You'll probably find they are not all kept live at once.... hence you have to track them down sequentially, hence you've got to find and kill 9 of them before the first one is replaced/restored..... dipshit.
Then you make sure your node is the one that replaces it (if you have 1 million coins of course)
The nice thing is you can use your "bad trust node" to reduce the hashing power needed to attack the network by reducing the effectiveness of the "good nodes". With a normal block chain network you can build a "bad chain" in private and only publish it once you have longer chain than the good chain. Since every hash has equal chance of finding the solution you can overcome the network with 51% of hashing power. Eventually the good network's luck will break and your bad chain will be longer and thus trusted by clients. This is the conventional "51% attack".
Now here is the super cool part. With solid coin the good network can't start another odd block until the prior even block is signed by a trusted node. When not attacked the even blocks are signed within seconds because they are always 1 difficulty.
One doesn't need to keep the good trusted nodes offline forever; they just need to be slowed down. If the average even block signing time goes from few seconds to say 60 seconds then that degrades the good network effective hashing power because they need the hash of the prior even block (which is now taking longer) in the header of the next odd block. In otherwords they have been handicapped 58 seconds in a race towards the next block.
If you have a "bad trusted node" you can sign your bad chain blocks in a few second and thus your bad network can start to work on the next odd block right away gaining a headstart on each block. Thus with a bad trusted node and rotating DDOS attack on other trusted nodes you could theoretically gain control of the block chain with <51% of network hashing power. How much less? Well that depends on how much you can delay/slow the good trusted node blocks (even blocks) in the long run.
Currently even blocks take on average 2 seconds and odd blocks on average 120 seconds to sign the block for a combined time of 122 seconds for each pair. If by attacking trusted nodes you slow down the average signing of even blocks by say 30 seconds then average total time for a pair of blocks is now 152 seconds. However the bad network signed their even block in 2 seconds giving them 150 seconds to sign the odds block vs 122 seconds for the "good" network. In that handicapped race the bad network will eventually have the longest chain with only 44% of network hashing power.
The longer the trusted nodes can be delayed (on average) the more the bad network can handicap the race. Since bad network can build chain in private you don't need to slow down each even block of the good chain just slow down the average even block signing time.
