~~ PSA PSA PSA ~~
btct.co accounts are definitely on the radar for hackers. I just finished replying to a very unhappy user with a compromised account. (Logs showed logins from China, South Korea, and Japan, all in a 24 hour window.) It's only the second such case I've heard of over the last 6 months, but that makes two accounts too many.
TURN ON 2FA.
mmmh... I have always kept it enabled for trades and withdrawals, and disabled for login, assuming in this case an eventual attacker may do nothing more than just looking at my portfolio... or did I miss something?
I was wondering this myself the other day, and have not done an audit to see what all could be done if login is off, but transaction is on. Some things that come to mind:
- The account page still uses PIN codes for many account settings, including the password, PIN, and email account changing interface.
- Thus logically, an attacker could bruteforce your PIN and change your email address on file.
- And from there file a support request to have the 2FA removed. Which I would happily oblige because the email account on file would match up at that point.
- The "Add Yubikey" interface is auth'd via PIN.
- Thus an attacker could bruteforce the PIN and add their own Yubikey.
- The "Delete Yubikey" button is not auth'd at all.
- Thus an attacker could remove your Yubikey access.
- The "Delete order" buttons are not auth'd at all.
- Thus an attacker could remove your orders.
- The options interface has not yet had all options actions setup with the auth interface. Of note:
- Exercising options can be done without auth.
- Re-listing held options can be done without auth.
Some of those the fixes are obvious. I'll work on getting 2FA auth going for the options interface and for account changes. But bottom line is that obviously it's a good idea to have 2FA on both login and transactions.
Please let me know too if the above list is incomplete. As many brains as possible are better than one when it comes to security.