re: paper for teleport
Read the paper and afaik I understand most of it. Please correct my mistakes.
An issue I see with the teleport and pods is that it relies on a few folks stepping up and being the front man if someone wants to cash out. So maybe if a few good money launders get into the business I can see this as a useful way to cash out to fiat.
If someone isn't interested to cash out and the anon card takes off, that changes things for the better, but the anon card still needs a front man.
Have you contacted the various mobs yet? I hear they like the profit margin of this type.
This is pretty much a tor network mixer using encrypted messages that is automated and built into the coin with incentive for random folks to run the teleport servers to keep the anon as high as possible. More servers better mixer. Keeping it all off tor using onion routing in a private network helps. I would suggest having the port change a bit as to keep the network fingerprinting down.
Am I missing anything?
cashout can also be handled by the telepod creator, which makes a closed loop. I am also working on automated tradebots to deal with some of the more dangerous parts, but not all these details are finished as the important part is the main network and I know there are several solutions for the entry/exit
By using other anon coins to feed into the system, it allows for much more private seeding of the initial telepods and once we get multiple other anon coins combined with some realtime trading of them, the attacker wouldnt even know which coin network the telepod value ended up.
I dont think there is much network fingerprinting possible due to the M of N fragmenting of each telepod. Using M of 40% of N (can be up to 254) and 85% probability to route, then for 4 hops you still end up with half the fragments getting to the destination, which is plenty to reconstruct. So I am envisioning some sort of constant white noise of the M of N fragments and since it is all encrypted not really a way to tell if it is a telepod being originated or rerouted or even if it is the destination since 15% of the destinations dont reroute! Was it the destination or was it the 15% random discard?
I am also not sure if you realize that the receiver is the one that controls the timing of the blockchain event and that this is randomly delayed by up to a max delay specified by each user. So not possible to even know what set of cloning events are actually part of the anon set when trying to correlate it with the sender. The sending anon set is potentially much bigger due to the possibility of aging telepods for a long time and even a minimal amount of trusted teleports (no cloning) will allow a telepod to end up anywhere. So the anon set for the sender is close to all the cloning events since the telepod was cloned but of course this is only being correlated to a guess as to the potential receivers.
With there being only txout/txin without any history other than all the clonings that just go back to telepod creator, the timing analysis is the best chance for correlations, but with each telepod resembling more a quantum wave function than a discrete particle, I think this is quite difficult
I try to make big headache for attacker. How did I do?
You are first to make such a good analysis, on a scale of 1 to 10 how would you rate this?
James
Thank you for the info.
Personally I give it a 7 or 8 since it simplifies the current method of, send alt/btc to random small exchange that won't be in business next week, pray they don't steal your funds, transfer to new wallet.
I like that it is a closed system, I think there will be a good market for selling telepods of various standard denoms as this will add a nice anon level.
As for fingerprinting, I was meaning more the fact that someone is running a teleport server on their isp. Guess you could route all traffic as https or wrap it so it looks live video traffic so it meets average traffic appearance.
One of the things to consider. You have a neighborhood of 100,000 people all using the internet to go on facebook, youtube, skype and watch streaming movies. This is 99.9% of traffic and makes a nice graph if it is being monitored. The 4 people that are using tor, irc, ssh etc all stand out like a giant blip on the chart. So those people get the attention focused on them a bit more...hey..why is bob using tor...he must be a bad guy, so LE might say we should look at his life a little closer and see if we can charge him on one of the 100 laws he doesn't know he is breaking. Or in a fun world...your isp says..I am sorry your traffic meets certain patterns and we are not willing to subject our shareholders to potential liability. 10 years from now, the only thing you can do online is to go to 'approved' sites. Give me hookers, blow and free information to anything I might want to learn even if it doesn't conform to my socialite neighbors or give me death.
So a way to prevent this type of fingerprinting of traffic is to encapsulate the traffic in a nice header from another type. Deep packet inspection is mean.
Just my random thoughts on this.
