Make a new topic.. Bitcoin + Mixers etc vs Monero
Make a REAL comparison
Mixing on an FBI server
The Internet is run on US Dept Of Defense Servers.
Many ISP's have a first hop to a traced IP at the DOD.. i know i checked this in Canada 10 years ago.
Further more the ISP's are 101% govt compliant.
There's a difference. If you run a full node, it is very difficult to find out whether your full node processed *your own* transaction, or a transaction coming from a light client connected to you (of which maybe one is yours). This is why you should run your own monero full node and why it is a bad idea to use light wallets in the first place. The encrypted tunnels to a full node don't reveal what's inside, only that there was a connection. In order to even start untangling that, you'd need a global surveillance of all local connections too. This can be done only for specific targets, and even then, it is difficult if several jurisdictions are at work.
So you only run this danger if you are already targeted, after which, it is just a matter of collecting proof.
But when you mix your coins on an FBI mixer, you are 1) signalling yourself and 2) making the mixing useless because they KNOW who brought what, and got out what on what address ; they don't need to pre-target victims, they come themselves, and they bring the proof of their own to their servers. The first thing is a multi-billion dollar surveillance program with doubtful utility and results, the second is a less-than-one-million program that is a honeypot for people wanting to hide something.
Setting up several FBI mixers is much, much, much lower budget than global internet surveillance and is directly targeting the people they are after without the legal hassle of global surveillance.
A guy buys coins on coinbase, goes to a mixer at the FBI's site, thinks he's safe and buys drugs on a dark market. The FBI agent looks at the analysis the next morning, sees the buying at a dark market wallet, sees that it comes from coinbase's wallets before mixing, asks a subpoena for coinbase, and knock, knock on the door if he happens to be in the US jurisdiction, or an e-mail to a collegue of a befriended jurisdiction to do the same.
You don't need global internet surveillance for that. If I were an FBI agent, I'd ask for $1 million budget to set up a few hundred of mixers around the world, and ask for a promotion the next year when I brought down 10 dark markets.
What you fail to see is, all else equal, when you use a bitcoin mixer, you fully trust the owner of the mixer, and you reveal him what you want to hide. BTW, DASH has exactly the same problem, with the master nodes which are nothing else but trusted mixers. Only, DASH protects this somewhat more with the fact that you cannot "Sybil attack" the DASH masternode network, as you can "Sybil attack" the bitcoin mixer population like I proposed.
The counter side to DASH is that most masternodes are in the hands of Evans, so in a certain way, you have to trust Evans for your mixing. That's probably somewhat safer than trusting the FBI agent, but still.