Topic: [ESHOP launched] Trezor: Bitcoin hardware wallet - page 92. (Read 966173 times)
Just following up letting it be known that I received mine yesterday 12-15-14. I ordered it on 11/17/14 and it was shipped 11/18/14. I am east coast usa. Not too bad shipping wise. Less than a month from EU with no DHL shipping.
A simpler way by which a malicious fake hardware wallet could steal your coins:
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.9856659
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.9856659
I would hope that RFC6979 deterministic signatures would be the standard for hardware wallets (that's what Trezor uses). Anyway, I doubt this would be used as an attack vector, since it's not guaranteed that the attacker would be the one claiming the funds (see: white hat returning lost BC.i funds).
If I read that paper correctly, with that attack the attacker (the person who wrote the malicious tx-signing code) would be the only person able to recover the private key from the transaction signature (or even to notice that the signature is leaking the key). Thus, that attack it is more subtle than the BCI fiasco -- where everybody had a copy of the faulty RNG, and thus could reproduce the k values, identify the compromised addresses, and sweep them.
If you read the paper correctly would you like to place a numerical estimate on how likely this attack is ...e.g. 50%, 10%, 1%, 0.001%?
Thanks in advance for reducing the FUD spreading.
A simpler way by which a malicious fake hardware wallet could steal your coins:
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.9856659
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.9856659
I would hope that RFC6979 deterministic signatures would be the standard for hardware wallets (that's what Trezor uses). Anyway, I doubt this would be used as an attack vector, since it's not guaranteed that the attacker would be the one claiming the funds (see: white hat returning lost BC.i funds).
If I read that paper correctly, with that attack the attacker (the person who wrote the malicious tx-signing code) would be the only person able to recover the private key from the transaction signature (or even to notice that the signature is leaking the key). Thus, that attack it is more subtle than the BCI fiasco -- where everybody had a copy of the faulty RNG, and thus could reproduce the k values, identify the compromised addresses, and sweep them.
A simpler way by which a malicious fake hardware wallet could steal your coins:
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.9856659
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.9856659
I would hope that RFC6979 deterministic signatures would be the standard for hardware wallets (that's what Trezor uses). Anyway, I doubt this would be used as an attack vector, since it's not guaranteed that the attacker would be the one claiming the funds (see: white hat returning lost BC.i funds).
A simpler way by which a malicious fake hardware wallet could steal your coins:
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.9856659
https://bitcointalksearch.org/topic/m.9856659
Just a small offtopic post to warn people for the new Case hardware wallet:
They brand themselves as being the most secure hardware wallet, because they use multisig, but i wouldn't call it secure. Why?
Key A is stored in the devcie
Key B is stored in the company's cold storage
Key C is stored on the company's server encrypted with a UDEK (User Data Encryption key)
The UDEK is stored in the device as well. When you want to send a transaction, you sign it on the device with your fingerprint.
The device sends the partially signed transaction (with key A) along with the UDEK and your fingerprint details to the company server.
The server decrypts key C, signs and broadcasts the transaction.
If you loose your device, you need to answer security questions and the company will take key B from the cold storage.
They also have your UDEK in cold storage and they use that to decrypt Key C after you confirm your identity by using a temporarly device to scan your fingerprint.
The company will send your bitcoins to a new device or another wallet.
The problem with this scheme?
A company employee can take the UDEK + Key B from cold storage, decrypt key C and steal the bitcoins.
***
So for now, Trezor will still be my first choice and recommendation towards new bitcoin users
A proper way should be let the user themselves to store the Key B in their lockers. Then the users don't need to use the locked key B unless they lose the devices. Moreover, then the users don't need to worry about their coins stolen by the case Employees in any case. They brand themselves as being the most secure hardware wallet, because they use multisig, but i wouldn't call it secure. Why?
Key A is stored in the devcie
Key B is stored in the company's cold storage
Key C is stored on the company's server encrypted with a UDEK (User Data Encryption key)
The UDEK is stored in the device as well. When you want to send a transaction, you sign it on the device with your fingerprint.
The device sends the partially signed transaction (with key A) along with the UDEK and your fingerprint details to the company server.
The server decrypts key C, signs and broadcasts the transaction.
If you loose your device, you need to answer security questions and the company will take key B from the cold storage.
They also have your UDEK in cold storage and they use that to decrypt Key C after you confirm your identity by using a temporarly device to scan your fingerprint.
The company will send your bitcoins to a new device or another wallet.
The problem with this scheme?
A company employee can take the UDEK + Key B from cold storage, decrypt key C and steal the bitcoins.
***
So for now, Trezor will still be my first choice and recommendation towards new bitcoin users
So for now, Trezor will still be my first choice and recommendation towards new bitcoin users
I agree, I'd sacrifice the beauty of the Case for the Trezor's security.
I also would sacrifice the beauty of Melanie for the Trezor security.
Case also has/had a malware clone site
w w w (dot) c a s e - w a l l e t (dot) c o m
http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2p4sg6/case_wallet_the_worlds_most_secure_and_easytouse/
Which directed users to download a firmware driver for a chance to win a free case as a beta tester.
w w w (dot) c a s e - w a l l e t (dot) c o m
http://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2p4sg6/case_wallet_the_worlds_most_secure_and_easytouse/
Which directed users to download a firmware driver for a chance to win a free case as a beta tester.
So for now, Trezor will still be my first choice and recommendation towards new bitcoin users
I agree, I'd sacrifice the beauty of the Case for the Trezor's security.
Just a small offtopic post to warn people for the new Case hardware wallet:
They brand themselves as being the most secure hardware wallet, because they use multisig, but i wouldn't call it secure. Why?
Key A is stored in the devcie
Key B is stored in the company's cold storage
Key C is stored on the company's server encrypted with a UDEK (User Data Encryption key)
The UDEK is stored in the device as well. When you want to send a transaction, you sign it on the device with your fingerprint.
The device sends the partially signed transaction (with key A) along with the UDEK and your fingerprint details to the company server.
The server decrypts key C, signs and broadcasts the transaction.
If you loose your device, you need to answer security questions and the company will take key B from the cold storage.
They also have your UDEK in cold storage and they use that to decrypt Key C after you confirm your identity by using a temporarly device to scan your fingerprint.
The company will send your bitcoins to a new device or another wallet.
The problem with this scheme?
A company employee can take the UDEK + Key B from cold storage, decrypt key C and steal the bitcoins.
***
So for now, Trezor will still be my first choice and recommendation towards new bitcoin users
They brand themselves as being the most secure hardware wallet, because they use multisig, but i wouldn't call it secure. Why?
Key A is stored in the devcie
Key B is stored in the company's cold storage
Key C is stored on the company's server encrypted with a UDEK (User Data Encryption key)
The UDEK is stored in the device as well. When you want to send a transaction, you sign it on the device with your fingerprint.
The device sends the partially signed transaction (with key A) along with the UDEK and your fingerprint details to the company server.
The server decrypts key C, signs and broadcasts the transaction.
If you loose your device, you need to answer security questions and the company will take key B from the cold storage.
They also have your UDEK in cold storage and they use that to decrypt Key C after you confirm your identity by using a temporarly device to scan your fingerprint.
The company will send your bitcoins to a new device or another wallet.
The problem with this scheme?
A company employee can take the UDEK + Key B from cold storage, decrypt key C and steal the bitcoins.
***
So for now, Trezor will still be my first choice and recommendation towards new bitcoin users
Sheesh, open all the things, or stop selling your product as 'open source'
Trezor *is* opensource and you don't need Plugin for it (e.g. Electrum). Anyway, Bridge (replacement for Plugin) is already opensourced.
Are our BTCs in danger if the plugin is not open sourced? I am not too technical, but I guess that we could loose our BTCs (if the trezor team would decide to scam, not that they will but speaking hypothetically) only while singing transactions if the plugin was to be malicious (by changing addresses etc..). Since trezor signs transactions locally I see this as the only possible scenario, am I right?
Technically speaking, the issue of the closed plugin is similar to Bits of Proof backend, because they both hinder you from running your own mytrezor instance.
However, it seems they are working hard to fix them now, but this requires sometime.
Sheesh, open all the things, or stop selling your product as 'open source'
Trezor *is* opensource and you don't need Plugin for it (e.g. Electrum). Anyway, Bridge (replacement for Plugin) is already opensourced.
Are our BTCs in danger if the plugin is not open sourced? I am not too technical, but I guess that we could loose our BTCs (if the trezor team would decide to scam, not that they will but speaking hypothetically) only while singing transactions if the plugin was to be malicious (by changing addresses etc..). Since trezor signs transactions locally I see this as the only possible scenario, am I right?
@SLUSH: Well done! Really good job!
The securest hardware wallet that I have seen.
I will buy one in few days! Keep going!
The securest hardware wallet that I have seen.
I will buy one in few days! Keep going!
Everyone should be aware that these devices apparently can take up to 2 months to get via mail. They are sent from Czech republic via standard mail
and apparently get caught up in customs for up to 5 weeks....and THEN are mailed to your address by USPS, which can take up to 21 days for delivery (WTF). Even if your product is amazing Slush et al, you seriously need to find a trusted american reseller or start using DHL/UPS. I most definitely would have paid extra for the shipping. I planned on using my trezor 2 weeks ago, now I'm stuck without mine for who knows how long....
I am from Czech Republic, so delivery by Czech post is about 36 hours.
Sheesh, open all the things, or stop selling your product as 'open source'
Trezor *is* opensource and you don't need Plugin for it (e.g. Electrum). Anyway, Bridge (replacement for Plugin) is already opensourced.
Trezor Plugin is closed
Sheesh, open all the things, or stop selling your product as 'open source'
I just hope I will be able to demonstrate the trezor without issues tomorrow :/
Me too :-).
mytrezor.com is down again...
Yeah, it was down for few minutes; current backend is driving me nuts. It's failing more and more often and I'll celebrate when I'll "rm -rf" it! We implemented heavy automatic checks and watchdog, so at least it can recover itself after few minutes of downtime.
In meantime we're working hard on replacing current backend by opensource Insight block explorer, but it requires significant refactoring of network API in myTREZOR.
yeah, I know you are working hard on this.
I just hope I will be able to demonstrate the trezor without issues tomorrow :/
Hmm I guess I missed that option at checkout, has it always been there? $40 for shipping such a small package also seems quite pricey, is UPS any cheaper?
DHL shipping in current form has been added like two weeks ago. Well, it's $35, but I agree it's rather high price. We're negotiating better deal, but I cannot promise anything right now.
Oh I see. yeah I placed my order on November 19th (almost a month ago) so the DHL option must have not been there.
/patiently awaiting my trezor.
mytrezor.com is down again...
Yeah, it was down for few minutes; current backend is driving me nuts. It's failing more and more often and I'll celebrate when I'll "rm -rf" it! We implemented heavy automatic checks and watchdog, so at least it can recover itself after few minutes of downtime.
In meantime we're working hard on replacing current backend by opensource Insight block explorer, but it requires significant refactoring of network API in myTREZOR.
Hmm I guess I missed that option at checkout, has it always been there? $40 for shipping such a small package also seems quite pricey, is UPS any cheaper?
DHL shipping in current form has been added like two weeks ago. Well, it's $35, but I agree it's rather high price. We're negotiating better deal, but I cannot promise anything right now.
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