Since the public key of your address is only revealed if you either chose to reveal it, sign a message from that address, or make a transaction from that address, then if you do none of these things, your bitcoin remain safe against quantum computing for decades more. What that means in practice is to simply to avoid address reuse. Do this and by the time quantum computing is a concern for you, we will have long ago moved to quantum resistant algorithms.
This is certainly true for us as individuals right now... but there is a large quantity of bitcoin in reused addresses, and there are plenty of coins that are effectively lost. When bitcoin forks to deal with the quantum threat, all coins will need to be moved to new, quantum-safe addresses. Those that aren't moved or can't be moved can then be stolen by a QC running Shor. Admittedly we don't have QCs capable of this right now, but the field is advancing rapidly, and because of superposition and entanglement QC processing power scales 2^n, so if you go from say 9 qubits to 10, the capability doubles... which is quite counterintuitive from a classical perspective. I'm not trying to be alarmist, and there are certainly engineering challenges to overcome with larger QCs, particularly in maintaining coherence, but the time will come when we're forced into a choice of whether to burn any coins that aren't moved by a given date, or else leave them to be stolen. Neither option is great, and I assume both would be hugely contentious. Achieving a consensus on this would I'd imagine be quite a challenge.
As a side note, ignore DWave and similar. These are annealers rather than universal gate QCs; they have a specific use case, and won't be running Shor's alogrithm. DWave is not a threat to bitcoin.