Topic: [BOUNTY] 🔥🔥WINNER-GETS-ALL / PROOF-OF-TRANSACTION CONSENSUS DEBATE BOUNTY!🔥🔥 - page 6. (Read 4115 times)

Keeping my eye on this idea. Deserves more attention because it talks about use case -- something that needs alot more discussion

The term handling this project are good term which will have to make sure that this new concept come to reality because developing a new concept is not easy. We are only familiar with proof-of-stake and proof-of-work. good luck.

So, as I have been posting on the telegram Convo...

I think that the PoT needs a small scale initial application where keeping track on a network specific transaction, such as school lunch sales could benefit. The Tau tokens would be purchased and used to buy the lunches at an initial rate of value. Then as the market of tau fluctuates the accounts would up/down as dictated by market.

This would also be a great test case for speed and volume since schools would be processing a few hundred transactions at a time and the tau coins could be used at any school utilizing the system. (Currently most commercial solutions limit the amounts in accounts to be spent a one school or district).

Well, how can I participate in what you say, in General, if you want some help from me, what is in my power to help you for your token, thank you

I believe there are some sort of club and harvest right? will that be considered as staking?

I am amaze with the concept and the ease of transaction with TAU. The only concern im having right now is when its massively adopted will the transaction be the same as what we are seeing right now?

As far as I know all type of wallet that are shared over the network are still hackable.. Im looking forward to also let the team create a offline wallet.

If anyone wants to be miner for TAU upcoming mainnet, we will help you and provide nice coins to start. Just message me....

This would be the best way to know more about this type of consensus mechanism since i only know POW and POS. And by the way the site is very user friendly.
I just be sitting in the corner and reading all the ideas shared on.

For environmental friendliness, I think TAU is close to the best possible. It is running on already existing platforms such as PC and mobile phone. Energy consumption is significantly lower than POW with hash calculation. Yes, there is project with even lower hardware/energy requirement, but the difference is small.

For DDOS attack, TAU currently follows Bitcoin's communication protocol and transaction pool rules. As of today, nearly 10,000 Bitcoin full nodes are running and DDOS is not a major concern.

I believe it good to be forward looking as TAUCoin is already planing ahead for the what will happen when the internet speed will be improved upon as regards speed, the project is taking a proactive action by introducing POT which will match the upcoming technology and have the client of TAUCoin benefit therefrom.

Tau foundation has not fixed up plan to control minging club to operate under 51%. One potential way during mean time is simply keeping foundation nodes to stay above 40% transaction mining power, this makes it very hard to achieve 51%. (Our current labor is focusing on mainnet, balance system, wallet, signal voting and removing time. )
It is our goal to have PC be able to intermittently run full nodes since there is no heavy computing neither storage work engaged. PC is getting more powerful everyday.
The way I understand TAU fairness is not by equalizing everyone, but reducing the entry barrier to common people. Both tau technology and coin econemy address fairness in following way: we are running bounty program for very long time to allow mininum effort to get on board TAU, hope 20 years from my perspective. We keep coin out of inflation. We reward common people essential behavior, spending money for living, rather than rich people racing on hardware and asset hoarding. I would claim we are more fair than POW and POS, but never want to claim the best and abosolute, even thought that is our long term mission.
For DDOS resistance, our mining signal system can easily allow mining leaders to randomly delegate to different address to avoid DDos. Here it is, mining club leader rent 1,000,000 IP addresses, each address associate to one TAU wallet address, then using TAU signal system randomly assign mining power to one of those 1,000,000 address, because DDos never knows club randomness to find IP to attack. I always trust randomness algo, which bitcoin is designed around, than oracles. It is our design purpose use TAU onchain signal system efficiently resist DDos and many other cool things.

the sybil attack is still possible, but using some kind of  recaptcha would indeed make a sybil attack much harder and more expensive for the attacker. Maybe even some decentralized authentication is possible for transactions? https://medium.com/@linonetwork/proof-of-human-engagement-on-decentralized-networks-6a87f50d7d55

How will TAU intervene if a potential 51% attack is suspected? What mechanisms do you have in place to prevent a Sybil from disrupting the network if it manages to gain a majority share of the blocks or harvest power? Perhaps you could include a selective network rollback feature?

There are also some issues with TAUcoin being the fairest decentralized network, though it does depend on your definition of fair. According to Google's definition, fairness means "impartial and just treatment or behaviour without favouritism or discrimination." However, by using the number of transactions, or average fee of transactions per window time (e.g. 1 year), you inadvertently favor tholse who either have more money to spend, or are more actively engaged in crypto spending. It could be argued that the differences in opportunity for these TAU users means the distribution of block rewards will never be fair. Rather than favoring those with investment power such as POW or POS coins, POT instead favors those with spending power. Although you could argue that that they fairly earned these coins as per the rules set out in Proof-of-transaction, the truth is the distribution inherits the inequalities found in life.

You also mention that TAUcoin is the most environmentally friendly blockchain, this means that the effects of its operation must be smaller than any other blockchain currently operating. However, because TAUcoin requires harvest club leaders to run a full node, there is an additional carbon footprint associated with its operation, which may not be necessary. There are a number of other blockchains that do not require specialist hardware to operate nodes, for example, using mobile devices instead. Until TAU can move to a similar system, without requiring the production of additional dedicated hardware, it cannot claim to be the most environmentally friendly.

I also suspect that the TAU network will be unusually vulnerable to denial of service attacks, by requiring only the harvest club leader to run a full node, the reduce the number of attack points to just a few. Even if we have 10,000 harvest clubs each with 100,000 members (total 1B users by 2040), there would still only be 10,000 points of attack. This means that a particularly large harvest club could instigate a DDOS attack on its nearest competitors to quite easily achieve a 51% share of the network harvest power. I think this could be potentially resolved by having only the harvest leader require a full node, whilst also having 3-5 oracles per harvest club run a partial node to achieve majority consensus if the club leader gets taken down. The IPs of these oracles should be masked to prevent a DDOS. Ideally, these oracles should be running a partial node on a mainstream device, perhaps being built into the wallet application on iOS/PC/MAC and Android. It would be quite simple to implement a centralization attack on a network with so few nodes, as the harvest club power will automatically lead to users gravitating towards the clubs with the largest harvest power, hence leading to just a few very large harvest clubs by 2040.  

I recommend limiting the size of harvest clubs to prevent centralization attacks, whilst adding a backup to the club leader in the form of 3-5 oracles running a partial node.

Reminds me of Grin coin and Cuckoo cycle POW. Nice recommendation

I agree there are always possibility on Sybil attack especially when the powerful Sybil purpose is to destroy network rather than making economical profit. This is the same as POW and POS 51% attack. Assuming the purpose is to destroy by 51% attack, the TAU foundation is always monitoring network and do best to counter 51% behavior. TAU has a bounty program and ICO program potentially runing for 20 years, during that process, TAU foundation accumulated massive transaction numbers and coins to resist 51%. I agree that for long period of time, TAU foundation itself has the power of 51% to destroy the network. But the goal of creating TAU by the foundation is not to destroy it but to promote it. There are certain trust has to be there to the foundation not destroy network by themself.
For recaptcha human verification, i think that is more for dAPP. On mainnet, we need to support programmable coins wiring API, it will cause huge infliction to enforce recaptcha onchain.
Thanks UBI18.

Very deep insight into the mechanism.

I'd like to mention that the harvest power of the club you join doesn't affect your expected harvest reward, as long as the club is always harvesting. Harvest power and reward is exactly in linear proportion to transaction count. For this reason, putting limit on a single harvest club probably will not work, since splitting one harvest club into two will not change its combined harvest power (exactly the same chance of generating new block).

Harvest club concentration is a potential problem. I am not sure 5000 limit could resolve it, since concentrator could run many nodes under one control. I wish the freedom for users to switch club can metigate the leadership risk. Physical authenticator is very centralized.
Sudden transaction fee massive increase is a problem for non-economical person. This is an area to dig into. Thanks for that.
Regarding to use transactions to replace time interval, most protocols such BTC and ETH have target block time interval to fit the network latency and allow information to arrive most of the nodes. Transactions missed past block has to wait until new block comes. This reduce the speed of the blockchain progress and cause traffic jam like red lights. In fact, the blockchain growth is  counted in block numbers rather than time. The content of a block is mostly transactions record. We propose using transaction numbers threshold to replace time interval for block generation. Transactions does not have to wait new time comes to be packed up. It just wait until the threshold, such as 5000 transactions packed. When there are lots of transactions in the pool, this will speed up the block generation. If there is less transactions, we use a bottom line time interval to allow the block to be generate.

- iMorpheus

i still think the sybillattack will be your worst problem. wouldnt be a attack vector for example a bad acting miner setting up as much sybil accounts as possible to manipulate himself/herself into recieving a ammount of overall blockreward and transaction fees, that is higher than the costs that the sybilattack creates?

as long as the overall blockreward is higher than overall transaction fees within that block, a sybill attack is atractive for bad actors.

as soon as the overall blockreward is lower than overall transaction fees within that block, the proof of transaction economy will neither be attractive for sybils nor for honest participants?

So i argue the system can NOT become sustainable without introduction of some kind of anti-sybil mechanism, most likely the introduction of yet to be developed 'proof of individuality' for participants.

You could argue against me that the creation of sybils comes with a certain financial risk for bad actors, because as a miner you need sybils that own/bought tau to do fake transactions and s/he cant be sure about future exchange value of tau. Still your contest is about the question if you create a sustainable economy and not about the question if the founders can profit on tau or not?

Good luck anyway, i ll setup account as soon as i got more time

Proof-of-transaction incentivizes users from an early stage to join a harvest club with the most harvest power. Because of this, it is unlikely that by the year 2040 there will be several thousand separate harvest clubs, as it is likely that one of the early large harvest clubs will become a majority pool, sucking up most of the new users that enter the network. In my estimation, by 2040 there will only be a few very large harvest clubs.

Potential resolution: Limit the number of members per harvest club to ~5,000.

Potential resolution 2: Require a physical authenticator for transactions.


I notice that later you state that you'll be using weighted transaction fee, rather than relative transaction number to determine the odds of who gets to mine the new block and receive the reward. However, this does not resolve the Sybil attack, it simply changes the nature of the attack. You assume that the the purpose of the sybil attack is to manipulate the network for financial gain, however, it can also be used to discredit the worth of the TAU blockchain and poison it from within. For example, if a bad actor with particularly deep pockets were to exclusively send high fee transactions in the scope of the 1-year window, then he would have the greatest chance of mining the new block. If the discrepancy between the transaction fees of the bad acting harvest club, and average harvest club is high enough, then they could mine and perhaps manipulate a significant fraction of the market, producing a situation where small, or poorly funded clubs simply cannot compete, and reducing the utility of the TAU blockchain for these individuals. A sudden increase in the transaction fees of one of the larger harvest clubs would also

Potential resolution: Limit the rate of change possible between the largest harvest clubs to ensure no club can suddenly (out-fee) the rest of the network.


Why not just fix the scaling to the relative change in transactions each month, or three months? And the relative change in the number of miners on the network.

For example if there was a 50% increase in number of transactions (A) in a 1 month period, and 50% increase in number miners (B), then there will be no scaling required. However, if either side of this is unbalanced (A /= B), then the percentage of block size increase can be calculated as A / B, if the number is below 1, then the block size is scaled down proportionally, if it is above 1, then it is scaled up proportionally

You also mention that TAUcoin is the fairest blockchain because it uses normal transactional activity in order to determine who has the highest chance of mining the next block and hence receiving their deserved fraction of the reward. However, this doesn't truly fit the definition of fair, as TAU essential inherits the biases in the users spending power. For example, a wealthy user and a poor user both start using TAU for their daily activities, the wealthy user is able to send more transactions as they have more disposable income and can afford to pay higher fees, whereas a poorer user will typically make fewer transactions, of smaller size and hence smaller fee. This system is therefore biased towards high net worth and high spending individuals.

Potential resolution: Rather than using simply the velocity of money as the main determinant of harvesting power, instead implement a second associated measure called transaction power. High power transactions would be those sent between high fee harvest clubs, and can hence be associated with high net worth. The true harvest power would be a ratio between the transaction power and transaction velocity, with transaction power acting to reduce harvest power, and transaction velocity acting to increase it. Though, overall this might incentivize network spam with low fee transactions.

Exciting to debate the Sybil attack on Tau econemy. There are two types of participants: club member and club leader(miner). For members, the future reward to the essential transactions is a good to have bonus. In POW/POS, you need to pay for transacton without reward, because it is an essential transaction anyway.
When someone wants to benifit from transactions, they have to be miner or club leader. I will argue due to market compeitition to be leader for receiving profit is so intense, the overall profit will nearly equal to the cost of being a miner just similar to online stock brokers fee merely covering their cost. Even more, lead may have to subsidize the club for attract transactions. The business model of miners is not  from profittng on transaction reward but from other value add services as “reputation and brand” of leader is higher than members. Through leader reputation, you can issue credit, derivatives or insurance.
Another antiSybil layer in TAU, we use accumulative history transactions as weight rather than short time window, this creates additional difficulty in time horizon for attackers to build up weight.
Thanks to your suggestion, we do plan to switch using transaction fee than transaction numbers for weight accounting.

Dear Rexx...
Very happy to receive the two points and encouragement. The first point of setup auto payment percentage to club members to reduce club leaders manipulation is very good idea. We will do something in that fashion. The 2nd point, we are actively researching how to achieve auto size or auto time interval to increase transaction speed. We found potentially using transaction fee accumulation in the transaction pending pool to replace the time element and let size to be adjustable seems to achieve ideal scalability on chain.