk3ur6pPEqFeckCJfAr
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90 ---------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 0.90001 BTC ------------ 1L12FHH2FHjvTviyanuiFVfmzCy46RRATU
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95 ---------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 0.95001 BTC ------------ 19eVSDuizydXxhohGh8Ki9WY9KsHdSwoQC
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100 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.00001 BTC ------------ 1KCgMv8fo2TPBpddVi9jqmMmcne9uSNJ5F
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105 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.05001 BTC ------------ 1CMjscKB3QW7SDyQ4c3C3DEUHiHRhiZVib
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110 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.10001 BTC ------------ 12JzYkkN76xkwvcPT6AWKZtGX6w2LAgsJg
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115 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.15001 BTC ------------ 1NLbHuJebVwUZ1XqDjsAyfTRUPwDQbemfv
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120 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.20001 BTC ------------ 17s2b9ksz5y7abUm92cHwG8jEPCzK3dLnT
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125 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.25001 BTC ------------ 1PXAyUB8ZoH3WD8n5zoAthYjN15yN5CVq5
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130 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.30001 BTC ------------ 1Fo65aKq8s8iquMt6weF1rku1moWVEd5Ua
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135 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.35001 BTC ------------ 16RGFo6hjq9ym6Pj7N5H7L1NR1rVPJyw2v
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140 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.40001 BTC ------------ 1QKBaU6WAeycb3DbKbLBkX7vJiaS8r42Xo
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145 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.45001 BTC ------------ 19GpszRNUej5yYqxXoLnbZWKew3KdVLkXg
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150 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.50001 BTC ------------ 1MUJSJYtGPVGkBCTqGspnxyHahpt5Te8jy
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155 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.55001 BTC ------------ 1AoeP37TmHdFh8uN72fu9AqgtLrUwcv2wJ
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160 --------- Unknown Private Key spent 0.00001 BTC from 1.60001 BTC ------------ 1NBC8uXJy1GiJ6drkiZa1WuKn51ps7EPTv
01 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 1BgGZ9tcN4rm9KBzDn7KprQz87SZ26SAMH
02 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 1CUNEBjYrCn2y1SdiUMohaKUi4wpP326Lb
03 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007 19ZewH8Kk1PDbSNdJ97FP4EiCjTRaZMZQA
04 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008 1EhqbyUMvvs7BfL8goY6qcPbD6YKfPqb7e
05 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000015 1E6NuFjCi27W5zoXg8TRdcSRq84zJeBW3k
06 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000031 1PitScNLyp2HCygzadCh7FveTnfmpPbfp8
07 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004c 1McVt1vMtCC7yn5b9wgX1833yCcLXzueeC
08 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0 1M92tSqNmQLYw33fuBvjmeadirh1ysMBxK
09 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001d3 1CQFwcjw1dwhtkVWBttNLDtqL7ivBonGPV
10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000202 1LeBZP5QCwwgXRtmVUvTVrraqPUokyLHqe
11 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000483 1PgQVLmst3Z314JrQn5TNiys8Hc38TcXJu
12 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a7b 1DBaumZxUkM4qMQRt2LVWyFJq5kDtSZQot
13 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001460 1Pie8JkxBT6MGPz9Nvi3fsPkr2D8q3GBc1
14 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002930 1ErZWg5cFCe4Vw5BzgfzB74VNLaXEiEkhk
15 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000068f3 1QCbW9HWnwQWiQqVo5exhAnmfqKRrCRsvW
16 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c936 1BDyrQ6WoF8VN3g9SAS1iKZcPzFfnDVieY
17 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001764f 1HduPEXZRdG26SUT5Yk83mLkPyjnZuJ7Bm
18 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003080d 1GnNTmTVLZiqQfLbAdp9DVdicEnB5GoERE
19 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005749f 1NWmZRpHH4XSPwsW6dsS3nrNWfL1yrJj4w
20 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000d2c55 1HsMJxNiV7TLxmoF6uJNkydxPFDog4NQum
21 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001ba534 14oFNXucftsHiUMY8uctg6N487riuyXs4h
22 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002de40f 1CfZWK1QTQE3eS9qn61dQjV89KDjZzfNcv
23 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000556e52 1L2GM8eE7mJWLdo3HZS6su1832NX2txaac
24 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000dc2a04 1rSnXMr63jdCuegJFuidJqWxUPV7AtUf7
25 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001fa5ee5 15JhYXn6Mx3oF4Y7PcTAv2wVVAuCFFQNiP
26 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000340326e 1JVnST957hGztonaWK6FougdtjxzHzRMMg
27 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006ac3875 128z5d7nN7PkCuX5qoA4Ys6pmxUYnEy86k
28 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000d916ce8 12jbtzBb54r97TCwW3G1gCFoumpckRAPdY
29 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000017e2551e 19EEC52krRUK1RkUAEZmQdjTyHT7Gp1TYT
30 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003d94cd64 1LHtnpd8nU5VHEMkG2TMYYNUjjLc992bps
31 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007d4fe747 1LhE6sCTuGae42Axu1L1ZB7L96yi9irEBE
32 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b862a62e 1FRoHA9xewq7DjrZ1psWJVeTer8gHRqEvR
33 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a96ca8d8 187swFMjz1G54ycVU56B7jZFHFTNVQFDiu
34 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000034a65911d 1PWABE7oUahG2AFFQhhvViQovnCr4rEv7Q
35 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004aed21170 1PWCx5fovoEaoBowAvF5k91m2Xat9bMgwb
36 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009de820a7c 1Be2UF9NLfyLFbtm3TCbmuocc9N1Kduci1
37 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001757756a93 14iXhn8bGajVWegZHJ18vJLHhntcpL4dex
38 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000022382facd0 1HBtApAFA9B2YZw3G2YKSMCtb3dVnjuNe2
39 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004b5f8303e9 122AJhKLEfkFBaGAd84pLp1kfE7xK3GdT8
40 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e9ae4933d6 1EeAxcprB2PpCnr34VfZdFrkUWuxyiNEFv
41 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000153869acc5b 1L5sU9qvJeuwQUdt4y1eiLmquFxKjtHr3E
42 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002a221c58d8f 1E32GPWgDyeyQac4aJxm9HVoLrrEYPnM4N
43 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006bd3b27c591 1PiFuqGpG8yGM5v6rNHWS3TjsG6awgEGA1
44 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e02b35a358f 1CkR2uS7LmFwc3T2jV8C1BhWb5mQaoxedF
45 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000122fca143c05 1NtiLNGegHWE3Mp9g2JPkgx6wUg4TW7bbk
46 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002ec18388d544 1F3JRMWudBaj48EhwcHDdpeuy2jwACNxjP
47 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006cd610b53cba 1Pd8VvT49sHKsmqrQiP61RsVwmXCZ6ay7Z
48 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ade6d7ce3b9b 1DFYhaB2J9q1LLZJWKTnscPWos9VBqDHzv
49 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000174176b015f4d 12CiUhYVTTH33w3SPUBqcpMoqnApAV4WCF
50 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000022bd43c2e9354 1MEzite4ReNuWaL5Ds17ePKt2dCxWEofwk
51 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000075070a1a009d4 1NpnQyZ7x24ud82b7WiRNvPm6N8bqGQnaS
52 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000efae164cb9e3c 15z9c9sVpu6fwNiK7dMAFgMYSK4GqsGZim
53 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000180788e47e326c 15K1YKJMiJ4fpesTVUcByoz334rHmknxmT
54 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000236fb6d5ad1f43 1KYUv7nSvXx4642TKeuC2SNdTk326uUpFy
55 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006abe1f9b67e114 1LzhS3k3e9Ub8i2W1V8xQFdB8n2MYCHPCa
56 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009d18b63ac4ffdf 17aPYR1m6pVAacXg1PTDDU7XafvK1dxvhi
57 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001eb25c90795d61c 15c9mPGLku1HuW9LRtBf4jcHVpBUt8txKz
58 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002c675b852189a21 1Dn8NF8qDyyfHMktmuoQLGyjWmZXgvosXf
59 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007496cbb87cab44f 1HAX2n9Uruu9YDt4cqRgYcvtGvZj1rbUyt
60 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000fc07a1825367bbe 1Kn5h2qpgw9mWE5jKpk8PP4qvvJ1QVy8su
61 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000013C96A3742F64906 1AVJKwzs9AskraJLGHAZPiaZcrpDr1U6AB
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65 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a838b13505b26867 18ZMbwUFLMHoZBbfpCjUJQTCMCbktshgpe
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70 ----------------------------- Unknown Private Key spent ----------------------------- 19YZECXj3SxEZMoUeJ1yiPsw8xANe7M7QR
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75 ----------------------------- Unknown Private Key spent ----------------------------- 1J36UjUByGroXcCvmj13U6uwaVv9caEeAt
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80 ----------------------------- Unknown Private Key spent ----------------------------- 1BCf6rHUW6m3iH2ptsvnjgLruAiPQQepLe
02 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 1CUNEBjYrCn2y1SdiUMohaKUi4wpP326Lb
03 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007 19ZewH8Kk1PDbSNdJ97FP4EiCjTRaZMZQA
04 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008 1EhqbyUMvvs7BfL8goY6qcPbD6YKfPqb7e
05 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000015 1E6NuFjCi27W5zoXg8TRdcSRq84zJeBW3k
06 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000031 1PitScNLyp2HCygzadCh7FveTnfmpPbfp8
07 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004c 1McVt1vMtCC7yn5b9wgX1833yCcLXzueeC
08 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e0 1M92tSqNmQLYw33fuBvjmeadirh1ysMBxK
09 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001d3 1CQFwcjw1dwhtkVWBttNLDtqL7ivBonGPV
10 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000202 1LeBZP5QCwwgXRtmVUvTVrraqPUokyLHqe
11 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000483 1PgQVLmst3Z314JrQn5TNiys8Hc38TcXJu
12 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a7b 1DBaumZxUkM4qMQRt2LVWyFJq5kDtSZQot
13 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001460 1Pie8JkxBT6MGPz9Nvi3fsPkr2D8q3GBc1
14 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002930 1ErZWg5cFCe4Vw5BzgfzB74VNLaXEiEkhk
15 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000068f3 1QCbW9HWnwQWiQqVo5exhAnmfqKRrCRsvW
16 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c936 1BDyrQ6WoF8VN3g9SAS1iKZcPzFfnDVieY
17 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001764f 1HduPEXZRdG26SUT5Yk83mLkPyjnZuJ7Bm
18 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003080d 1GnNTmTVLZiqQfLbAdp9DVdicEnB5GoERE
19 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005749f 1NWmZRpHH4XSPwsW6dsS3nrNWfL1yrJj4w
20 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000d2c55 1HsMJxNiV7TLxmoF6uJNkydxPFDog4NQum
21 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001ba534 14oFNXucftsHiUMY8uctg6N487riuyXs4h
22 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002de40f 1CfZWK1QTQE3eS9qn61dQjV89KDjZzfNcv
23 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000556e52 1L2GM8eE7mJWLdo3HZS6su1832NX2txaac
24 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000dc2a04 1rSnXMr63jdCuegJFuidJqWxUPV7AtUf7
25 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001fa5ee5 15JhYXn6Mx3oF4Y7PcTAv2wVVAuCFFQNiP
26 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000340326e 1JVnST957hGztonaWK6FougdtjxzHzRMMg
27 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006ac3875 128z5d7nN7PkCuX5qoA4Ys6pmxUYnEy86k
28 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000d916ce8 12jbtzBb54r97TCwW3G1gCFoumpckRAPdY
29 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000017e2551e 19EEC52krRUK1RkUAEZmQdjTyHT7Gp1TYT
30 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003d94cd64 1LHtnpd8nU5VHEMkG2TMYYNUjjLc992bps
31 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007d4fe747 1LhE6sCTuGae42Axu1L1ZB7L96yi9irEBE
32 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000b862a62e 1FRoHA9xewq7DjrZ1psWJVeTer8gHRqEvR
33 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a96ca8d8 187swFMjz1G54ycVU56B7jZFHFTNVQFDiu
34 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000034a65911d 1PWABE7oUahG2AFFQhhvViQovnCr4rEv7Q
35 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004aed21170 1PWCx5fovoEaoBowAvF5k91m2Xat9bMgwb
36 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009de820a7c 1Be2UF9NLfyLFbtm3TCbmuocc9N1Kduci1
37 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001757756a93 14iXhn8bGajVWegZHJ18vJLHhntcpL4dex
38 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000022382facd0 1HBtApAFA9B2YZw3G2YKSMCtb3dVnjuNe2
39 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004b5f8303e9 122AJhKLEfkFBaGAd84pLp1kfE7xK3GdT8
40 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e9ae4933d6 1EeAxcprB2PpCnr34VfZdFrkUWuxyiNEFv
41 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000153869acc5b 1L5sU9qvJeuwQUdt4y1eiLmquFxKjtHr3E
42 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002a221c58d8f 1E32GPWgDyeyQac4aJxm9HVoLrrEYPnM4N
43 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006bd3b27c591 1PiFuqGpG8yGM5v6rNHWS3TjsG6awgEGA1
44 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e02b35a358f 1CkR2uS7LmFwc3T2jV8C1BhWb5mQaoxedF
45 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000122fca143c05 1NtiLNGegHWE3Mp9g2JPkgx6wUg4TW7bbk
46 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002ec18388d544 1F3JRMWudBaj48EhwcHDdpeuy2jwACNxjP
47 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006cd610b53cba 1Pd8VvT49sHKsmqrQiP61RsVwmXCZ6ay7Z
48 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ade6d7ce3b9b 1DFYhaB2J9q1LLZJWKTnscPWos9VBqDHzv
49 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000174176b015f4d 12CiUhYVTTH33w3SPUBqcpMoqnApAV4WCF
50 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000022bd43c2e9354 1MEzite4ReNuWaL5Ds17ePKt2dCxWEofwk
51 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000075070a1a009d4 1NpnQyZ7x24ud82b7WiRNvPm6N8bqGQnaS
52 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000efae164cb9e3c 15z9c9sVpu6fwNiK7dMAFgMYSK4GqsGZim
53 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000180788e47e326c 15K1YKJMiJ4fpesTVUcByoz334rHmknxmT
54 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000236fb6d5ad1f43 1KYUv7nSvXx4642TKeuC2SNdTk326uUpFy
55 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006abe1f9b67e114 1LzhS3k3e9Ub8i2W1V8xQFdB8n2MYCHPCa
56 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009d18b63ac4ffdf 17aPYR1m6pVAacXg1PTDDU7XafvK1dxvhi
57 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001eb25c90795d61c 15c9mPGLku1HuW9LRtBf4jcHVpBUt8txKz
58 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002c675b852189a21 1Dn8NF8qDyyfHMktmuoQLGyjWmZXgvosXf
59 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007496cbb87cab44f 1HAX2n9Uruu9YDt4cqRgYcvtGvZj1rbUyt
60 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000fc07a1825367bbe 1Kn5h2qpgw9mWE5jKpk8PP4qvvJ1QVy8su
61 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000013C96A3742F64906 1AVJKwzs9AskraJLGHAZPiaZcrpDr1U6AB
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65 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a838b13505b26867 18ZMbwUFLMHoZBbfpCjUJQTCMCbktshgpe
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70 ----------------------------- Unknown Private Key spent ----------------------------- 19YZECXj3SxEZMoUeJ1yiPsw8xANe7M7QR
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75 ----------------------------- Unknown Private Key spent ----------------------------- 1J36UjUByGroXcCvmj13U6uwaVv9caEeAt
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80 ----------------------------- Unknown Private Key spent ----------------------------- 1BCf6rHUW6m3iH2ptsvnjgLruAiPQQepLe
112 bit is the current record for the ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem = retrieve the private key from the public key)
I understood correctly: if you have 200 playstation3 and 6 months, then you can find a private key to any Bitcoin address that had outgoing transactions?
No, you could find any private key in a 120 bit space, but Bitcoin uses a 256 bit space.
You could find only the private keys of the puzzle transaction below 120 bit: #85, #90, #95, #100, #105 ... #115 bit
If you have 2^143 * 200 = 2230074519853062314153571827264836150598041600 PS3 and 6 months. And the electricity to power them, let's say about 100W per PS3.
112 bit is the current record for the ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem = retrieve the private key from the public key)
I understood correctly: if you have 200 playstation3 and 6 months, then you can find a private key to any Bitcoin address that had outgoing transactions?
If you have 2^143 * 200 = 2230074519853062314153571827264836150598041600 PS3 and 6 months. And the electricity to power them, let's say about 100W per PS3.
112 bit is the current record for the ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem = retrieve the private key from the public key)
I understood correctly: if you have 200 playstation3 and 6 months, then you can find a private key to any Bitcoin address that had outgoing transactions?
Um no it doesnt work like that
112 bit is the current record for the ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem = retrieve the private key from the public key)
I understood correctly: if you have 200 playstation3 and 6 months, then you can find a private key to any Bitcoin address that had outgoing transactions?
It is possible that all these addresses will be reset to zero in the next few days.
I don't think so, the #85 and #90 for sure, maybe #95 and #100, but not the other addresses. And it will take many many days, not just a few.
From : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discrete_logarithm_records
Quote
In July 2009, Joppe W. Bos, Marcelo E. Kaihara, Thorsten Kleinjung, Arjen K. Lenstra and Peter L. Montgomery announced that they had carried out a discrete logarithm computation on an elliptic curve modulo a 112-bit prime. The computation was done on a cluster of over 200 PlayStation 3 game consoles over about 6 months. They used the common parallelized version of Pollard rho method.
112 bit is the current record for the ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem = retrieve the private key from the public key)
I try description algorim. But I do not understand a few moments.
Code:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
int next = 0;//Initial varibale next for cicl search in publick kes
//Convert publik keys from raw to eckey format. Nothing intresested.
for (int i = 0; i < NUMPUBKEYS; i++) {
if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&pubkeys[i], rawpubkeys[i], 33)) {
printf("Unparsable pubkey %2d\n", i);
return -1;
}
}
printf("Build Hash\n");
secp256k1_gej pt;//Init variable pt
secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pt, &secp256k1_ge_const_g);//??????
//Start cicle from 1 to GSTEP (1<<25 or other count bits). With step one.
for (size_t i = 1; i < GSTEP; i++) {
/*if(i%1000000==0){
printf("Generate %zu from %2d \n", i, GSTEP);
}*/
secp256k1_fe x,zinv;//Init variable z and zinv
secp256k1_fe_storage xst;//Init variable xst
secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&zinv, &pt.z);//????????? Maybe inverted variable. But zinv or pt.z?
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zinv, &zinv);//Sqr from who? Sqr zinv from zinv?
secp256k1_fe_mul(&x, &pt.x, &zinv);//Multiple x pt.x and zinv. But who changes?
secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&xst, &x);//Return hash data to xst from x . xst this array from 8 part of hashes.
uint32_t entry = xst.n[0] & (HASH_SIZE-1);//In entry getted last (25-1 or other setted count bit) bit from xst.n[0] (first part from hash)
while (table[entry].exponent != 0) {//Cicle run if in table with key entry already setted data.
entry = (entry + (xst.n[1] | 1)) & (HASH_SIZE - 1);//Changed entry. In current xst.n[1] setted last bit to 1 plus add current entry. From this value get last 25-1 or other setted bits.
}//This is algortim searned free row in table with changed key by algoritm in up.
table[entry].exponent = i;//Set in table with key entry to subkey exponent varuibale i (currently pozition in main for)
table[entry].x = xst.n[2];//Set in table with key entry to subkey x, xst.n[2] (part of hash from storage)
//------------
//I try inserte here searched this hash in curently public keys. Algoritm founded, but maksimal found 25 or other setted bit, no more! Logical is true.
//------------
secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&pt, &pt, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, NULL);//????????????
}
//End generated main table
//But undestord. Variable i not used for generated hashes. Who is used aka privatkey?
printf("Search Keys\n");
secp256k1_ge ptgstep;//Init variable ptgstep
secp256k1_gej_neg(&pt, &pt);//Negativation pt ????? pt from previos step?
secp256k1_gej_double_var(&pt, &pt, NULL);//Double pt ???
secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&ptgstep, &pt);//????
secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&pt);//????
//In up init variable from main cicl.
//Start cicl i from 0 (previos cilck start from 1). To 2*GSTEP (double gstep). With step 1.
for (size_t i = 0; i < 2*GSTEP; i++) {
//Start cicl j from next (dinamic variable for exclude founded keys on begin array). To NUMPUBKEYS (coun publick keys). With step 1.
for (int j = next; j < NUMPUBKEYS; j++) {
secp256k1_gej diff;//Init variable diff
secp256k1_fe x,zinv;//Init variable x and zinv
secp256k1_fe_storage xst;//Init variable xst
secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&diff, &pt, &pubkeys[j], NULL);//????? May be added variable diff, pt and pubkeys[j] (currently publick key)
secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&zinv, &diff.z);//??????Maybe inverted variable. But zinv or pt.z?
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zinv, &zinv);//Sqr from who? Sqr zinv from zinv?
secp256k1_fe_mul(&x, &diff.x, &zinv);//Multiple x pt.x and zinv. But who changes?
secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&xst, &x);//Return hash data to xst from x . xst this array from 8 part of hashes.
uint32_t entry = xst.n[0] & (HASH_SIZE-1);//In entry getted last (25-1 or other setted count bit) bit from xst.n[0] (first part from hash)
//-----------------
//I try showed this entry for each publcik addr. And with each new cycle, this value was different for the same public key. Why?
//-----------------
while (table[entry].exponent != 0) {//Cicl run if in table with key entry present data.
if (table[entry].x == (uint32_t) xst.n[2]) {//If table[entry].x (hash part 2 generated in in prevos loop) equal xst.n[2] (hash part 2 from currently publik key) run block down
uint64_t key = (uint64_t) i * (uint64_t) (2 * GSTEP);//Generate varibale key. i * (2*GSTEP) . !!!!!!!!!!! Do not understand the logic. !!!!!!!!!!
//show founded key
printf("Found private key %2d: %16lx or %16lx\n", j + 1,
key - table[entry].exponent,
key + table[entry].exponent);
next++;//Add in variable next +1; Exclude this publick key from next searched.
if (next == NUMPUBKEYS)//if next equal NUMPUBKEYS, found ded last key, programm is stop
return 0;
}
entry = (entry + (xst.n[1] | 1)) & (HASH_SIZE - 1);//Changed entry. In current xst.n[1] setted last bit to 1 plus add current entry. From this value get last 25-1 or other setted bits.
}
if (j == next)///????????? In cycl each firt loop this is true, break? not searched other public keys.
break;
}
secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&pt, &pt, &ptgstep, NULL);//?????????? Choto gdeto kakto
}
return 0;
}
secp256k1_context *ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE);
int next = 0;//Initial varibale next for cicl search in publick kes
//Convert publik keys from raw to eckey format. Nothing intresested.
for (int i = 0; i < NUMPUBKEYS; i++) {
if (!secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse(&pubkeys[i], rawpubkeys[i], 33)) {
printf("Unparsable pubkey %2d\n", i);
return -1;
}
}
printf("Build Hash\n");
secp256k1_gej pt;//Init variable pt
secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&pt, &secp256k1_ge_const_g);//??????
//Start cicle from 1 to GSTEP (1<<25 or other count bits). With step one.
for (size_t i = 1; i < GSTEP; i++) {
/*if(i%1000000==0){
printf("Generate %zu from %2d \n", i, GSTEP);
}*/
secp256k1_fe x,zinv;//Init variable z and zinv
secp256k1_fe_storage xst;//Init variable xst
secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&zinv, &pt.z);//????????? Maybe inverted variable. But zinv or pt.z?
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zinv, &zinv);//Sqr from who? Sqr zinv from zinv?
secp256k1_fe_mul(&x, &pt.x, &zinv);//Multiple x pt.x and zinv. But who changes?
secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&xst, &x);//Return hash data to xst from x . xst this array from 8 part of hashes.
uint32_t entry = xst.n[0] & (HASH_SIZE-1);//In entry getted last (25-1 or other setted count bit) bit from xst.n[0] (first part from hash)
while (table[entry].exponent != 0) {//Cicle run if in table with key entry already setted data.
entry = (entry + (xst.n[1] | 1)) & (HASH_SIZE - 1);//Changed entry. In current xst.n[1] setted last bit to 1 plus add current entry. From this value get last 25-1 or other setted bits.
}//This is algortim searned free row in table with changed key by algoritm in up.
table[entry].exponent = i;//Set in table with key entry to subkey exponent varuibale i (currently pozition in main for)
table[entry].x = xst.n[2];//Set in table with key entry to subkey x, xst.n[2] (part of hash from storage)
//------------
//I try inserte here searched this hash in curently public keys. Algoritm founded, but maksimal found 25 or other setted bit, no more! Logical is true.
//------------
secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&pt, &pt, &secp256k1_ge_const_g, NULL);//????????????
}
//End generated main table
//But undestord. Variable i not used for generated hashes. Who is used aka privatkey?
printf("Search Keys\n");
secp256k1_ge ptgstep;//Init variable ptgstep
secp256k1_gej_neg(&pt, &pt);//Negativation pt ????? pt from previos step?
secp256k1_gej_double_var(&pt, &pt, NULL);//Double pt ???
secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&ptgstep, &pt);//????
secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&pt);//????
//In up init variable from main cicl.
//Start cicl i from 0 (previos cilck start from 1). To 2*GSTEP (double gstep). With step 1.
for (size_t i = 0; i < 2*GSTEP; i++) {
//Start cicl j from next (dinamic variable for exclude founded keys on begin array). To NUMPUBKEYS (coun publick keys). With step 1.
for (int j = next; j < NUMPUBKEYS; j++) {
secp256k1_gej diff;//Init variable diff
secp256k1_fe x,zinv;//Init variable x and zinv
secp256k1_fe_storage xst;//Init variable xst
secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&diff, &pt, &pubkeys[j], NULL);//????? May be added variable diff, pt and pubkeys[j] (currently publick key)
secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&zinv, &diff.z);//??????Maybe inverted variable. But zinv or pt.z?
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zinv, &zinv);//Sqr from who? Sqr zinv from zinv?
secp256k1_fe_mul(&x, &diff.x, &zinv);//Multiple x pt.x and zinv. But who changes?
secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&xst, &x);//Return hash data to xst from x . xst this array from 8 part of hashes.
uint32_t entry = xst.n[0] & (HASH_SIZE-1);//In entry getted last (25-1 or other setted count bit) bit from xst.n[0] (first part from hash)
//-----------------
//I try showed this entry for each publcik addr. And with each new cycle, this value was different for the same public key. Why?
//-----------------
while (table[entry].exponent != 0) {//Cicl run if in table with key entry present data.
if (table[entry].x == (uint32_t) xst.n[2]) {//If table[entry].x (hash part 2 generated in in prevos loop) equal xst.n[2] (hash part 2 from currently publik key) run block down
uint64_t key = (uint64_t) i * (uint64_t) (2 * GSTEP);//Generate varibale key. i * (2*GSTEP) . !!!!!!!!!!! Do not understand the logic. !!!!!!!!!!
//show founded key
printf("Found private key %2d: %16lx or %16lx\n", j + 1,
key - table[entry].exponent,
key + table[entry].exponent);
next++;//Add in variable next +1; Exclude this publick key from next searched.
if (next == NUMPUBKEYS)//if next equal NUMPUBKEYS, found ded last key, programm is stop
return 0;
}
entry = (entry + (xst.n[1] | 1)) & (HASH_SIZE - 1);//Changed entry. In current xst.n[1] setted last bit to 1 plus add current entry. From this value get last 25-1 or other setted bits.
}
if (j == next)///????????? In cycl each firt loop this is true, break? not searched other public keys.
break;
}
secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&pt, &pt, &ptgstep, NULL);//?????????? Choto gdeto kakto
}
return 0;
}
I don't understand thoroughly the algorithm 
can you explain in short why the size of RAM matters in this algorithm?
I thought it just generates privkey hex sequentially, finds corresponding pubkey and compares it to target pubkey
can you explain in short why the size of RAM matters in this algorithm?
I thought it just generates privkey hex sequentially, finds corresponding pubkey and compares it to target pubkey
You could look up the algorithms here: https://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/~sgal018/crypto-book/crypto-book.html
BSGS is in chapter 13.3
When memory is limited - Distributed Kangaroo in chapter 14.6
Since I don't have the resources to hope to compete here and everyone else is likely frantically converting pubkeys into byte arrays and re-writing thier stuff... So anyway the breakshort program uses the baby step giant step algo and the public key ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baby-step_giant-step ) to basically cut the searching down to the squareroot but it is ram intensive (like build a hashtable that can hold 2^80 and it can then search 2^160 and that is VERY cool, BUT the sheer ram needed to do something like that doesn't exist at the moment. ) say you have 8gb ram you can do maybe* 2^27 in the hashtable which seems to search "about" 2^55 keyspace - in a freakishly short amount of time. Kinda awesome right? say you wanna do 2^28 hashtable.. now you just doubled memory requirements.
* maybe is because of certain variables.. like the breakshort program as is, you can in theory do 2^29? (i think) with 8gb but with unint32_t you have potential for false collisions - and on my comp for some reason while 2^28 "should" work fine - 2^27 takes 52% mem so if I try 2^28 it starts using the swap file and SIGNIFICANTLY slowing it down. you figure that 4% wouldn't be THAT big a deal but it is the difference between driving a car a mile vs riding a skateboard a mile and a half. All over this thread is all kinds of info that is far more informative than I'm being - look around, have fun with it. (seriously I started out as "What?!?! free bitcoin!!! and then got sucked into teaching myself C (With quite a bit of help - you know who you are and thank you again) At my age this is kind of a "thing" - and going from not having a clue what an elliptic curve is to being fascinated by cryptography (well okay that whole journey started in 2012? 13? when my son first said the word bitcoin and I was like "Huh?" ) -:) anyway go back as many pages as you need to and happy hunting.
@arulbero can you tell us how you found it? details on how you used baby-step giant-step algorithm
can you explain in short why the size of RAM matters in this algorithm?
I thought it just generates privkey hex sequentially, finds corresponding pubkey and compares it to target pubkey
So anyway the breakshort program uses the baby step giant step algo and the public key ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baby-step_giant-step ) to basically cut the searching down to the squareroot but it is ram intensive (like build a hashtable that can hold 2^80 and it can then search 2^160 and that is VERY cool, BUT the sheer ram needed to do something like that doesn't exist at the moment. ) say you have 8gb ram you can do maybe* 2^27 in the hashtable which seems to search "about" 2^55 keyspace - in a freakishly short amount of time. Kinda awesome right? say you wanna do 2^28 hashtable.. now you just doubled memory requirements. * maybe is because of certain variables.. like the breakshort program as is, you can in theory do 2^29? (i think) with 8gb but with unint32_t you have potential for false collisions - and on my comp for some reason while 2^28 "should" work fine - 2^27 takes 52% mem so if I try 2^28 it starts using the swap file and SIGNIFICANTLY slowing it down. you figure that 4% wouldn't be THAT big a deal but it is the difference between driving a car a mile vs riding a skateboard a mile and a half. All over this thread is all kinds of info that is far more informative than I'm being - look around, have fun with it. (seriously I started out as "What?!?! free bitcoin!!! and then got sucked into teaching myself C (With quite a bit of help - you know who you are and thank you again) At my age this is kind of a "thing" - and going from not having a clue what an elliptic curve is to being fascinated by cryptography (well okay that whole journey started in 2012? 13? when my son first said the word bitcoin and I was like "Huh?" ) -:) anyway go back as many pages as you need to and happy hunting.
arulbero
It seems that someone is doing something very odd here. the above recent transaction https://www.blockchain.com/de/btc/tx/17e4e323cfbc68d7f0071cad09364e8193eedf8fefbcbd8a21b4b65717a4b3d3
~
Who else other than puzzle owner can spend from theses wallets??
I think that's the reason he can find #65 private key, exposed public key makes it easier It seems that someone is doing something very odd here. the above recent transaction https://www.blockchain.com/de/btc/tx/17e4e323cfbc68d7f0071cad09364e8193eedf8fefbcbd8a21b4b65717a4b3d3
~
Who else other than puzzle owner can spend from theses wallets??
@arulbero can you tell us how you found it? details on how you used baby-step giant-step algorithm
I think that beyond #85 it will be very difficult to recover the private key, even with 1 TB of RAM (with the Baby-Giant Step algorithm).
With my 32 GB finding the #70 is already a hard task.
But there are other algorithms more suitable that don't need so much ram.
I don't understand thoroughly the algorithm With my 32 GB finding the #70 is already a hard task.
But there are other algorithms more suitable that don't need so much ram.
can you explain in short why the size of RAM matters in this algorithm?
I thought it just generates privkey hex sequentially, finds corresponding pubkey and compares it to target pubkey
arulbero
It seems that someone is doing something very odd here. the above recent transaction https://www.blockchain.com/de/btc/tx/17e4e323cfbc68d7f0071cad09364e8193eedf8fefbcbd8a21b4b65717a4b3d3
~
Who else other than puzzle owner can spend from theses wallets??
I think that's the reason he can find #65 private key, exposed public key makes it easier It seems that someone is doing something very odd here. the above recent transaction https://www.blockchain.com/de/btc/tx/17e4e323cfbc68d7f0071cad09364e8193eedf8fefbcbd8a21b4b65717a4b3d3
~
Who else other than puzzle owner can spend from theses wallets??
@arulbero can you tell us how you found it? details on how you used baby-step giant-step algorithm
I think that beyond #85 it will be very difficult to recover the private key, even with 1 TB of RAM (with the Baby-Giant Step algorithm).
With my 32 GB finding the #70 is already a hard task.
But there are other algorithms more suitable that don't need so much ram.
I don't understand thoroughly the algorithm With my 32 GB finding the #70 is already a hard task.
But there are other algorithms more suitable that don't need so much ram.
can you explain in short why the size of RAM matters in this algorithm?
I thought it just generates privkey hex sequentially, finds corresponding pubkey and compares it to target pubkey
My life would change abruptly if I found the key to one of the addresses with the cue ball here is my address just in case 
39xoA35q27BZEvc5acyPmBwvZ3xVfqvnn5
39xoA35q27BZEvc5acyPmBwvZ3xVfqvnn5 It is possible that all these addresses will be reset to zero in the next few days.
I don't think so, the #85 and #90 for sure, maybe #95 and #100, but not the other addresses. And it will take many many days, not just a few.
It seems that this opens a new perspective. We do have now spending scripts for these puzzle wallet
#65 18ZMbwUFLMHoZBbfpCjUJQTCMCbktshgpe (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#70 19YZECXj3SxEZMoUeJ1yiPsw8xANe7M7QR (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#75 1J36UjUByGroXcCvmj13U6uwaVv9caEeAt (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#80 1BCf6rHUW6m3iH2ptsvnjgLruAiPQQepLe (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#85 1Kh22PvXERd2xpTQk3ur6pPEqFeckCJfAr (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#90 1L12FHH2FHjvTviyanuiFVfmzCy46RRATU (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#95 19eVSDuizydXxhohGh8Ki9WY9KsHdSwoQC (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#100 1KCgMv8fo2TPBpddVi9jqmMmcne9uSNJ5F (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#105 1CMjscKB3QW7SDyQ4c3C3DEUHiHRhiZVib (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#110 12JzYkkN76xkwvcPT6AWKZtGX6w2LAgsJg (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#115 1NLbHuJebVwUZ1XqDjsAyfTRUPwDQbemfv (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#120 17s2b9ksz5y7abUm92cHwG8jEPCzK3dLnT (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#125 1PXAyUB8ZoH3WD8n5zoAthYjN15yN5CVq5 (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#130 1Fo65aKq8s8iquMt6weF1rku1moWVEd5Ua (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#135 16RGFo6hjq9ym6Pj7N5H7L1NR1rVPJyw2v (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#140 1QKBaU6WAeycb3DbKbLBkX7vJiaS8r42Xo (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#145 19GpszRNUej5yYqxXoLnbZWKew3KdVLkXg (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#150 1MUJSJYtGPVGkBCTqGspnxyHahpt5Te8jy (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#155 1AoeP37TmHdFh8uN72fu9AqgtLrUwcv2wJ (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#160 1NBC8uXJy1GiJ6drkiZa1WuKn51ps7EPTv (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
a GPU version of this code https://gist.github.com/jhoenicke/2e39b3c6c49b1d7b216b8626197e4b89 or arulbero code is worthed ....
#65 18ZMbwUFLMHoZBbfpCjUJQTCMCbktshgpe (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#70 19YZECXj3SxEZMoUeJ1yiPsw8xANe7M7QR (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#75 1J36UjUByGroXcCvmj13U6uwaVv9caEeAt (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#80 1BCf6rHUW6m3iH2ptsvnjgLruAiPQQepLe (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#85 1Kh22PvXERd2xpTQk3ur6pPEqFeckCJfAr (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#90 1L12FHH2FHjvTviyanuiFVfmzCy46RRATU (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#95 19eVSDuizydXxhohGh8Ki9WY9KsHdSwoQC (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#100 1KCgMv8fo2TPBpddVi9jqmMmcne9uSNJ5F (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#105 1CMjscKB3QW7SDyQ4c3C3DEUHiHRhiZVib (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#110 12JzYkkN76xkwvcPT6AWKZtGX6w2LAgsJg (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#115 1NLbHuJebVwUZ1XqDjsAyfTRUPwDQbemfv (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#120 17s2b9ksz5y7abUm92cHwG8jEPCzK3dLnT (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#125 1PXAyUB8ZoH3WD8n5zoAthYjN15yN5CVq5 (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#130 1Fo65aKq8s8iquMt6weF1rku1moWVEd5Ua (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#135 16RGFo6hjq9ym6Pj7N5H7L1NR1rVPJyw2v (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#140 1QKBaU6WAeycb3DbKbLBkX7vJiaS8r42Xo (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#145 19GpszRNUej5yYqxXoLnbZWKew3KdVLkXg (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#150 1MUJSJYtGPVGkBCTqGspnxyHahpt5Te8jy (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#155 1AoeP37TmHdFh8uN72fu9AqgtLrUwcv2wJ (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
#160 1NBC8uXJy1GiJ6drkiZa1WuKn51ps7EPTv (0.00001 BTC - Sortie)
a GPU version of this code https://gist.github.com/jhoenicke/2e39b3c6c49b1d7b216b8626197e4b89 or arulbero code is worthed ....
It is possible that all these addresses will be reset to zero in the next few days.
arulbero
well done now it is clear who takes Bitcoin
well done now it is clear who takes Bitcoin
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