https://cryptonotestarter.org/
Ring signatures bloat the blockchain insanely as well. Monero's is almost 1 gigabyte now and it was 100 megabytes 20 days ago.
However, I will give it to the developer; you perfected the initial distribution and PoW.
This coin will trump Monero (100%) because of that, plus since the network is supported by ASICS, the speeds will be faster.
But, again, this coin is no less, and no more anonymous than any other CryptoNote coin, Boolberry, Monero, Bytecoin.
Also ring signatures are not the same as stealth addresses, but they are VERY similar. It's like a stealth address collective, that the receiver signs with a one time key.
If you actually read my post about privacyServers, your will realize that ring signatures is just one possible means for anon tech. When zerocash comes out, it will be another. Also, you never know, I just might have my own method.
What happens if I am able to combine all of them?
So, please study my post on privacyServer and tell me how this is similar in ANY way to other cryptonotes. In ANY way??
James
Okay read.
So you push all the transactions through these centralized nodes; but its utilizing ring signatures, and possibly in the future other algorithms as well. It is a new concept I'll give you that, combining them that is, but it is a trusted system.
If you can figure a way to make the privacyServers trustless then this will be on par with the leading two anonymous coins. XCurrency, CloakCoin. They have trustless decentralized anon methods; they also have transactions speeds sub 5 minutes for fully washed funds.
I thought that was sort of the definition of decentralization. Nobody controls who is allowed to setup a privacyServer and anybody can download source, recompile and run one.
So, yes, you do have to trust ONE privacyServer and if you cant find a vendor you trust, then can you trust yourself? If you cant trust yourself, then I think you have some serious trust issues
James
Lol you seem like a cool dude. I guess the problem lies in the fact that you have to opt in to run a server, so potential attackers could set then up. Truly Trustless would mean that everyone and anyone is automatically a privacyServer.
The problem is that not all nodes have decent bandwidth and the performance will suffer
OK, so lets say we have these attackers. What is the attack vector? deanonimization using info about who you are sending messages to? For that an additional onion layer would suffice, wouldnt it? They would know the intermediary you send it to, but just pick random intermediaries so there is no useful information gleaned
I will need to think carefully about the private acct #s. Maybe there is a way to hide it from your privacyServer. If I can do that, then there really is nothing you are trusting the privacyServer with other than routing packets.
I think performance is worth the full extent of anonymous protocol. An onion layer would help as well, but if you can conceal the private keys, that'd be best.