There always is a server. Bitcoind has to be somewhere. If you have access to the server you have access to the keys. Period.*
It appear the attackers gained access to the server. Ergo they had access to the private keys.
* Well in theory maybe not with a HSM or TPM. But even then if the attacker has gained access to the wallet server your security model has already failed, it is just you could get lucky and avoid losing a lot of funds.
Hi Death and Taxes,
This is not quite true. if by HSM you mean Hardware Security Modules 8000 or a PayShield 9000 then both of these would have been fine. the tamper on those badboys is _really_ good. Most of the worlds interbanking transactions run on this kit... but I am not sure how they would handle bitcoin transactions... however for bitcoin we do not need one of those, one of these is a tenth of the price and will do everything that is needed. including purge the keys if they come under threat.
http://www.thales-esecurity.com/Products/Hardware%20Security%20Modules/nShield%20Edge.aspxI still do not understand why people do not shred/purge the seceret keys from the disk when the server alarms go off... restoring a key is much cheaper...
If anyone wants to talk about this further, please feel free to email me, my email is in my profile.
(sorry if someone said all this already, I havent finished reading the thread)
regards,
steve
I feel sad for those that lost money, it isnt their fault. What we need now is positive steps on how to avoid this in future.