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Topic: Gold collapsing. Bitcoin UP. - page 221. (Read 2032248 times)

legendary
Activity: 1764
Merit: 1002
June 17, 2015, 07:05:47 PM
Oleganza arguing with me that Bitcoin has already achieved gold status and can do so w/o more scaling.  c'mon, i don't even argue that.  i say it is in the process of doing so:

https://twitter.com/oleganza/status/611298778667220992
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1007
June 17, 2015, 06:42:02 PM
Speaking of O(n2) scaling:



I took some creative liberties  Grin
legendary
Activity: 4690
Merit: 1276
June 17, 2015, 06:16:53 PM
...
In short he is either knowingly acting as a gatekeeper, senile, or just not that smart. I would bet on the first conclusion.

I'll agree with your bet.  Classic controlled opposition.  

No, I think both of you conspiracy theorists are smarter than Chomsky. Chomsky is a slave of the establishment and both of you conspiracy theorists are free hero members of the society.
If you brake your leg or your neck, you should consult a quack instead of a university trained doctor of the establishment.

Some 'trained' doctor told my mom not very long ago that she should take some medication for cholesterol.  When she asked about the reports of liver damage, the guy said "Oh, we can do liver transplants now."

From my research into vaccines I am sure that 90% of 'trained' doctors have very little knowledge of how the various parts of our immune systems interact and how the ecology of diseases themselves actually work.  They are trained to 'know' what the pharmaceutical industry wants them to know and nothing more though some of them will, thankfully, not stop there.

So, no, I won't go to a quack.  I'll evaluate the situation myself and decide who is most appropriate to help me out then I'll evaluate what they tell me and double-check that it is not self-serving bullshit.  I am sure that almost no medical doctors are deliberately evil.  Just that they are humans like everyone else.  You probably have to be in the upper 10% in terms of native intelligence to obtain a doctorate (medical or otherwise) but that is certainly not sufficient to be immune against intellectual laziness and various socio-economic pressures.

legendary
Activity: 1764
Merit: 1002
June 17, 2015, 05:59:02 PM
BTW, does anyone know what the status of IBLT is? This one change (which doesn't require a fork) would do a lot for the network.

Gavin has been seriously distracted from this  Angry, just as the SC guys have been seriously distracted from their own work, by their blowback on the 1MB.

Yeah, you may well be right about SC/LN timing, I am still trying to give them the benefit of the doubt, FWIW (at least until Wladimir breaks ranks).





From the recent language I've read from Wlad, this doesn't sound too likely.
legendary
Activity: 1764
Merit: 1002
June 17, 2015, 05:57:18 PM
Probably the biggest reason that Core Dev is prepared to let the 1MB limit be constantly hit is that they think they can manage the situation. Perhaps they need to look up the word "hubris" in the dictionary.

I think they want to make sure a hard fork is already needed around the same time they are ready to launch Blockstream's LN and SC changes. This would make it easier to push the changes through. i.e. "OK, transactions recently hit the 8MB limit and we need to increase the limit today, here are some additional updates to include in the fork".

If there is no pressing need for another hard fork (because the blocksize issue was already dealt with), then the entire discussion is focused on if people want to make a drastic change, and there is no rush to do so. Combining the two might accelerate the process.

For a VC backed firm, that has limited time to demonstrate adoption or revenue, running into a wall where it takes 2 years just to convince the Bitcoin ecosystem to change for you, can be a killer.

They forget that people will remember this incident and that there will be pay back time when they want to change the protocol for their own reasons. Not too smart.
legendary
Activity: 1764
Merit: 1002
June 17, 2015, 05:54:25 PM
this should work. nice and simple and pleases Chinese miners w/o giving miners in general any votes:

https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39ziy6/eli5_what_will_happen_if_there_is_a_hard_fork/cs7xe9o



If 75% of hashing power is producing up-version blocks

AND after some brave miner decides to actually produce a >1MB block.

8MB max block size (chinese miners were unhappy with 20 for not-entirely-clear reasons)
Earliest fork date 11 Jan 2016 (miners and others want sooner rather than later)
Activation when 750 of last 1,000 blocks are up-version (version 0x20000004 to be compatible with sipa's new versioning bits scheme)
2 week 'grace period' after 75% threshold reached before first >1MB block allowed to be mined
8MB cap doubles every two years (so 16MB in 2018, etc: unless there is a soft fork before then because 16MB is too much)

Not sure why limiting the date is necessary. I feel like we should be able to pull this off sooner, especially if we are backed into a corner by some kind of big rally.

i agree but miners need time to switch over and indicate so with the versioning.

Sure. But doesn't the 2 week grace period after 75% imply enough time?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nuHfVn_cfHU

Gavin's solution is very good, and the 2-week grace period a smart move. The reason for this is that it gets the most people on-board with the >1MB change in a controlled manner. It is axiomatic that 100% of miners cannot be in the first 75% to upgrade even if they all wanted to. The 2-week period focuses minds on a known deadline and will likely see a "hockey-stick" uptick in the adoption curve. I would expect 85-90% mining power behind the change before the first >1MB block is mined. If 90% was the original target then Bitcoin's ecosystem growth, supported by the majority, could be stymied by a mere 11% of hold-out miners. The grace period also allows for non-mining nodes to upgrade who are not paying close attention to the whole process.

I like Jeff's BIP 100 with the miner voting, but not sure about the 90% he mentions because of the concern above.
Also, I really don't like a fixed date for everyone to upgrade (although this is far better than no change planned at all). Not using block versioning to change the 1MB means applying a sub-standard software solution for politically correct reasons, i.e. just so people can say "Aha, the users control Bitcoin and are telling the miners what to do." We already know the user consensus on a dozen btc and reddit polls, ecosystem business feedback, and now at least 50% of mining power opinion. So the change should be done as safely as possible. Gavin is perusing this path.

Probably the biggest reason that Core Dev is prepared to let the 1MB limit be constantly hit is that they think they can manage the situation. Perhaps they need to look up the word "hubris" in the dictionary.

A big bazooka in Core Dev's (fairly small) armory needed to "manage" a blocks-limit-full situation is prior roll-out of a change to purge unconfirmed tx from node mempools. This would in theory blunt some of the nasty effects in Mike's Crash Landing scenario.

So, no surprise that a pull request exists to do this:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6281

Quote
Restrict the maximum memory pool size to avoid potential DoS issues.
The mechanism is simply to recursively remove the transactions which have the lowest priority until the memory pool is below the maximum size.

(my emphasis)
Hmm, DoS issues like ordinary users legitimately trying to use Bitcoin after tx are backing up when free block-space has vanished?

However, what appears to be a bed of roses rapidly turns into a bed of thorns...

Quote
@sipa ah so if a wallet transaction is evicted from the mempool the conflict tracking stuff will all break? that's nasty
the rabbit's hole of things to fix gets ever deeper

Their bazooka has a barrel bent into a U-shape.

Another big concern about mempool limiting is the implications for IBLT, which is Bitcoin's best hope for challenging the likes of Visa and MC in the medium, not long-term.
Randomly ejecting unconfirmed tx, or allowing a user-configurable max-mempool-size, creates non-uniform mempools. This seriously degrades the potential for IBLT, especially when miners want to clear most of the unconfirmed tx, to maximize revenue when the block reward is lower.

The is no mempool limit right?
legendary
Activity: 1153
Merit: 1000
June 17, 2015, 05:05:07 PM
Yeah, you may well be right about SC/LN timing, I am still trying to give them the benefit of the doubt, FWIW (at least until Wladimir breaks ranks).

That is why I think a permanent solution to the blocksize limit today is better than a limit increase that leaves the issue to be addressed later. Even with the 20MB change, we will have to implement another hard fork in 3-5 years. It is better to take care of the issue once and for all, and have future hard fork decisions be limited to a single proposed change.

The voting proposal is one form of a permanent solution, Gavin's doubling every 2 years is another, creating a floating limit that resets every x blocks to the average of recent blocks plus overhead is a third. Any of these three work fine and have their own pros and cons.
legendary
Activity: 1078
Merit: 1006
100 satoshis -> ISO code
June 17, 2015, 04:42:00 PM
BTW, does anyone know what the status of IBLT is? This one change (which doesn't require a fork) would do a lot for the network.

Gavin has been seriously distracted from this  Angry, just as the SC guys have been seriously distracted from their own work, by their blowback on the 1MB.

Yeah, you may well be right about SC/LN timing, I am still trying to give them the benefit of the doubt, FWIW (at least until Wladimir breaks ranks).



legendary
Activity: 1153
Merit: 1000
June 17, 2015, 04:32:19 PM
In general, we should not be afraid of cartels
That's only true in the sense that cartels are naturally unstable unless and until they get support from governments in the form of externalizing the cost of enforcement.

I'm not sure cartels is really the right analogy here.

A cartel in the traditional sense is a small number of large entities banding together to force everyone to follow their decisions.

But in Bitcoin, any miner not in the cartel could choose to issue larger blocks and capture the fees. That is how Bitcoin's open nature works. The only way a cartel could succeed here is if 51% of the hash rate pooled together and agreed to build a longest chain ignoring large blocks. But I would call this at 51% attack, not a cartel.

there is no reason to be part of the 51% cartel in this eg. one of the miners will stop cooperating because it leaves money on the table and whoever breaks rank can profit by pretending to support it and earn more fees by processing bigger blocks giving the 51% advantage to the network.

Exactly, it is why the argument that a cartel might form to limit the blocksize and ignore the protocol limit, is unlikely to succeed.

BTW, does anyone know what the status of IBLT is? This one change (which doesn't require a fork) would do a lot for the network.
legendary
Activity: 1153
Merit: 1000
June 17, 2015, 04:29:05 PM
Probably the biggest reason that Core Dev is prepared to let the 1MB limit be constantly hit is that they think they can manage the situation. Perhaps they need to look up the word "hubris" in the dictionary.

I think they want to make sure a hard fork is already needed around the same time they are ready to launch Blockstream's LN and SC changes. This would make it easier to push the changes through. i.e. "OK, transactions recently hit the 8MB limit and we need to increase the limit today, here are some additional updates to include in the fork".

If there is no pressing need for another hard fork (because the blocksize issue was already dealt with), then the entire discussion is focused on if people want to make a drastic change, and there is no rush to do so. Combining the two might accelerate the process.

For a VC backed firm, that has limited time to demonstrate adoption or revenue, running into a wall where it takes 2 years just to convince the Bitcoin ecosystem to change for you, can be a killer.
legendary
Activity: 1372
Merit: 1000
June 17, 2015, 04:28:29 PM
In general, we should not be afraid of cartels
That's only true in the sense that cartels are naturally unstable unless and until they get support from governments in the form of externalizing the cost of enforcement.

I'm not sure cartels is really the right analogy here.

A cartel in the traditional sense is a small number of large entities banding together to force everyone to follow their decisions.

But in Bitcoin, any miner not in the cartel could choose to issue larger blocks and capture the fees. That is how Bitcoin's open nature works. The only way a cartel could succeed here is if 51% of the hash rate pooled together and agreed to build a longest chain ignoring large blocks. But I would call this at 51% attack, not a cartel.

there is no reason to be part of the 51% cartel in this eg. one of the miners will stop cooperating because it leaves money on the table and whoever breaks rank can profit by pretending to support it and earn more fees by processing bigger blocks giving the 51% advantage to the network.
legendary
Activity: 1078
Merit: 1006
100 satoshis -> ISO code
June 17, 2015, 04:18:19 PM
this should work. nice and simple and pleases Chinese miners w/o giving miners in general any votes:

https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/39ziy6/eli5_what_will_happen_if_there_is_a_hard_fork/cs7xe9o



If 75% of hashing power is producing up-version blocks

AND after some brave miner decides to actually produce a >1MB block.

8MB max block size (chinese miners were unhappy with 20 for not-entirely-clear reasons)
Earliest fork date 11 Jan 2016 (miners and others want sooner rather than later)
Activation when 750 of last 1,000 blocks are up-version (version 0x20000004 to be compatible with sipa's new versioning bits scheme)
2 week 'grace period' after 75% threshold reached before first >1MB block allowed to be mined
8MB cap doubles every two years (so 16MB in 2018, etc: unless there is a soft fork before then because 16MB is too much)

Not sure why limiting the date is necessary. I feel like we should be able to pull this off sooner, especially if we are backed into a corner by some kind of big rally.

i agree but miners need time to switch over and indicate so with the versioning.

Sure. But doesn't the 2 week grace period after 75% imply enough time?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nuHfVn_cfHU

Gavin's solution is very good, and the 2-week grace period a smart move. The reason for this is that it gets the most people on-board with the >1MB change in a controlled manner. It is axiomatic that 100% of miners cannot be in the first 75% to upgrade even if they all wanted to. The 2-week period focuses minds on a known deadline and will likely see a "hockey-stick" uptick in the adoption curve. I would expect 85-90% mining power behind the change before the first >1MB block is mined. If 90% was the original target then Bitcoin's ecosystem growth, supported by the majority, could be stymied by a mere 11% of hold-out miners. The grace period also allows for non-mining nodes to upgrade who are not paying close attention to the whole process.

I like Jeff's BIP 100 with the miner voting, but not sure about the 90% he mentions because of the concern above.
Also, I really don't like a fixed date for everyone to upgrade (although this is far better than no change planned at all). Not using block versioning to change the 1MB means applying a sub-standard software solution for politically correct reasons, i.e. just so people can say "Aha, the users control Bitcoin and are telling the miners what to do." We already know the user consensus on a dozen btc and reddit polls, ecosystem business feedback, and now at least 50% of mining power opinion. So the change should be done as safely as possible. Gavin is perusing this path.

Probably the biggest reason that Core Dev is prepared to let the 1MB limit be constantly hit is that they think they can manage the situation. Perhaps they need to look up the word "hubris" in the dictionary.

A big bazooka in Core Dev's (fairly small) armory needed to "manage" a blocks-limit-full situation is prior roll-out of a change to purge unconfirmed tx from node mempools. This would in theory blunt some of the nasty effects in Mike's Crash Landing scenario.

So, no surprise that a pull request exists to do this:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/6281

Quote
Restrict the maximum memory pool size to avoid potential DoS issues.
The mechanism is simply to recursively remove the transactions which have the lowest priority until the memory pool is below the maximum size.

(my emphasis)
Hmm, DoS issues like ordinary users legitimately trying to use Bitcoin after tx are backing up when free block-space has vanished?

However, what appears to be a bed of roses rapidly turns into a bed of thorns...

Quote
@sipa ah so if a wallet transaction is evicted from the mempool the conflict tracking stuff will all break? that's nasty
the rabbit's hole of things to fix gets ever deeper

Their bazooka has a barrel bent into a U-shape.

Another big concern about mempool limiting is the implications for IBLT, which is Bitcoin's best hope for challenging the likes of Visa and MC in the medium, not long-term.
Randomly ejecting unconfirmed tx, or allowing a user-configurable max-mempool-size, creates non-uniform mempools. This seriously degrades the potential for IBLT, especially when miners want to clear most of the unconfirmed tx, to maximize revenue when the block reward is lower.
full member
Activity: 280
Merit: 100
June 17, 2015, 04:13:23 PM
JGarzik's proposal:
http://gtf.org/garzik/bitcoin/BIP100-blocksizechangeproposal.pdf
Wherein the central authority of developers to set block size is passed to the miners who vote (with the highs and lows dropped).

This seems to solve the issue of figuring out the right size a bit better than one person picking an arbitrary number.

It also moves the ball forward in automating the governance of the protocol.

There are a couple of things to like about this proposal.

The first is that miners voting on blocksize plus IBLT effectively guarantees the blocksize limit will be removed and the bitcoin MC will be allowed to scale as required. The reasoning is simple, IBLT only works if the majority of unconfirmed transactions are included in the next block. If transaction volume bumps against a blocksize limit, then a only a subset of transactions can be included in a block and the miner cannot transmit their block using IBLT and instead has to re-transmit the entire block, increasing the risk of being orphaned.

For example let's say that because of the blocksize limit, only 50% of unconfirmed transactions can be included in the block. Miners on the receiving end do not know which 50% of transactions are in the block and which 50% are not. This means they cannot use IBLT and have to transmit the entire block. However it is in miners' interest to use IBLT to reduce their orphan rate and because it enables them to easily include as many transactions as possible for fees.

Because of this it makes sense with IBLT that miners would favor keeping the blocksize limit high enough that it does act as a real limit, but rather constantly rises as needed to match user volume. It is essentially another way to get to Gavin's original proposal of doubling the limit every 2 years.

The second thing to like is it moves us toward the environment where miners themselves are voting on what bitcoin is. Not developers, not regulators, not users, not full nodes (which are subject to Sybil attacks), but miners who spend real work to vote.

It also will force pools to publicly announce their voting preferences, which in turns allows individual miners to see their preferences and decide which pool to switch to to match their own view. For example if most individual miners want to support larger blocks, but the larger chinese pools vote for 1MB limits, well we might just see miners switching to pools that match their views or that have the capability to grow properly. It brings back the true market, which this dev fight shows we don't have right now.

Personally I like this proposal the best right now.

the only problem with voting is that it seems to me that that could be gamed in some way. also, miners aren't forced to follow the results of a vote.  maybe better to leave voting out all together?  just set an automatic adjustment increase and let the market players adapt around it.

I originally thought of Garzik's voting proposal that it was brilliant. But now I think adding this would be unnecessarily complex.

If there is a need to hold back blocsize, it should be a hard increase based on previous blocks in the style of difficulty change. We can then continue the situation where the only link to the real world is the timestamps.

The miners could agree on a soft limit (dont make larger blocks, but build on larger blocks from others). The soft limit could be communicated in a side channel outside bitcoin. Call it a miner cartel, but before you dismiss it, know that a cartel is a very weak economic construct, with possible attacks from inside and outside. Don't forget that each miner is free to choose which block to base his mining on, he chooses that based on self interest.

So dynamically incremented hard limit for security, market based soft limit.


giving miners a vote in terms of block size is paying them too much deference in terms of the market dynamics in Bitcoin. i've always said that no contingent is more powerful than another in Bitcoin.  everyone is important and needed and has power to a degree or so; users, merchants, miners, node operators.  which is why i always give that bucket analogy when i think in terms of which of those subspaces i would want to invest in.  some will always be more developed (filled) or over invested in than the others while the whole space can still be in a bull mkt w/o anyone of them being "in charge".  

I agree with this, what I was trying to get at is the outcome of this proposal (miner voting +IBLT) essentially forces or at least encourages maximum blocksize over time. This is in the interest of users and why I like the proposal.

 I enjoyed your dialog so much
legendary
Activity: 1512
Merit: 1005
June 17, 2015, 03:41:44 PM
In general, we should not be afraid of cartels
That's only true in the sense that cartels are naturally unstable unless and until they get support from governments in the form of externalizing the cost of enforcement.

I'm not sure cartels is really the right analogy here.

A cartel in the traditional sense is a small number of large entities banding together to force everyone to follow their decisions.

But in Bitcoin, any miner not in the cartel could choose to issue larger blocks and capture the fees. That is how Bitcoin's open nature works. The only way a cartel could succeed here is if 51% of the hash rate pooled together and agreed to build a longest chain ignoring large blocks. But I would call this at 51% attack, not a cartel.

To me it is the same, and, correct me if I am wrong, this is according to protocol. I guess the nodes also have a saying, but who could oppose such a decision?
legendary
Activity: 1162
Merit: 1004
June 17, 2015, 03:34:58 PM
Chomsky's confrontation with a truther idiot:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3i9ra-i6Knc

I watched it.

His arguments are:

1) If you don't do science through the establishment, then you are not doing science.

2) Only people trained in universities can be trusted to do peer review.

3) Bush was running the government (and not the DEEP STATE) and Bush's only objective was not "you are either for us or you are against us". He entirely sidesteps the point of 9/11 was to foist  "you are either for us or you are against us" on the entire world. And he substitutes a strawman, Hegelian dialectic for logic. He sidesteps the concept that the DEEP STATE plays many different elements against each other in order to retain control.

In short he is either knowingly acting as a gatekeeper, senile, or just not that smart. I would bet on the first conclusion.

I'll agree with your bet.  Classic controlled opposition.  

No, I think both of you conspiracy theorists are smarter than Chomsky. Chomsky is a slave of the establishment and both of you conspiracy theorists are free hero members of the society.
If you brake your leg or your neck, you should consult a quack instead of a university trained doctor of the establishment.
legendary
Activity: 1512
Merit: 1005
June 17, 2015, 03:30:24 PM
In general, we should not be afraid of cartels
That's only true in the sense that cartels are naturally unstable unless and until they get support from governments in the form of externalizing the cost of enforcement.

EDIT: I was a bit quick to respond. Yes, If the cartel can collude with the government, they are set for a real monopoly. It is not only the cost, but that they can keep internal and external attackers in check by the force of law, (less kindly expressed as violence in contempt of human  rights).


Cartels are unstable. There is a ton of literature on the subject.

Just think about the internal pressure. A subset of the members can collude to fool the othes. A subset can collude with someone external. If the cartel does something stupid, outside forces will be quick to attack. For instance, if the cartel reduces production to hike prices, they will be bled from externals that have the higher market price, but not the volume constraints. If a cartel divide markets, the attacker will have only one competitor. The list goes on.

For bitcoin mining, there sure is a cartel if there is an economic point to it (large equipment orders for instance). But a shadow cartel with a subgroup from the first cartel and some others could easily appear.
legendary
Activity: 1153
Merit: 1000
June 17, 2015, 03:28:20 PM
In general, we should not be afraid of cartels
That's only true in the sense that cartels are naturally unstable unless and until they get support from governments in the form of externalizing the cost of enforcement.

I'm not sure cartels is really the right analogy here.

A cartel in the traditional sense is a small number of large entities banding together to force everyone to follow their decisions.

But in Bitcoin, any miner not in the cartel could choose to issue larger blocks and capture the fees. That is how Bitcoin's open nature works. The only way a cartel could succeed here is if 51% of the hash rate pooled together and agreed to build a longest chain ignoring large blocks. But I would call this at 51% attack, not a cartel.
legendary
Activity: 1764
Merit: 1002
June 17, 2015, 03:27:39 PM
giving miners a vote in terms of block size is paying them too much deference in terms of the market dynamics in Bitcoin. i've always said that no contingent is more powerful than another in Bitcoin.  everyone is important and needed and has power to a degree or so; users, merchants, miners, node operators.  which is why i always give that bucket analogy when i think in terms of which of those subspaces i would want to invest in.  some will always be more developed (filled) or over invested in than the others while the whole space can still be in a bull mkt w/o anyone of them being "in charge".  

I agree with this, what I was trying to get at is the outcome of this proposal (miner voting +IBLT) essentially forces or at least encourages maximum blocksize over time. This is in the interest of users and why I like the proposal.

i get what you are saying but it assumes 2 things:

1.  voting is good
2.  IBLT is ready

i worry that voting can be gamed.  you could argue that versioning is a form of voting i guess but it is different in that it is a commitment that only has to be done once by a miner to indicate the preference to double the block size acc to Gavin's proposal.  all that then needs to be done is to flip the switch after 75% of the mining network is demonstrating the upversioned blocks.

i have hopes for IBLT as well but that seems like that will take a while and certainly not in time for what we need now.

Voting can best be gamed when the process is hidden behind closed side channels between pools, developers or anything else. The advantage of putting voting into the blockchain is it makes the process transparent and visible to individual miners, which makes it much less exposed to gaming as individual miners can see this and respond.

The POW process is Bitcoin's voting process. Yes users, merchants, etc. should have influence, and they do, they can choose to run which ever client they want that follows whatever rules they want. But that is the external world interacting with Bitcoin and deciding how they want to interact with Bitcoin.

Bitcoin as a self-contained system has only one voting mechanism, POW blocks. If anyone wants to vote within Bitcoin's self contained world, stand-up a miner and point it to the pool that best follows your preferences. In many ways this is better than representative democracy, you are much more likely to find a pool you agree with than a US D or R candidate you agree with.

so then how do you deal with the IBLT issue given that we need a solution now?
legendary
Activity: 1400
Merit: 1013
June 17, 2015, 03:19:04 PM
In general, we should not be afraid of cartels
That's only true in the sense that cartels are naturally unstable unless and until they get support from governments in the form of externalizing the cost of enforcement.
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