Apples and oranges for this thread. He is speaking of double-spending attacks and the like rather than overall network security from outside DDoSing and whatever.
I'm not sure you understand. Knocking something offline doesn't actually accomplish anything. Well, it shouldn't...
Security, including double spending, is enforced by the network itself. Pools perform work ("hashing") to upkeep the network including verifying coins, coin transfers and generation.
If someone decided to take down the 4 largest pools (guaranteed to be over 50% of the network) then they could attempt to poison the chains for double spending and other fun stuff provided they could convince the leftover nodes their transactions were legitimate for some length of time.
If a majority of the network that is left over includes more private nodes than poison nodes.... the integrity can be maintained.
The security, both against double spending and other shennanigans as well as DDoS silliness, is built into the bitcoin network. For the umpteeth time - pools create synthetic weakness.
What would be even more interesting...... Let's say an attacker could either spoof or otherwise redirect requests from a pool operators client. Or perhaps manage to get that client to trust it as a node rather than the existing bitcoin network through the IRC mechanism. Or the attacker was able to modify a bitcoin.conf to point to their poison nodes. Not only could they contribute poison blocks but they could even just continuously send out unproductive (stale/corrupt) work. The pools would appear up and working at 100%, but they wouldn't be performing the current work for network enforcement (or generation, of course). Toss in a few poison nodes and double-spending would probably be achievable. Even better - miners will think the pools simply aren't productive thanks to their misunderstanding of complexity and abandon the whole thing.
Even more interesting would be if the attack could intercept work from the clients and claim it. Now there's no need to control the network for double spending - you've just made an attacker quite the rich individual and none of the pool's participants are the wiser until it's far too late.
Another factor is possibly crooked pool operators. On the other hand, there is no contractual agreement - so really, there's no way to be crooked, now is there? There are certainly no consequences. There's a peer-trust faith that drives these pools with no governing body. A pool operator could easily shut the whole payout operation down and walk away without any ramifications whatsoever. The outcome becomes everyone hates bitcoins because the overclocker crowd is so vocal about "hackers" stealing their money.
So yes, for the umpteenth+1 time, pools create synthetic weakness.
tl;dr Hack hack hack, give me an easy target, pools create several synthetic weaknesses.