If we cannot trust that the majority of the mining power will do what is best for Bitcoin then Bitcoin has already fundamentally failed which I do not think is presently the case. In order to orphan all non-abiding blocks a single entity would need to be able exert control over more then fifty one percent of the mining power, if this happens Bitcoin has already been undermined anyway. I do not think it will be possible to enforce such policy across every jurisdiction in the world, this is however more of a question for geopolitics.
My point still stands: larger blocks increase mining centralization pressures. Truth is, even with a single miner you can trust that it will do what's best for Bitcoin. But it doesn't have to. It's all based on incentives. Mining centralization is hard to prevent, as the past tells us, and even harder to undo. You likely won't notice until the bad happens.
I agree with you that mining centralization is difficult to prevent, because of centralization of manufacture and economies of scale among other reasons, to a certain extend I have accepted this reality however. I still do not think that increasing the blocksize would increase mining centralization since miners do not run full nodes.
In my position for instance I just point my hashing power towards a pool of my choice that I think reflects my beliefs well and acts responsible, increasing the block size does not effect my mining operation whatsoever and the majority of the hashing power is under the control of people that are in a similar position to myself.
Increasing the blocksize does introduce centralization pressures but not in regards to mining. Keeping the blocksize at one megabyte also introduces centralization in the form of an increased reliance on third parties. So for me considering this balancing act, increasing the blocksize is the most decentralized option with everything considered.
You don't say anything new; in fact, you're reiterating your claims as if I never challenged them.
I'll try again, the last time: there are network topology issues which result in an uneven block propagation. Uneven propagation alters the orphan race outcomes for different players (mostly pools), making some of them more profitable. The larger blocks get, the larger is the financial difference. This is what alters the incentive structure.
You are claiming that you can vote with your feet, and I hate to repeat that a lot of hashing power is industrial scale, and is attached to a particular pool. Whether there is a million 1 GH/s miners going back and forth is irrelevant, their combined hashpower is what matters. I don't have any statistical data, but I
suspect the majority of hashpower is already industrial-scale and is rigid w/r/t to pools.
I think you could simply state that you don't agree with all of the above, and I will be okay with that. I just don't want to waste my time engaging in a unproductive discussion.
In response to the incident of Antpool SPV mining and causing a fork a few months back, since then Antpool has lost a lot of its mining power which proves my point exactly, such a pool is incentivized to attract more miners by acting responsibly and when they act irresponsibly they lose support, proving the points that I have been making. I very much doubt that Antpool would make such a mistake again since they lost a lot of money because of the reward and reputation that was lost, if miners understand one thing it is profit.
I believe this is a common logical fallacy known as
post hoc ergo propter hoc. Moreover, I couldn't find anything that can support your claim. According to
organofcorti, there were no significant plunges in AntPool hashrate during June-August, and it has risen over that two-fold in the period. And has risen since then as well.