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Topic: Bitcoin XT - Officially #REKT (also goes for BIP101 fraud) - page 197. (Read 378996 times)

hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
What incentives the users/businesses (those who ultimately give value to the coin) have for using a system being centralised by a single miner?

Who spoke of "a single miner"?

Understand that the miners have to some extent the ability to maintain a certain illusion of decentralization.

I don't propose that bigger blocks will immediately translate to consolidation of miners in hashing power (what the user is really worried about) but it certainly leads to risky behaviours that reduces the security of the network. The cost externalization to nodes is not something most regular users would think twice about yet it severely undermines the nature of Bitcoin.
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1007
Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.   
Actually, I'm interested by your work because if the model is sound, it's useful for the present...and the future.
Anyway. One step at a time. The next step should be to validate the model against actual data.

Agreed.  I was actually working on that yesterday.  Hopefully I will have something to say about validation against actual data in Montreal. 
legendary
Activity: 1302
Merit: 1008
Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users.  


Both parties need a secure network.  If miners raise fees enough (raising fees is in their interests already) to get to a baseline level of security, would users walk away?  I don't think they would.
Do miners really need to be coerced into charging an adequate fee by a block limit?  I don't think they do.
sr. member
Activity: 384
Merit: 258
Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.   
Actually, I'm interested by your work because if the model is sound, it's useful for the present...and the future.
Anyway. One step at a time. The next step should be to validate the model against actual data.
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

hey! i disagree!! Grin

in my view miners are nothing if it was not for the users they validate the transactions for: users do the speculation, users gives bitcoin its value, which then makes it profitable to mine (and not any other altcoin) .

remember what happened btc price wise when ghash.io almost had 50% of the network? massive sell out.. Roll Eyes

hence, miners do have an incentive to keep on mining the longest VALID chain, which, by definition means the one that has the more value potential.
so they better not screwing around with some power grabbing fork, else they loose everything...

this is bitcoin's consensus.

I agree with most of what you said but I don't believe it really addresses my point.

The GHash situation is very different as it was very public. The SPV mining fiasco is a better example of a situation users were not readily aware of yet causes considerable risk to the ecosystem. The miners do have incentives to maintain the users trust but they have a certain flexibility and ability to optimize for profit in a "bend but don't break" manner. Anyway, Peter Todd always makes a good point that we should not build this system based on "best-behaviour" assumptions but rather expect any potential attack.

The centralization I refer to relates to geographical and technical optimization that give larger miners a slight advantage over smaller ones that slowly but surely dries out the smaller miners revenue.

It is not something that is immediately apparent to most users and the extent to which such centralization can occur is difficult to examine.

That is not to suggest they are expect to fork off or create immediate damage but it is a slippery & dark road that can slowly lead to a level of centralization that enables considerable throughput hence the centralization pressure externalized to the network nodes.
legendary
Activity: 1372
Merit: 1000
--------------->¿?
Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralised more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.

Miners' centralization is not only reflected by a combination of their hashpower.

The incentive is clear: mitigate costs derived from creating bigger blocks to capture more transactions fees

I am asking the incentives from a market perspective.

 Huh

Reduce propagation costs of creating bigger blocks. They apparently are already doing it in some form under the existing block size.

What exactly do you mean by "from a market perspective"?

What incentives the users/businesses (those who ultimately give value to the coin) have for using a system being centralised by a single miner?
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralised more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.

Miners' centralization is not only reflected by a combination of their hashpower.

The incentive is clear: mitigate costs derived from creating bigger blocks to capture more transactions fees

I am asking the incentives from a market perspective.

 Huh

Reduce propagation costs of creating bigger blocks. They apparently are already doing it in some form under the existing block size.

What exactly do you mean by "from a market perspective"?
legendary
Activity: 1372
Merit: 1000
--------------->¿?
Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralised more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.

Miners' centralization is not only reflected by a combination of their hashpower.

The incentive is clear: mitigate costs derived from creating bigger blocks to capture more transactions fees

I am asking the incentives from a market perspective.
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralised more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.

Miners' centralization is not only reflected by a combination of their hashpower.

The incentive is clear: mitigate costs derived from creating bigger blocks to capture more transactions fees

Quote
If, for example, the majority of miners are in China (they are), and there is really poor connectivity in and out of China (there is) and a miner naively optimizes for profit, they will create blocks which are large and take a while to relay out of China. By simple trial-and-error an individual large miner might notice that when they create larger blocks which fork off miners in other parts of the world, they get more income.
http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-May/008364.html

Moreover, miners now know better than to repeat GHash's mistake. They can easily distribute their hashing power to different pools to maintain a "decentralization theater"
legendary
Activity: 1372
Merit: 1000
--------------->¿?
Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe was an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.

What are the incentives for miners to centralise more than they currently are? The Ghash episode demonstrated that the market have no incentive for such a thing and have reacted accordingly. Ghash is now a thing of the past.
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.  

It absolutely doesnt. Miners already optimize for profit by centralizing in various ways. The recent SPV mining near-catastrophe is an excellent example.

Your conclusions hold under no existing and future scenario. It makes assumptions that are untenable and require absolute altruism from miners.

The crux of the issue is that miners incentives are not aligned with the network's users. The max block size cap mitigates the fact that they are expected (for security reasons) to prioritize financial profit over network decentralization. Yes, there might be no other way to align these incentives than by forcing it through consensus code.
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
Here is a comment from Matt Corrallo that explains why Peter R's research should not be considered to make our decisions. Again, it might add up in a vacuum under precise conditions but is not applicable to reality.

Quote
If, for example, the majority of miners are in China (they are), and there is really poor connectivity in and out of China (there is) and a miner naively optimizes for profit, they will create blocks which are large and take a while to relay out of China. By simple trial-and-error an individual large miner might notice that when they create larger blocks which fork off miners in other parts of the world, they get more income.
http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-May/008364.html
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1007
Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.

My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).

Do you agree that this conclusion applies to the way the network is now and the way it has always been?

I ask, just because I want it to be clear to readers that this "point of contention" is about a hypothetical future scenario.  And that we already know that there are hypothetical future scenarios, such as mining centralized around a single super pool, that would be bad for Bitcoin.   
sr. member
Activity: 384
Merit: 258
Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  
But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.
I think the point of contention is really about this conclusion.
My understanding is that it may also happen with several miners if they have an incentive to synchronize their mempools (with a mechanism like IBLT).
See this post written by Gavin (chapter "Will this skew incentives ?" of https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/e20c3b5a1d4b97f79ac2)

hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
My paper implies that the most "efficient" network configuration (at least from a superficial perspective) is a single miner in a large data center.  No one is disputing this fact.  No one is also disputing the fact that a monopoly miner like this has the ability to censor transactions and to double-spend (and earn a greater profit this way too).

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  

But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

Great, but that's completely irrelevant to the decisions we have to make. In fact it strongly suggest against removing entirely the block size cap so you should really stop pulling up this material as it absolutely does not support your position.

What you essentially propose is to see "how far" the miners will be willing to centralize toward "the most efficient network configuration"

My paper says nothing about this.  It just shows that a transaction fee market exists without a block size limit assuming the network isn't already centered around a single miner.  

Now on to a topic outside of the scope of that paper: You are under the impression that increasing the block size limit will for some reason lead to more centralization (which I don't understand--there's "centralization pressure" at any block size limit).  I, on the other hand, see this as allowing Bitcoin to grow and gain new users, new nodes, new miners, and in general protection in numbers.  

Furthermore, you're scheme of implementing a production quota on block size requires centralized control to enforce the quota.  You have said it yourself that we need a centrally-planned limit to keep Bitcoin decentralized.  Do you not find that logic absurd?

To be exact:
"Are you saying we need centrally planned limit (21,000,000) to keep Bitcoin from turning into fiat"

"Are you saying we need centrally planned block interval to keep Bitcoin secure"

The quota is necessary and effective precisely because the negative externality you make a footnote of in your material is very real and needs to be a focal point of any decision made going forward.
legendary
Activity: 1302
Merit: 1008
Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political
Peter, I'm unfamiliar with the details of off chain scaling,
but I haven't seen anyone show me how off chain scaling
helps decentralization.  Doesn't a "payment network" or similar
require trusted parties?
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1007
My paper implies that the most "efficient" network configuration (at least from a superficial perspective) is a single miner in a large data center.  No one is disputing this fact.  No one is also disputing the fact that a monopoly miner like this has the ability to censor transactions and to double-spend (and earn a greater profit this way too).

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  

But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

Great, but that's completely irrelevant to the decisions we have to make. In fact it strongly suggest against removing entirely the block size cap so you should really stop pulling up this material as it absolutely does not support your position.

What you essentially propose is to see "how far" the miners will be willing to centralize toward "the most efficient network configuration"

My paper says nothing about this.  It just shows that a transaction fee market exists without a block size limit assuming the network isn't already centered around a single miner.  

Now on to a topic outside of the scope of that paper: You are under the impression that increasing the block size limit will for some reason lead to more centralization (which I don't understand--there's "centralization pressure" at any block size limit).  I, on the other hand, see this as allowing Bitcoin to grow and gain new users, new nodes, new miners, and in general protection in numbers.  

Furthermore, you're scheme of implementing a production quota on block size requires centralized control to enforce the quota.  You have said it yourself that we need a centrally-planned limit to keep Bitcoin decentralized.  Do you not find that logic absurd?
legendary
Activity: 1302
Merit: 1008
Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political


You absolutely don't understand the implications of what Peter's paper suggest .
 


Then I imagine you're going to enlighten me.  What do the implications suggest?
hero member
Activity: 644
Merit: 504
Bitcoin replaces central, not commercial, banks
I'm just gonna drop this here  Grin

https://botbot.me/freenode/bitcoin-wizards/2015-08-30/?msg=48477664&page=1

Quote
It's infuriating when someone makes an intellectually weak argument, but slateers it in so much (very nicely constructed) pretext and trappings that people who aren't interested or lack the context to evaluate it on its merits are too busy being mesmorized with the leather binding. Smiley

Which paper of Peter's is Greg referring to?

I thought Peter is now arguing we don't need any block limit for a "healthy fee market".

Is this a different paper?
 

Greg claimed the paper is fundamentally flawed and asked me several times to publicly retract it.  Instead, I have examined his objections, and in addressed them I have been able to remove assumptions and strengthen the claims of the paper.  

The fee market paper is interdisciplinary and really outside the realm of Greg's expertise: it is a mixture of physics and economics.  My opinion of Greg is that he is an professional cryptographer, an amateur physicist, and a lousy economist and game theorist.  Remember, he already "proved" that decentralized consensus was impossible...

And it is, Bitcoin uses carefully aligned incentives to work around the problem.

Your paper is fundamentally flawed because it addresses nothing resembling the current dynamics at stake in Bitcoin. More precisely it ignores the incentives for miners to centralize (as they have shown to have) to mitigate propagation times. In effect your paper clearly demonstrates it is more profitable to do so under free-floating blocks and you essentially rely on their altruism to maintain the validity of your model to make decisions going forward. In short, your work might be sound from a technical standpoint, in a vacuum, but can not be used to construct security models that depend on worst-behaviours assumptions.

I cannot accept that you could comment on Greg's game theory intelligence when you continue to wave away the clear negative externality present in your models. You chose to ignore the obvious tragedy of commons at stake and that is why your opinion can never be considered as long as you don't recognize the cost externalized to node and the overall centralization pressure suggested by YOUR alignment of the incentives.


My paper implies that the most "efficient" network configuration (at least from a superficial perspective) is a single miner in a large data center.  No one is disputing this fact.  No one is also disputing the fact that a monopoly miner like this has the ability to censor transactions and to double-spend (and earn a greater profit this way too).

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  

But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

Great, but that's completely irrelevant to the decisions we have to make. In fact it strongly suggest against removing entirely the block size cap so you should really stop pulling up this material as it absolutely does not support your position.

What you essentially propose is to see "how far" the miners will be willing to centralize toward "the most efficient network configuration"



The fees SHOULD be irrelevant right now, but some people (in this very thread) are pointing to arguments that
we have to have small blocks because of fees, so I think Peter's paper actually is relevant if it dispells those fears.

You absolutely don't understand the implications of what Peter's paper suggest .

I couldn't careless if fees are irrelevant right now we need a model that takes them into account for the future.

legendary
Activity: 1302
Merit: 1008
Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political
I'm just gonna drop this here  Grin

https://botbot.me/freenode/bitcoin-wizards/2015-08-30/?msg=48477664&page=1

Quote
It's infuriating when someone makes an intellectually weak argument, but slateers it in so much (very nicely constructed) pretext and trappings that people who aren't interested or lack the context to evaluate it on its merits are too busy being mesmorized with the leather binding. Smiley

Which paper of Peter's is Greg referring to?

I thought Peter is now arguing we don't need any block limit for a "healthy fee market".

Is this a different paper?
 

Greg claimed the paper is fundamentally flawed and asked me several times to publicly retract it.  Instead, I have examined his objections, and in addressed them I have been able to remove assumptions and strengthen the claims of the paper.  

The fee market paper is interdisciplinary and really outside the realm of Greg's expertise: it is a mixture of physics and economics.  My opinion of Greg is that he is an professional cryptographer, an amateur physicist, and a lousy economist and game theorist.  Remember, he already "proved" that decentralized consensus was impossible...

And it is, Bitcoin uses carefully aligned incentives to work around the problem.

Your paper is fundamentally flawed because it addresses nothing resembling the current dynamics at stake in Bitcoin. More precisely it ignores the incentives for miners to centralize (as they have shown to have) to mitigate propagation times. In effect your paper clearly demonstrates it is more profitable to do so under free-floating blocks and you essentially rely on their altruism to maintain the validity of your model to make decisions going forward. In short, your work might be sound from a technical standpoint, in a vacuum, but can not be used to construct security models that depend on worst-behaviours assumptions.

I cannot accept that you could comment on Greg's game theory intelligence when you continue to wave away the clear negative externality present in your models. You chose to ignore the obvious tragedy of commons at stake and that is why your opinion can never be considered as long as you don't recognize the cost externalized to node and the overall centralization pressure suggested by YOUR alignment of the incentives.


My paper implies that the most "efficient" network configuration (at least from a superficial perspective) is a single miner in a large data center.  No one is disputing this fact.  No one is also disputing the fact that a monopoly miner like this has the ability to censor transactions and to double-spend (and earn a greater profit this way too).

Will mining centralize around one single miner?  No one knows.  This is why Bitcoin is still a risk.  

But if this doesn't happen--if there remains more than a single miner--then the fee market does exist.

Great, but that's completely irrelevant to the decisions we have to make. In fact it strongly suggest against removing entirely the block size cap so you should really stop pulling up this material as it absolutely does not support your position.

What you essentially propose is to see "how far" the miners will be willing to centralize toward "the most efficient network configuration"



The fees SHOULD be irrelevant right now, but some people (in this very thread) are pointing to arguments that
we have to have small blocks because of fees, so I think Peter's paper actually is relevant if it dispells those fears.

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